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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the effects of the South African War on the rural 
community of Heidelberg in the Southern Cape. It investigates the complexities of 
wartime allegiance among Cape Afrikaners that arose as a result of a century of 
British influence. Intermarriage, cultural cross-pollination, and shared frontier 
experience combined to create a hybrid Cape Colonial culture characterised by 
complex allegiances, composite identities, and culturally constructed structures of 
power. This study explores the local history of Heidelberg and the surrounding region 
within the context of the historical development of the Cape Colony, and 
demonstrates the formation of a localised hybrid cultural identity and hierarchical 
power structures built on the vestiges of the old Dutch system of legal distinctions, 
which had been transmuted by British rule. As many of the colonial inhabitants had 
familial ties and sympathies to the Boer Republics, the pressures of the war 
challenged the complexity that characterised Cape Colonial identity and allegiance. 
Despite deep connections to those living in the Boer Republics, their status as British 
citizens made them liable to treason charges which prevented any action of support 
towards the republican cause.  
Although most disapproved of the war and the way in which it was conducted, 
very few renounced their citizenship to take up arms against the British Empire. Cape 
Afrikaners had a vested interest in the Cape Colony, and had grown accustomed to the 
civil liberties and access to Imperial markets which sustained their livelihoods. This 
study investigates the people of Heidelberg’s loyalty to British citizenship and 
sympathy with the republics by exploring their connections to the republics, incidents 
of loyalty or sympathy, as well as identifying possible motivations behind such 
displays. Martial law was the primary point of contention during the war and became 
the vehicle of change in Cape Colonial society, having both ideological and material 
effects on the population.  
This thesis details how the application of martial law impacted the community 
of Heidelberg both from outside and within. Externally, this was through the 
introduction of seemingly foreign ideas on Imperial hegemony and British citizenship 
which created great animosity between the military and local government. Internally, 
it was through the challenges to existing hierarchies and civil liberties by the new 
institutions and practices created for the express purpose of enforcing martial law and 
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safeguarding the Colony from invasion. This work also highlights how the spectacle 
of battle and destructiveness of republican invasion shaped the attitudes and 
inclinations of Cape Afrikaners by exploring the skirmish at Heidelberg as well as its 
aftermath. Martial law and the battle in town created a climate of civil war and 
paranoia within the community. This thesis concludes with an examination into how 
community divisions resulting from the war were addressed by reporting on incidents 
of reconciliation and retribution in the post-war period, as well as in identifying long 
term changes in the community. It highlights how the South African War became a 
critical juncture in formation of ethnic identity among Cape Afrikaners, and how the 
war in the Cape Colony contributed to the evolution of Afrikaner Nationalism. 
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OPSOMMING: 
 
Hierdie verhandeling ondersoek die impak van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die 
landelike gemeenskap van Heidelberg in die Suid-Kaap. Dit ondersoek die 
kompleksiteite in die lojaliteit van Kaapse Afrikaners wat ontstaan het weens ‘n eeu 
van Britse invloed. Ondertrouery, kulturele-vermenging, en gemeenskaplike grens-
ervarings het gely tot die ontstaan van ‘n gemengde of hibriede Kaapse koloniale 
kultuur, gekenmerk deur verdeelde lojaliteite, saamgevoegde identiteite, en 
kulturgeskoeide magstrukture. Hierdie studie is ‘n verkenning van die plaaslike 
geskiedenis van Heidelberg en die omliggende area binne die konteks van die 
historiese ontwikkeling van die Kaap Kolonie, en demonstreer die vorming van ‘n 
plaaslike, hibriede kulturele identiteit en hiërargiese magstrukture geskoei op die 
oorblyfsels van die voormalige Hollandse stelsel van wetlike onderskeidings, 
aangepas onder Britse heerskappy. Aangesien menigde van die koloniale inwoners 
familiebande en simpatie met die Boererepublieke gehad het, was die oorlog ‘n 
uitdaging vir die kompleksiteit wat Kaapse koloniale identiteit en lojaliteit gekenmerk 
het. Ten spyte van noue bande met die Boererepublieke, het hulle status as Britse 
onderdane hulle aanspreeklik gemaak tot die aanklag van hoogverraad en daarvan 
weerhou om enige bystand aan die republikeinse stryd te verleen. 
Alhoewel meeste van hulle die oorlog, en die manier waarop dit gevoer is, 
afgekeur het, het weinig hulle burgerskap verwerp en die wapen opgeneem teen die 
Britse Ryk. Kaapse Afrikaners het ‘n gevestigde belang gehad in die Kaap Kolonie, 
en het gewoond geraak aan die burgerlike vryhede en toegang tot Imperiale markte 
wat hulle lewensbestaan onderhou het. Hierdie werkstuk ondersoek beide die 
inwoners van Heidelberg se lojaliteit aan hulle Britse burgerskap en hulle simpatie 
met die Boererepublieke, deur ‘n verkenning van hulle verbintenisse met die 
republieke, stawing van insidente van lojaliteit en simpatie, asook die identifisering 
van die motiverings agter hierdie verskynsels. Die Krygswet was die primêre twispunt 
gedurende die oorlog, asook die middel tot verandering binne die Kaapse koloniale 
samelewing, en het ‘n ideologiese sowel as ‘n materialistiese impak op die populasie 
gehad. 
Hierdie tesis illustreer hoe die toepassing van die Krygswet die gemeenskap 
van Heidelberg van buite en binne beïnvloed het. Van buite, het die instelling van 
uitheemse idees aangaande Imperiale hegemonie en Britse burgerskap groot 
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vyandigheid tussen die Britse weermag en die plaaslike owerhede veroorsaak. Van 
binne, was die new instellings en praktyke wat geskep is om die Krygswet toe te pas 
en die Kaap te beskerm teen inval, beskou as ‘n uitdaging van burgerlike vryhede en 
bestaande hiërargieë. Hierdie werk wys ook hoe die skouspel van geweld en 
vernietiging van republikeinse invalle die houding en neigings van Kaapse Afrikaners 
gevorm het deur die skermutseling by Heidelberg en die nadraai daarvan te verken. 
Krygswet en die skermutseling in die dorp het ‘n klimaat van burgeroorlog en 
paranoia binne die gemeenskap laat posvat. Hierdie tesis sluit dan met ‘n ondersoek 
wat illustreer hoe verdeeldheid binne die gemeenskap aangespreek is, deur te kyk na 
insidente van versoening en vergelding tydens die naoorlogse tydperk, asook die 
identifisering van langtermyn veranderinge in die gemeenskap. Hierdie werk 
onderstreep hoe die Anglo-Boereoorlog ‘n kritiese stadium in die vorming van etniese 
identiteit onder Kaapse Afrikaners was, en hoe die oorlog in die Kaap Kolonie 
bygedra het tot die evolusie van Afrikaner Nasionalisme. 
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"Ik ben een Afrikaander - al slaat de landdrost mij dood, of al zetten hij mij in de 
tronk, ik zal, nog wil niet zwijgen!" 
 
Hendrik Biebouw, 1707. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The High Commissioner is of opinion that there will be more trouble in the Cape 
Colony after the war, than in any other part of South Africa, and the information we 
glean from various sources has led us to the same conclusion.” 
 
The General Manager, Standard Bank, 1902. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Well, gentlemen, of course you are loyal. It would be monstrous if you were not.” 
 
Alfred Milner, 1898. 
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Introduction 
 
i.) The War in the Cape Colony: Afrikaner Nationalism and ethnic identity 
 
The South African War or Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 is generally 
regarded as a defining event in the history of South Africa. Like the American Civil 
War, it can be considered a crossroads which stood between what had been, and what 
was to be. The war was a brief window of opportunity for determining the course of 
South African development. Like all wars, the story of the South African War was 
one of tragedy, heroism, missed opportunities, and folly. Despite its updated and more 
inclusive title, the war came to define the nature of white rule in South Africa, and 
was to become the most important event in the formation of Afrikaner ethnic identity 
and a major flashpoint in the continuum of Afrikaner Nationalism. In The Afrikaners: 
biography of a people, Hermann Giliomee quite aptly refers to this as “The Crucible 
of War.” From a regional viewpoint, the war was a clash between two different 
visions of how Southern Africa should develop and be governed. Politically, it was a 
war between the British Empire and the Boer Republics regarding the shifting power 
dynamics resulting from the economic boom of the mineral revolution. The 
republican vision of agrarian-based economic development clashed with the plans and 
ambitions of ardent imperialists like Alfred Milner. The resulting conflict, defeat of 
the republics, and bitterness regarding the atrocities of concentration camps and 
scorched earth policies are often-cited factors when accounting for the emergence of 
Afrikaner cultural solidarity, and formed a crucial part of the mythos of Afrikaner 
Nationalism. Yet, it would require nearly half a century for Afrikaner Nationalism to 
come to fruition. In the decades following the war, a crucial series of events would 
combine to create this new exclusive nationalism. These included the 1910 Act of 
Union, the 1914 Rebellion, South Africa’s participation in the First World War, the 
cultural and economic mobilisation drive of the twenties and thirties, and finally the 
issue of participation in the Second World War. Although these events definitely had 
a more tangible effect in establishing the structures and ideological groundwork of 
Afrikaner Nationalism, they relied heavily on the ideals and bitter memory of the 
South African War to define the exclusionary nature of this new ethnic nationalism. 
Often overlooked and marginalised, is the impact of the war in the Cape 
Colony. The Cape had been the launchpad for the ideological war into the South 
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African interior, and its subdued wartime experiences had a profound effect on 
cultural identity among Afrikaners. Given that the impetus and agenda of future 
Afrikaner Nationalism would come to be dominated by the “southern tradition” that 
emerged amongst the nationalist intelligentsia of the Cape, investigation into the 
impact of the war on Cape society warrants closer inspection. Despite having intricate 
family connections to the republics and sharing in the same language and religion, 
only a small number of Cape Colonists joined the republics in open warfare against 
Britain. As British subjects, any tangible support to the South African Republic 
(ZAR) and Orange Free State (OFS) would have been regarded as an act of treason. 
Many condemned the war as an act of imperial aggression invoked by the greed of 
opportunistic robber barons. Most sympathised openly with their republican 
neighbours but refrained from any overt political and military action. The reason for 
this muted response is one of complexity and requires a more informed understanding 
of the historical development of Cape Afrikaner identity. Answers can be found when 
scrutinising the emergence of the unique hybrid culture that emerged at the Cape in 
the period following the final British occupation of 1806. 
 
ii.) The impact of British rule on the Cape Colony 
 
After a prolonged period of neglect by the profit driven Dutch East India 
Company (VOC), during which the Dutch settlers were mostly left to their own 
devices and denied any significant improvements to infrastructure and cultural 
development, the naturalised Cape Dutch had acquired a strong character of 
independence and affinity for their adopted country. The change in regime infused the 
Cape with a firm but benevolent British paternalism which mitigated the deficiencies 
of the old Dutch system. The British leniently allowed many of the old hierarchical 
remnants of the VOC to remain intact, and incorporated them into their own systems 
to govern the Cape more efficiently. The Cape Dutch were also beneficiaries of 
educational advances, improvements to infrastructure, and an important economic 
revamp of the market system. As the Cape Dutch adopted British ways and the two 
groups started to intermarry, many grew wealthy and new social hierarchies and 
foundations of power started to emerge. Despite the amalgamation of cultures, certain 
fault lines between the two remained which increasingly manifested in an urban-rural 
divide. Politically apathetic, rural Cape Afrikaners sought protection for their way of 
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life, mostly in the form of control over black labour and protective trade tariffs. They 
were regarded as backwards by their more worldly and progressive British 
countrymen, who economically dominated the urban spheres of life. Yet, as this 
hybrid Cape identity matured throughout the nineteenth century, the space keeping 
cultures apart was narrowed by the shared frontier experience and a political system 
that recognised the importance of accommodating the Afrikaner electorate. Through 
compromise and coercion, British rule in the Cape Colony allowed the descendants of 
the Dutch to remain a culturally distinct group, yet by including them in the apparatus 
of the state, their identity was transformed through their connection with the British 
world. The years under Company rule were hallmarked by a lack of cultural 
achievement and opportunities for expression. When combined with their self-
identification as a conquered nation and gratitude over the improvements and 
allowances introduced by British rule, Cape Afrikaners developed a certain deference 
to authority which allowed for a duality in allegiance, accommodating both their 
cultural distinctiveness and British citizenship. The resulting portrait of white Cape 
society that emerged, was one in which loyalties were often conflicted, contradictory, 
and subject to regional and even familial patterns of affiliation. 
The issue of allegiance among Cape Afrikaners then, was one of complexity. 
While politicians and patrons in the period leading up to the war had an innate 
understanding of this hybrid cultural creature, the new High Commissioner, Alfred 
Milner, and the dyed-in-the-wool British military command that followed on his heels 
as war bloomed, had limited understanding and even less patience for the 
complexities in the Cape. Milner became convinced that in order for the war to be 
won and imperial hegemony successfully installed, it required slaying the chimera of 
Cape Colonial identity with its multitude and conflicting loyalties. The individuals in 
the British military tasked to suppress rebellion and maintain law and order in the 
Cape, were remnants of a British imperial system unprepared for the complexities in 
cultural identity which characterised Cape society. As martial law was declared, the 
inherent constitutional rights of Cape Afrikaners as British subjects were suspended, 
and its enforcement carried out by what seemed to be a completely foreign and alien 
style of governance. During this period, the privileges, authority and ultimately the 
identity of Cape Afrikaners were severely challenged. As civil liberties, control over 
labour, and old hierarchies were swept aside by martial law in the efforts to defend the 
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colony, Cape Afrikaners increasingly became aware of their cultural exclusion, and 
thus the war contributed to a greater sense of ethnic solidarity.  
 
 
iii.) Literature review: 
 
Existing studies on the effects of the South African War in the Cape are sparse 
and dated. A notable exception is Pierre Burger’s Die invloed van die Anglo-
Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn, an excellent 
dissertation on the effects of the war on the civilian population of Oudtshoorn, which 
has proved to be a valuable companion piece to this paper, as both towns were located 
in the same military jurisdiction during the war. Some of the older studies like CJS 
Strydom’s Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog (1943) and JH Snyman’s Die 
Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902 (1979), were written in a distinctly Afrikaner 
Nationalist vocabulary with providential overtones that tend to gloss over the 
fractured identity of Cape Afrikaners. Although well researched, both studies are 
products of a specific historiographical school that tends to forgo interpretation in 
favour of “scientific objectivity.” To be fair, Snyman’s studies are generally even-
handed regarding the multiplicities in allegiance, and his Rebelle-verhoor in 
Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale verwysing na die 
Militêre howe (1899-1902) (1962) provides valuable contextual information for 
understanding the constitutional issues regarding the application of martial law by the 
Cape Colonial Parliament. Likewise, John Galbraith’s British War Measures in Cape 
Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement (1983), provides 
insight into the issues facing the British military in the implementation of martial law 
by recounting the history of its usage throughout the British Empire. Other studies, 
like Taffy Shearing’s dogged and meticulous The Cape Rebel of the South African 
War, 1899-1902 (2004) are concerned mainly with the military aspects and 
movements of rebel commandos in the Cape.  
An overarching concern regarding all these studies is the terminology and 
vocabulary they employ. They tend to create synthetic divisions and dichotomies for 
the sake of analysis and generalisation, which often obscures complexity regarding 
allegiance and identity. The term Cape Afrikaner is in itself problematic, as it carries 
certain connotations of a later era that did not necessarily exist during the period 
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under focus. Referring to the non-English speaking inhabitants of the Colony as the 
Cape Dutch would be linguistically more representative but also fails to 
comprehensively describe the unique culture in question. In their defence, such 
synthetic divisions are to some extent an unavoidable consequence when writing 
about a subject so naturally divisive as war. Mordechai Tamarkin’s studies on the 
relationship between Cape Afrikaners and British politicians at the turn of the 
nineteenth century provides the most informative account on the nature of Cape 
identity, and fits well onto the foundations of Ross and Giliomee’s studies on rural 
hierarchies and early nationalism at the Cape. However, they stop short at the start of 
the war, and the issue of Cape Afrikaner identity only re-emerges via oblique 
references in studies examining the period between the Act of Union and the Second 
World War. This study ambitiously aims to fill this gap by restoring complexity to the 
issues of allegiance and identity, in the hope of identifying new and historically 
significant factors which may have influenced Cape loyalties during the South 
African War. 
 
iv.) Goals of study 
 
The broad focus of this paper is an examination into the complexities in 
allegiance among Cape Afrikaners during the South African War. Specifically, it 
focuses on how the community of Heidelberg experienced the South African War. Its 
purpose is twofold, and aims to illustrate the complexity and nuance in allegiance 
among inhabitants of the Cape Colony, as well as contributing to the larger narrative 
regarding the emergence of Afrikaner ethnic identity and a nascent Afrikaner 
Nationalism. For the purposes of this study, the Southern Cape town of Heidelberg 
was chosen as case study. Given that Heidelberg was situated at an administrative 
crossroads between two regions, its inhabitants had grown accustomed to a certain 
degree of autonomy free of unnecessary government interference. It shared the spirit 
of independence which existed in the more isolated areas of the Northern Cape and 
Cape Midlands where acts of rebellion were more rife. This factor greatly 
compounded the uncertainty and frustration regarding its efficient administration and 
loyalty during the war. Heidelberg was also one of the few towns in this part of the 
Cape to witness a major military engagement between an invading republican force 
and the British military. Its inhabitants not only experienced the conflict through 
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martial law measures but also witnessed the physical violence of war in person. 
Unlike larger towns, where the urban space was dominated by a large English 
speaking community, in Heidelberg the English community was a minority and the 
urban sphere was occupied by anglicised Afrikaners with family ties to both language 
groups. 
 
This study aims to extend and add to the work of scholars like, Hermann 
Giliomee, Robert Ross, and Mordechai Tamarkin, by placing wartime Heidelberg in 
the conceptual framework they constructed regarding the emergence of, and challenge 
to, rural Afrikaner socio-economic hierarchies. It will start by illustrating how the 
socio-economic structure of the region and local community had emerged in the 
period prior to and following Heidelberg’s founding, while connecting this process to 
wider currents of cultural development within Cape society. This section contains the 
fundamental ideas on class, identity, and allegiance in rural Cape society which forms 
the conceptual framework for this paper. This section will conclude by providing a 
snapshot of Heidelberg at the start of the war and aims to display the contemporary 
mood and concerns which preoccupied the community at the time. The next chapter 
examines the issue of allegiance by examining how local inhabitants displayed their 
wartime loyalty to Britain and documenting cases of sympathy towards the Boer 
republics. This chapter aims to add to the complexity regarding the divided loyalties 
of Cape Afrikaners by examining the non-ideological motivations behind loyalty, as 
well as scrutinising familial ties to the Boer Republics. Like other chapters in this 
study, it makes heavy use of genealogical records in order to discern a more nuanced 
understanding of allegiance and identify alternative patterns of loyalty than the 
synthetic dichotomies provided by existing studies on the war in the Cape. 
The next section concerns the administration and enforcement of martial law 
in the community of Heidelberg and how the measures of war challenged the 
traditional hierarchies, sources of power and ultimately the identity of local 
Afrikaners. It will start by examining the clash between Imperial and Cape British 
styles of governance and culture which caused a great deal of frustration, contempt, 
and distrust between the military personnel tasked with defending the colony and the 
Cape inhabitants subjected to martial law. This sections documents incidents and 
prosecutions under martial law in the Heidelberg region and aims to show how 
identity and authority was challenged during the war. It also examines how 
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administrative lags, confusion over authority and mistrust of existing Cape judicial 
authority filtered down to compound the tension created under martial law. Chapter 4 
details the events of the military engagement in Heidelberg which took place when an 
invading Boer commando attacked the town on 13 September 1901. The battle in 
town served as a violent culmination of the anxiety and dislocation experienced by the 
community during the war, and provides further confirmation of conclusions reached 
in the preceding chapters. The final chapter examines community reactions to the 
battle and martial law during the closing months of the war, and aims to establish how 
the community composition had changed regarding issues of allegiance and identity. 
This section includes incidents of retribution and reconciliation, as well as illustrating 
how the community had changed in the years following the war. 
 
 
v.) On the use of local history: limitations and opportunities 
 
The level of detail and extensive use of genealogy in this study arguably 
places it in the field of local history. In addition to the stigma connected to local 
history and its amateur origins, this presents certain theoretical dilemmas regarding 
the representivity and historical significance of this study’s findings. Some of the 
theoretical objections and critiques associated with local history are inherent to the 
nature of all historical research, while others only pertain to local history’s unit of 
study. In order to avoid the more salient of these pitfalls and ensure the relevance of 
this study, it is important that some of these concerns be addressed. The most frequent 
charge laid against local histories concern their amateur nature that relies heavily on 
anecdotal evidence and apocryphal tales. Conversely, the academic discipline of local 
history is often criticised as being elitist for relying heavily on documentary evidence 
whilst omitting oral sources and the histories of common people.1 The latter criticism, 
is ironic and only troublesome to those completely blind to the limitations of 
historical sources and the inherent theoretical issues of their use. Yet, keeping these 
critiques in mind while producing a study such as this can be highly beneficial to the 
synthesis of data and findings. This study aims to overcome these pitfalls by utilising 
both documentary sources and existing amateur local histories. Due to the subject !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 G. Sheeran & Y. Sheeran: Discourses in Local History, p. 67. 
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matter’s distance in the past, obtaining oral testimony from first hand witnesses was 
impossible. Therefore, the use of existing local histories, both amateur and academic, 
formed a crucial part of reconstructing historic events and ascertaining vital 
biographical information of the historical actors of this study. Aside from providing 
more comprehensive information usually omitted from amateur local histories, the 
documentary sources in this study are also used to verify, dismiss or clarify anecdotal 
information in the local histories used. This complementary approach produces a 
richer historical account while simultaneously addressing the social historian’s charge 
that the use of documentary sources places too much focus on the history of 
institutions and elites whilst ignoring the history of common people. 
Another issue plaguing the application of local history concerns the 
representivity of the unit of study. Resolving the question of whether local history’s 
small unit of study can be representative of national history as well as subject to wider 
trends and influences, is the central theoretical problem of the discipline. This issue 
was first identified by HPR Finberg in his 1952 paper, The Local Historian and His 
Theme, which illustrates the theoretical precariousness connected to the concept of 
localised national history. Finberg highlights the need for a more nuanced approach 
that addresses the question of whether local history is simply a reflection of national 
trends, or if it bucks these trends in a historically significant way.2 Therefore it is of 
paramount importance to tread lightly when attempting to conflate the local with the 
national through generalisations. Studies have shown that the proper interpretation of 
local historical data requires not only determining the validity of the data but also the 
context of its creation, in order to ascertain its significance to the study.3  
Acknowledging the context of local historical data and its limitations when 
connecting the local to the national, highlights the need to identify other modulating 
factors. This reflects more recent trends which attempt to introduce more 
interdisciplinary approaches to local history. These include geography, sociology, and 
cultural anthropology, which take into account factors like natural boundaries, the 
physical landscape, regional cultural trends and community dynamics. The goal of 
such approaches is to identify the more salient factors which may have shaped local 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 G. Sheeran & Y. Sheeran: Discourses in Local History, p. 68. 
3 W. Kew: The value of local history, p. 16. 
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history, their weighted significance in relation to larger national trends, and/or their 
modulating influence on said trends.4 
 This study attempts to take into account any inconspicuous local factors 
which may have shaped the community reaction to the war and martial law measures. 
In order to identify these factors and their modulating influence on community 
allegiance, requires consideration of the historic development of the region 
surrounding Heidelberg. This pre-war historical account takes into consideration the 
socio-economic and cultural impact of geography, regional economic development, 
and the reciprocal relationship between material and cultural change. It primarily 
illustrates the creation of a regional cultural identity among inhabitants very much in 
line with the general disposition of all Cape Afrikaners. This meant an identity and 
disposition shaped by the introduction of British culture and institutions, and 
modulated by regional geographic and economic realities as well as larger national 
trends. 
An approach to local histories that attempts to address the local vs. national 
issue is that of the case study or microcosmic study, which can be defined as the 
analysis of a small area within a larger context. It has been suggested that such studies 
are distinct from traditional local history and are often referred to as micro-histories. 
Case studies or micro-histories can either endorse national trends or deviate from 
them. In his paper Local history: A new definition and its implications (1981), Victor 
Skipp suggests aggregating micro-studies in order to create a national history mosaic. 
In such a model, local history is used as an approach or field of study rather than a 
distinct discipline.5 This model offers the best solution for this study, as it addresses 
the inherent theoretical problem of local history by allowing the use of studies on 
other localities for the sake of comparison.6  
By comparing the findings of this study with those from other localities during 
the South African War (eg. Burger’s study on Oudtshoorn), and aggregating these into 
a colonial mosaic, a more comprehensive and representative historiographic record of 
the war’s effects on the Cape Colony can be produced. Although partially in the realm 
of local history, this study is by no means a comprehensive history of Heidelberg, and 
is only concerned with the local history to ascertain how it shaped community !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 G. Sheeran & Y. Sheeran: Discourses in Local History, p. 68. 
5 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
6 W. Kew: The value of local history, p. 15. 
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response during and after the war. To reiterate, this study makes extensive use of 
existing local histories to create a highly detailed history of wartime Heidelberg, yet 
on its own it is not a “pure” local history per se, as it is primarily concerned with 
matters relating to the South African War. Confining the unit of study is also 
problematic given the rural setting, and much effort is exerted when selecting what to 
include. A more inclusive and regional approach such as the one used in the pre-war 
historical development would probably be better but unfeasible given the level of 
detail undertaken in the research. This study aims to overcome the limitations inherent 
to local history and seeks to illustrate its complementary value to academic historical 
research. 
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Chapter 1 – Town and Country  
 
1.1) Early Roads 
 
Heidelberg is situated on the banks of the Duivenhoks River at the foot of the 
Langeberg mountain range. The town lies halfway between Swellendam and 
Riversdale, on the edge of the vast agricultural area known as the Overberg. Tracing 
the historical development of this area and its place in the history of Cape society is 
vital to understanding the character and allegiances of the inhabitants. The root of 
early colonisation and settlement of the Overberg was driven primarily by the VOC’s 
demand for meat which prompted cattle bartering with the native peoples of the area, 
resulting in early trekboers reaching the Breede River circa 1720.7 Prior to 1707, the 
vast Overberg region was the exclusive domain of Governor Willem Adriaan Van Der 
Stel, and consisted of 18 farms managed by company employees appointed as 
foremen. The present day site of Heidelberg used to form part of the farm 
Wytgelegen, before Van Der Stel had to forfeit ownership of his property holdings 
after being dismissed over corruption charges.  
The dissolution of Van Der Stel’s private fiefdom, led to the recall of his 
foremen who spread word of the lucrative opportunities of farming in the area. This 
inspired wealthy peninsula farmers to graze their cattle on the other side of the 
Hottentots Holland mountains, as well as luring lower ranking Company employees to 
apply for leasehold farms which formed part of a newly designed land ownership 
system designed to secure perpetual rents and settle the wild interior of the country.8 
Most of these early settlers had been drawn from impoverished German states into the 
service of the VOC as low ranking employees and indentured servants. 9 Settlement of 
the Overberg occurred along the path of the old trade route used by the native people 
who originally inhabited the area. This was the same route used by the seventeenth 
century explorers Hieronymus Cruise and Olof Bergh, and became known as the 
Kaapse wapad or old Wagen-weg, for its adherence to the level areas surrounding the 
river which could be traversed by wagon.10  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the 
Cape, p. 198. 
8 E. Burrows: Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days, pp. 7-9. 
9 Ibid., p. 3. 
10 Ibid., pp. 6, 24. 
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Settlement of the area grew slowly yet steadily over the next century, aided by 
protection from the VOC to ensure a steady supply of meat to the Cape. Starting in 
the 1780s settlement increased threefold as roughly 200 immigrants seeded the area. 
These early settlers would establish many of the well known Cape Afrikaner families 
which came to dominate the region and play an important role in the shaping of its 
future. Familiar surnames included: Beukes, Beyers, De Kock, Delport, De Wet, Du 
Toit, Fick, Gildenhuys, Groenewald, Linde, Morkel, Moolman, Otto, Swart, and 
Wessels.11 The majority of these early farmers were poor stock farmers who also kept 
sheep for extra income and nourishment in addition to the cattle feeding the VOC’s 
demand for beef. In general, farming in the Overberg remained relatively unprofitable 
and on a subsistence level throughout the late eighteenth century and first decade of 
the nineteenth century as the lucrative Cape Town market was still too far away and 
inaccessible to most of these farmers.12  
Although the majority of farmers in the region came from humble beginnings 
and lived simple unobtrusive lives, there were, of course, notable exceptions. Some of 
the more illustrious settlers to the region included  foreign professionals and 
mercenaries hired by the Company to explore and chart the sparsely inhabited 
interiors. These included the French Chevalier, Francois Renier Duminy, tasked with 
charting the Cape coastline from 1782-1790. As part of his remuneration, Duminy 
was awarded land near Caledon and next to the Breede River in the vicinity of what is 
today Riversonderend and Malgas. His daughter Jeanne Francois,13 inherited the 
Caledon farm after his death and married the Belgian Charles Johannes Van 
Helslandt. Duminy’s eldest son, Francois Anthonie Duminy,14 named his own son, 
Pieter Willem Van Helslandt Duminy,15 in honour of his brother in law. This branch 
of the Duminy family eventually settled near the Krombeks River on what would 
become the outskirts of Heidelberg.16 Arguably the most well known of the old 
Company scions were the Van Reenen and Reitz families, who by means of marriage, 
both to one another and to newly arrived British pioneers, established not only an 
agriculturally based economic empire, but also one of South Africa’s earliest and 
most influential political families. The Van Reenen’s had a wealthy aristocratic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 E. Burrows: Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days, p. 13. 
12 Ibid., p. 120. 
13 Duminy b1 
14 Duminy b2 
15 Duminy b2c6 
16 E. Burrows: Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days, p. 58. 
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Prussian heritage, which endowed the South African primogenitor’s son, Jacob Van 
Reenen, 17  with a considerable fortune that was supplemented by his lucrative 
contracts to provide the Company with meat and wine.18 Van Reenen’s sons Dirk 
Gysbert19 and Jacob,20 were early agricultural pioneers of the region, and settled the 
fertile stretch of farmland along the path of the Slang River in the vicinity of Port 
Beaufort. Dirk Gysbert’s farm, Rhenosterfontein, would become the jewel in the Van 
Reenen crown and base of operation for using their vast fortune and land holdings to 
experiment with new agricultural techniques and stock breading which influenced the 
agrarian development of the region. Dirk Gysbert Van Reenen was an early adopter 
who experimented with the wool yields of Merino sheep, by crossbreeding these 
Spanish rams with the Overberg staple, the Cape Fat Tail, as early as 1782 on his farm 
in the Swartland area.21  
The Merino sheep was famously introduced to the Cape in 1789 by Captain 
Robert Jacob Gordon, the ill-fated garrison commander of the Cape who committed 
suicide after failing to prevent the British from invading in 1795.22 Van Reenen’s 
early tinkering with crossbreeding Merino and Cape sheep would eventually be 
expanded and brought to fruition by JF Reitz and Michiel Van Breda. The 
introduction of the crossbred Merino with its bountiful wool yield and robust meat 
supply would significantly boost the prosperity of the Overberg region starting in the 
second decade of the nineteenth century.23 JF Reitz arrived in Cape Town as part of 
the Dutch Navy in 1794, as a result of Napoleon seizing the Netherlands. Choosing 
voluntary exile instead of returning to his tumultuous homeland, Reitz settled in Cape 
Town and married Barbara Jacoba Van Reenen, the daughter of Dirk Gysbert Van 
Reenen. Their youngest son, Francis William Reitz Snr (1810-1881), 24  would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Van Reenen b1 
18 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the 
Cape, pp. 143-144. 
19 Van Reenen b1c7 
20 Van Reenen b1c8 
21 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the 
Cape, pp. 90-91. 
22 E. Burrows: Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days, pp. 122-123. 
23 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the 
Cape, pp. 90-91. 
24 Reitz b6 
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eventually succeed his maternal grandfather as the agricultural baron and spokesman 
for the interests of the Cape Afrikaner in the Overberg region.25 
 
By the 1830s, the region known as the Overberg had become prosperous, 
despite the introduction of certain fundamental changes to society, like the 
emancipation of slaves, which initially seemed to threaten the livelihood of the 
region’s inhabitants. The Merino sheep had replaced the horse and ox as the staple 
farm commodities, its wool creating a very lucrative market which lifted many 
farmers out of marginality and into modernity. British rule introduced growth of the 
rural economy in first half of nineteenth century, and by mid century the Swellendam 
area had become largest grain growing district in the Cape. This was also the result of 
the use of Port Beaufort as a harbour which connected the eastern areas beyond 
mountains to the Cape peninsula by sea. During the period of Company rule, officials 
had not even bothered with collecting taxes from the area. Wheat now accounted for 
60% of grains grown in the Colony, the region having grown prosperous as a result of 
market access and government contracts supplying cereals to feed the British military 
on the eastern frontier. The descendants of early trekboers and squatters had become 
sedentary and deeply connected to the land which they had settled.   
In the wake of the final British conquest of 1806, they had become more 
domesticated, and prone to displays of conspicuous consumption, fuelled by greater 
access to material objects and larger discretionary incomes. This was also an effect of 
the British overhaul of the land grant system, whereby loan farms were systematically 
replaced by free holds from 1814 to 1850 in order to create a property market and tax 
revenues, as well as in an attempt to stabilise the rural regions by promoting 
settlement and docility.26 The changes in culture resulting from the booming material 
prosperity are quite noticeable when comparing excerpts taken from travel accounts 
recorded during the Batavian and British periods. Lady Anne Barnard described in 
detail the limited vanities, unkempt yards and lack of personal possessions during her 
1798 visit to Port Beaufort and stay at Jacob Van Reenen’s farm, Meerlust.  
These observations contrast markedly from later descriptions of the displays of 
wealth at Rhenosterfontein. Accounts describe it’s inhabitants as the epitome of rich !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the 
Cape, pp. 92-93. 
26 R. Ross: Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa, pp. 51-52. 
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country squires, complete with all the associated luxuries and personal 
accoutrements.27 The influx of British culture and resulting material changes had 
opened up a vital conduit for expression to rural Cape Afrikaners which they had been 
denied during the Company period. Physically isolated and neglected by a business 
concern uninterested in providing any inhabitants of infrastructure attuned to their 
economic, cultural and spiritual needs, led to a lifestyle of seclusion. Cut off from 
peninsular life and with limited means or access to the simplest of material objects 
and conveniences, the rural lifestyle of the Overberg people had afforded them little 
opportunity or conduit for social, cultural or individual expression. In the absence of 
more traditional and conspicuous outlets of expression, coupled with their relative 
isolation from one another, occupants of the area developed uniquely rural and 
culturally specific means of expression. A dearth in personal possessions and lack of 
occasion to display their rank, station, wealth and individuality, gave rise to the use of 
more mundane and subtle forms of expression. All aspects of daily life were in some 
way used as opportunities for affirmation and distinction, which included the 
hallmarks of rural life such as hospitality, gregariousness, cordiality and politeness. 
Due to the secluded lifestyle and relative rarity of socialising, all social gatherings 
became opportunities for distinction and expression, especially events centred around 
food preparation like the customary Sunday afternoon hosting of visiting neighbours. 
28 Some accounts have even suggested that the desire for expression extended to the 
rituals surrounding country funerals.29  
The changes to Overberg society primarily originated from the external 
influence of the British takeover as well as the internal responses to the changes 
wrought by the new dispensation.30  These material changes had a powerful impact on 
culture and identity, and go a long way in aiding our understanding of Cape Afrikaner 
identity. Before the arrival of the British, there had been no need for them to 
culturally self-identify, as most had been assimilated into the primarily Dutch culture 
of the Cape, and could simply be called Cape Dutch. The incursion of the British and 
subsequent transformation of Cape society would also fundamentally change their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the 
Cape, p. 150. 
28 E. Prins: Die kulturele en ekonomiese ontwikkeling van die westelike Overberg in die agtiende en 
vroee negentiende eeu, pp. 103-104. 
29 P. Borcherds: An autobiographical memoir, p. 194. 
30 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the 
Cape, pp. 62-63. 
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perception of themselves. The British transformation of the Cape over the course of 
the nineteenth century significantly contributed to the formation of Afrikaner cultural 
identity.  
Yet the Cape Afrikaners as referred to in this study did not yet represent the 
modern twentieth century conception connected to the moniker. In the introduction to 
Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa, Robert Ross 
emphasises the very colonial nature of the culture that characterised Cape society 
during the nineteenth century.31 Culturally and politically, Afrikaners in the Cape 
Colony would differ markedly from their Republican brethren in the north, having a 
vested interest, both economically and culturally, in the imperially-connected colonial 
society of which they had become part.32 The hybrid culture that hallmarked the 
colonial society at the Cape was primarily the result of how the remnants of the social 
structure from the VOC period had been reshaped and transformed by the changes 
and reforms introduced with British rule.33 The hallmarks of British paternal rule after 
1806, directly reflected British intentions for the Cape. 
 Initially, the Cape was not regarded as a new colonial settlement, nor just as a 
resource for raw materials, but as a strategic stronghold along the route to their 
eastern maritime empire. As such, the main objective was control, as to establish and 
maintain order. Entrenching law and order required a more autocratic and hands-on 
approach to the administration of the Cape than had been the case during the 
Company period. For Cape Afrikaners, the firm hand of British paternal rule first 
manifested itself when the old legal distinctions which stratified Cape society during 
the Company period were disposed of. The revamp did away with ambiguous position 
which the Khoi had inhabited within the old system and identified them as subjects on 
the same legal footing as the Europeans. Torture and capital punishment of Khoi 
labourers were outlawed and enforced by a new circuit court system that forced 
farmers and employers to settle labour disputes through official and recorded means.34 
Most Cape Afrikaners were wary of the courts due to illiteracy and the fear of 
punishment when labourers or slaves testified against them on brutality charges. The 
fear of losing control over labour and the indigenous population helped the British to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 R. Ross: Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa, p. 1. 
32 A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-
1850, p. 20. 
33 Ibid., p. 6. 
34 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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subdue the unruly elements among rural Cape Afrikaners, as well as establishing a 
precedent of docility and weariness of political involvement among most.35 
Despite the seemingly altruistic government measures concerned with the 
plight of indigenous peoples, the new economic realities of administering the Cape 
proved to be more pertinent, resulting in the mitigation of most of these policies. In 
order to realise the blueprint of a financially self-sufficient asset, the British needed 
the Cape to be productive. After the British invasion, there was an increased demand 
for meat, and with the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, the Cape experienced 
increasing labour shortages that did not bode well for the British plan of self-
sufficiency. As a result the British were forced to institutionalise elements of the 
existing Dutch labour control system in order to subordinate the large numbers of 
Khoi people who were absorbed into the labour market after the old legal distinctions 
were dismantled. The net effect of these economic and administrative necessities was 
increased control over the labour market and new labour mechanisms that prolonged 
the existence of measures like passes and indentured servitude.36 Although labour had 
now become contract based, freedom and mobility was dealt a blow in 1809 through 
the adoption of Caledon’s Code which required Khoi labourers to have a fixed 
residence and apply for passes should they decide to move.37  
The Apprenticeship of Servants Act of 1812 effectively nullified Khoi 
freedom and reintroduced indentureship by forcing Khoi children into unpaid labour 
for a period of ten years.38 Ordinance 50 of 1828 repealed these restrictions on the 
Khoi in an attempt to stimulate labour productivity in anticipation of the emancipation 
of slaves. Yet, without adequate legislation and measures to enforce the new 
proclamation, and its enforcement, often the responsibility of disinclined  Cape 
Afrikaner officials in unsupervised rural areas, such gestures had little practical 
effect.39 By 1833 when slavery at the Cape was officially abolished, former slave 
owners were already skilled in the arts of coercive labour having drawn from their 
experience to control Khoi labour. By the 1850s the system and mechanisms for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 R. Ross: Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa, p. 7. 
36 Ibid., p. 5. 
37 N. Penn: The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist & Khoisan on the Cape’s Northern Frontier in the 18th 
Century, p. 268. 
38 S. Trapido: From Paternalism to Liberalism: The Cape Colony, 1800-1834, p. 84. 
39 A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-
1850, pp. 12-13. 
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controlling labour were thoroughly entrenched by way of a series of laws which came 
to be known as the Master and Servant Ordinances.40 
The new British administration at the Cape realised at an early stage that the 
primary obstacle blocking its reforms were the remnants of the old Company system 
in the rural areas. Real authority in the rural districts had always been in the hands of 
the lower officials who served under Landdrosts and Magistrates. In the old Dutch 
system, the Landdrosts were very reliant on local boards (heemraden) and field 
cornets (veldwachtmeesters) to execute official policy. More than often, these local 
officials had firm ties to their respective communities on whom they depended for re-
election. As such, the way in which they officiated their duties was often coloured by 
local and even personal interest, resulting in them acting more as agents for local 
interest than representing the will of the government.41 Even though the newly created 
post of Colonial Governor of the Cape was vested with extraordinary executive 
power, the British elected to leave the bulk of the administration of the colony in the 
hands of existing officials. The reason for this decision was twofold. Firstly, it aligned 
with British policy goals of making the Cape more productive by making it pay for its 
own upkeep. 42  Secondly, the British recognised that existing local officials 
represented the elites of Cape Dutch society, and by incorporating them into the new 
system was vital to ensuring a smooth transition, as they had the necessary power of 
influence to sway local electorates.43 The decision to accommodate the existing Cape 
gentry and hierarchies based on the legal distinctions from the Company period, 
would have a profound effect on the way Cape society would develop over the course 
of the nineteenth century. Within the new British order these old hierarchies were 
transmuted into the new social classes of colonial society, and contributed 
significantly to the cultural identity of Cape Afrikaners.44 By allowing old structures 
of power to continue and ensuring control over labour, British governance established 
powerful precedents which served to entrench Cape Afrikaner cultural identity in 
relation to indigenous populatons. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 R. Ross: Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Arica, p. 6. 
41 A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-
1850, p. 8. 
42 S. Trapido: From Paternalism to Liberalism: The Cape Colony, 1800-1834, p. 81. 
43 N. Penn: The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist & Khoisan on the Cape’s Northern Frontier in the 18th 
Century, pp. 269-270. 
44 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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Shortly after the invasion of 1806, the British started to court Cape Afrikaners 
and to mollify the top strata by giving preference to their wine within the imperial 
market system and by abolishing the trade limitations set in place by the VOC.45 
Initially, the rural Cape Afrikaner elite were weary of getting politically involved 
beyond the local level. Most avoided coming to a head with the expansive powers of 
the Governor and instead relied on patronage to sustain their interests. The 
proclamation of Ordinance 19 in 1826, which sought to improve the treatment of 
slaves, prompted some of the disaffected to bemoan the usurping of a master’s 
authority over his slaves.46 The vocalisation of such grievances followed in the wake 
of the 1825 slump in the Cape wine market when imperial preference was withdrawn. 
Although the Cape’s induction into the imperial market system had stimulated 
agricultural production, and the recent slump in wine prices was to a certain extent 
ameliorated by the growing export market for merino wool, Cape Afrikaners were 
becoming increasingly aware of the cultural rift with their new countrymen and 
colonial government. 47  The British takeover and subsequent influx of settlers 
translated into increased population growth, better infrastructure, establishment of 
towns and diversification of cultures. As British immigrants to the Cape did not 
assimilate to the pre-existing culture at the Cape but remained distinct, Cape 
Afrikaners became just one of many minority groups that felt increasingly 
marginalised and culturally excluded from British civic institutions.48 
In the Overberg, one of the changes manifested was the completion of the pass 
in 1830 that crossed the Hottentots Hollands Mountains which guaranteed the survival 
and prosperity of the region by linking it to the markets and speeding up travel by 
replacing ox wagons with horse carts. Spearheaded and vigorously defended by Cape 
Governor Sir Lowry Cole, the pass was testament to benefits of British rule and 
mutual cooperation between the two groups.49 Yet, since the arrival of British settlers 
from the 1820s, frequent cultural clashes occurred, most commonly resulting over 
resentment regarding perceived British cultural superiority. A degree of distance and 
cultural distinctiveness still remained between the two groups, as the Dutch or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 S. Trapido: From Paternalism to Liberalism: The Cape Colony, 1800-1834, p. 83. 
46 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
47 A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-
1850, pp. 13, 23. 
48 Ibid., p. 22. 
49 E. Burrows: Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days, pp. 20-21. 
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emergent Afrikaners retained a sense of inferiority as a conquered people and clashed 
at various points in Cape history with the British sense of cultural superiority.50  
Cultural enmity between the groups was compounded by the fact that those 
inhabiting the Cape prior to British rule had achieved little economic or cultural 
achievements. English culture took hold in urban commercial spaces while Dutch-
Afrikaners remained largely rural and illiterate.51 These differences between the 
groups were often reflected in their respective cultural and leisure activities. While the 
British inhabitants at the Cape still retained cultural and emotional ties to their 
original homeland, Afrikaners had been completely separated from their Dutch 
origins as multiple generations had lived and died at the Cape.52 The introduction of 
the iron plough had initially been a major issue, as many of the existing inhabitants 
preferred the older wooden plough.53  
Colonial institutions, like the new magistrate system that replaced the 
landdrosts, were solidly British in culture, resulting in the exclusion of the majority of 
Cape Afrikaners and translated to a loss of their coercive power. For Cape Afrikaners 
to escape marginalisation and remain part of the political process, required them to 
participate in the new system, often leading to partial or total anglicisation. 
Participation was mostly the purview of the wealthier educated burghers with some 
past experience in public life. As a result, those old institutions and positions that 
were absorbed into the British bureaucratic machine formed the framework of how 
Cape Afrikaner society would be structured and was further strengthened by the 
Victorian system of rank and class.54 Wealthy farmers or former company employees 
with established agricultural empires transformed into urban traders who used the new 
language as tool without emotional ties. Institutions like the prestigious school 
established by the Tot Nut van’t Algemeen society trained many Cape Afrikaner elites 
between 1804 and 1870, resulting in successive generations of Cape Afrikaners 
becoming anglicised, despite the exclusionary nature of British institutions having 
spurred their begrudging involvement in government.55  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Cape Afrikaner participation was more a reactive response towards their 
increasing marginalisation and fluctuating economic realities resulting from the 
changes introduced by British rule during the first half of the nineteenth century. Most 
were unconcerned with higher democratic ideals for Cape white society, being more 
inclined towards maintaining and protecting their status quo. Yet, cooperation and 
interaction between the two cultural groups proved to be a pivotal action in 
determining Cape Afrikaner identity.56 The cultural and institutional dominance of the 
British had, to some extent, rendered Cape Afrikaners quiet in public debates 
regarding colonial rule. Their deference to British culture and authority stemmed from 
a variety of factors. The humiliation of the Dutch in contrast to British military 
strength during the invasion of 1806 had instilled a sense of defeat and cultural 
inferiority. For most, the change in regime had been beneficial, especially in light of 
dissatisfaction with VOC corruption. British rule had various benefits like 
improvements to infrastructure, access to better markets and prices, better education, 
and a stronger economy. The inclusion of a top strata of Cape Afrikaners into the 
political system and administration of the Colony would also ensure future 
generations of loyalists. They would form the new generation of Cape Afrikaners who 
decided to hitch their wagons to British success.57 
In the Overberg region, probably no other figure more than FW Reitz Snr, 
came to embody the new duality in cultural identity that hallmarked Cape Colonial 
society. Born into one of the wealthiest Cape families instrumental during the 
Company period, and raised during the early transitory period of British rule, Reitz 
became the quintessential Anglo-Afrikaner, and an ideal figure to bridge the divide 
between the Dutch and British.58 Reitz was educated in English at the Faure School in 
Cape Town, after which he travelled to Scotland 1829 to study farming for two years. 
His classical education at the University of Edinburgh shaped his ideas on how to 
combat horse sickness at the Cape during the 1830s, as well as engendering a life-
long love for English literature. Reitz, along with his extended family, was a pivotal 
figure in the British-infused economic awakening of the Overberg. His education and 
status as a local Afrikaner during the period when local government and commerce !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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became anglicised, made him approachable to parties from both sides of the cultural 
divide.59  
Reitz’s elite education and reputation as an Anglophile made him an 
influential proponent of progressive agricultural techniques and scientific innovation, 
maintaining the momentum to which British ideas and culture were infused into the 
region and Cape Afrikaner culture. Reitz maintained a life-long friendship and 
political partnership with Dr Henry White, the medical practitioner at Swellendam 
and later Cape Treasurer General who lived in a house on Reitz’s farm, 
Rhenosterfontein. Their relationship exemplified the nature of cooperation between 
the two cultures during this period.60 Although Reitz’s political involvement was 
usually restricted to agricultural matters, he was an influential figure in the Anti-
Convict movement of 1849, as well as repeatedly calling for more colonial 
independence in the form of Responsible Government while on the Cape Legislative 
Council and Assembly.61 The Reitz family would become one of South Africa’s most 
influential political families, representing a brand of liberal Anglo-Afrikaner political 
thought representative of the colonial nationalism and hybrid Cape Colonial identity 
that hallmarked South African politics until the 1930s. 
 FW Reitz Snr married Cornelia Magdalena Deneys, the daughter of 
Swellendam’s District Secretary. 62  Their son FW Reitz Jnr, 63  was born in 
Swellendam in 1844. Like his father he was afforded a classical education at 
Rondebosch and the South African College, leaving South Africa to study law in 
London in 1864. Although frequently vacationing at the family farm of 
Rhenosterfontein, he was not as connected to the Overberg as his father and left to 
become a lawyer in the Orange Free State in 1870. FW Reitz Jnr would become the 
president of the OFS, and the Secretary of State for the ZAR during the South African 
War. 64  His sister, Frances Hester Reitz, married William Philip Schreiner in 
Swellendam in 1884. Schreiner would eventually become Prime Minister of the Cape 
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Colony, just prior to the outbreak of the South African War.65 FW Reitz Jnr inherited 
his grandfather, DG Van Reenen’s giant library of British literature from his father. 
The collection was moved to Pretoria upon his appointment as State Secretary, only to 
be lost after the British took Pretoria when his home was ransacked and the books 
distributed among wounded British soldiers in hospital.66 His son, Deneys Reitz, was 
a Boer commando during the war, later celebrated author and South African High 
Commissioner to London.67 
The impact of influential Anglo-Afrikaners like the Reitz and Van Reenen’s 
represent just one part of the story of the Overberg’s prosperity during the course of 
the nineteenth century. Another crucial part of the tale concerns the role played by 
prominent British families who settled the area and contributed to its economic and 
cultural development. Like the illustrious Reitz family, the Barry family became 
synonymous with the history and prosperity of the Overberg. The Barry trading 
empire was instrumental in popularizing the Merino sheep in the region as well as 
connecting the region to other markets, both of which profoundly boosted the 
prosperity and sustainability of  the region. Their company, Barry & Nephews, 
became the vital link that connected the cultures of the region’s rural Afrikaner’s and 
British settlers, having a profound impact on the shaping of culture and identity. The 
enterprise consisted of Joseph Barry and his brother’s two sons, Thomas and John.  
Joseph Barry was born in England and first arrived at the Cape in 1817 as an 
agent for a London Wine house. He was tasked with sourcing local wine for export, 
but the substandard quality of Cape wines brought an end to the venture and Barry 
returned to England in 1819. However, his visit to the Cape and travels through the 
hinterland had convinced him to return to the Cape and start a different business 
endeavour.68 The initial enterprise was small and consisted only of Joseph Barry 
travelling across the region buying and reselling fresh produce, as well as performing 
various maintenance jobs on farms.69 In 1822, when the Overberg’s grain crop failed 
and the region faced hunger, Barry vowed to fulfil the contract to deliver a 
government relief consignment of rice and wheat to the area. In order to do so !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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speedily, he chartered a boat from Cape Town to the harbour at Port Beaufort. The 
successful delivery of the government consignment sparked the idea to use Port 
Beaufort and the Breede River as a conduit to deliver fresh produce from the 
Overberg to the market in Cape Town. The long and arduous overland route via the 
old wagon route and across the Hottentots Holland Mountains had prevented farmers 
in the Overberg from selling their produce at a profit and the agricultural output had 
long been relegated to subsistence use and simple goods-for-goods bartering. By 
establishing a link via the sea, the Barry’s had transformed the Overberg from a barter 
to a cash economy and ushered in an era of prosperity.70 
In 1825, Joseph Barry married Johanna Marthina Van Reenen.71 She was the 
granddaughter of Dirk Gysbert Van Reenen and cousin of FW Reitz Snr. The joining 
of these influential families had providential consequences not only for the individual 
members but also for the economic development of the region and its cultural 
development. Joseph’s marriage into the rural Afrikaner gentry bestowed him with 
respectability and acceptance by the Afrikaner community, as well as granting him 
access to the agricultural innovation of the Van Reenen/Reitz powerhouse.72 JF Reitz 
and Michiel Van Breda, were undoubtedly the leading innovators experimenting with 
cross breeding the Spanish Merino and Cape Fat Tail sheep. Yet, it was the tenacity 
and entrepreneurship of Joseph Barry that popularised the Merino throughout the 
region. Distributing the Merino and its wool through the Barry trade empire, did much 
to break down Afrikaner resistance and animosity towards the idea of abandoning the 
Cape Fat Tail.73 Barry’s successful marketing of the Merino was so exceptional that 
when studying the inventories of Rhenosterfontein, it can bee seen that in 1831 the 
farm had no sheep, yet by the end of 1832, a total of 1743 Merino’s were recorded on 
the books and by 1862 FW Reitz had completely switched over to keeping Merino 
sheep.74  
By the end of the 1850s, Barry & Nephews were exporting Overberg-
produced Merino wool directly to London via Port Beaufort. By 1857, the business 
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was selling wool products over the counter in their own stores.75 Joseph Barry’s 
success prompted him to invite his two nephews to join him in South Africa. Thomas 
and John followed their uncle in business and marriage, with both marrying into the 
Van Reenen family. Both John and Thomas married women named Aletta Catharina 
Van Reenen. Thomas’ wife was the daughter of Jacob Van Reenen, the granddaughter 
of DG Van Reenen, and the sister of Joseph’s wife Johanna Marthina.76 John’s wife 
was the daughter of Daniel Van Reenen, the granddaughter of DG Van Reenen, and 
the cousin of Thomas and Joseph’s wives.77 
The expansion of the Barry & Nephews enterprise seemed to mirror the 
growth of the region, as new branches opened in every new town established over the 
course of the century. Towns like Riversdale, Heidelberg, Riviersonderend, 
Bredasdorp, Montagu, Robertson, Mosselbay, Ladismith and Barrydale, all contained 
a branch of Barry & Nephews.78 Joseph established himself in Swellendam, while 
Thomas was stationed at the enterprise’s headquarters at Port Beaufort. Thomas’ son, 
John Joseph,79 worked and operated the Heidelberg store for many years.80 The 
Barry’s were highly influential in determining what the farmers in the region 
produced and in the way they conducted business. Joseph Barry contributed greatly 
towards engendering trust and cooperation between local farmers and the British 
settlers in the way he conducted business. As many Afrikaner farmers resented the 
cultural superiority of the British and often felt inferior due to such shortcomings as 
being illiterate, Barry recognised the need to make his clients feel comfortable. Barry 
& Nephews would often undertake the signing of contracts and other written 
documentation on the behalf of illiterate farmers. They also recognised the importance 
of accommodating clientele in their native tongue, and the slogan: As jy lekker wil 
lewe, koop by Barry en Newe!”, soon became a well known catchphrase in the 
district.81 After the emancipation of slaves in 1833, the Barry’s had even filed 
compensation claims on the behalf of farmers, who had granted them power of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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attorney.82 From 1852 until 1876 Barry & Nephews even operated the Swellendam 
Bank, which was a subsidiary of their main enterprise. So powerful and influential in 
the rural economy of the Overberg had the Barry’s become that they even started to 
print their own promissory notes, which farmers used as a currency.83 The popularity 
and acceptance of the business by rural Afrikaners had much to do with Joseph 
Barry’s formative years in the region, when he had shared in their hardship and 
endeared himself to them through a reputation of honesty and integrity.84 
Like the Barry’s, the Moodies were another influential British family in the 
history of the region. Descending from noble Scottish origins, Benjamin Moodie 
arrived in the area in 1817.85 Moodie was employed to bring English craftsmen into 
the Overberg as part of the 1820s settler drive. For his efforts, Moodie was granted 
5000 morgen of land near Port Beaufort by Sir Lowry Cole in 1831.86 From here, 
Moodie established the Port Beaufort Trading Company which exported wheat and 
imported manufactured goods into the Overberg. The success of the enterprise 
stimulated the growth of wheat by farmers.87 The Moodies soon grew in stature as 
they settled into the community and became ingratiated to local Afrikaners. Although 
not part of the DRC, Moodie was granted special membership to attend services at the 
DRC church in Swellendam. Both Moodie and his son, Donald, become field cornets 
in the Heidelberg region.88  
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1.2) A town is born 
 
The earliest known reference to the site that was to become the town of 
Heidelberg can be found in a journal entry made by Hendrik Swellengrebel Jnr, while 
visiting the Cape during 1776. Swellengrebel, the son of one time Cape Governor, 
Hendrik Swellengrebel Snr, was en route to Swellendam by way of the old wagon 
road that followed the river in the direction of Zuurbraak. While exploring the 
surrounds, he recorded making a stop on a farm belonging to the widow Fourie, 
situated on the banks of the Duivenhoks River.89 Like other towns in the Cape 
Colony, the story of Heidelberg’s origin can be traced to the establishment of a Dutch 
Reformed Church (DRC), when a group of influential and wealthy farmers decided 
that the monthly excursion for holy communion at Swellendam had become too 
arduous.  
On 13 November 1855, a new congregation was formed when a section of the 
farm Doornboom, belonging to LJ Fourie, was purchased for the express purpose of 
establishing a new parish and community. The purchase was undersigned and funded 
by a number of wealthy agrarian scions of the district, most of whom bore the familiar 
surnames of the early pioneers of the Overberg. They were JP Eksteen, JJ Gildenhuys, 
CJ Human, EP Kleynhans, CJ Uys, and JJ Van Wyk.  
As the oldest, Gildenhuys and Uys would serve as the first elders in the church 
council, while the remainder of the undersigned acted as deacons.90 Although it would 
take almost 21 years to erect a building befitting the majesty of the founders’ 
ambitions, community life in both body and spirit quickly started to revolve around 
the church.91 Since its original wooden incarnation, the church represented not only 
the geographic centre of town, but also the heart of the community. The town’s 
inception coincided with a period in Cape colonial history when fraternity and 
cooperation between Cape Afrikaners and their British countrymen reached a zenith. 
Following in the wake of such crucial flashpoints like the Anti-Convict movement 
(1848-1849), Frontier War (1850) and Kat River Rebellion, increased cooperation 
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between the two cultural groups lay the path for Representative government (1853).92 
Within the larger socio-economic area of the Overberg, its inhabitants had by 1855, a 
venerable history of cooperation and cultural intermingling. As such Heidelberg’s 
DRC congregation contained many English-speaking parishioners alongside their 
stalwart Afrikaner counterparts.93 It could perhaps be regarded as a fitting tribute or 
the most ironic of coincidences, that the church was located on the corner of two 
streets named after individuals representing the different cultures of the region. 
Named after the original owner of Doornboom and perpendicular to the church was 
Fourie Street, which ran from the southwest to northeast in the direction of the 
Duivenhoks River and the old homestead. Parallel to the church’s entrance running 
from northwest to southeast, was Hopley Street which functioned as Heidelberg’s 
main road and thoroughfare. Hopley Street was named for William Musgrave Hopley, 
a land surveyor who settled near Buffeljagsfontein in 1817 and became one of the first 
mapmakers in the Overberg, having worked the area for almost 40 years.94 Hopley’s 
father was a Royal Naval officer turned teacher, who arrived in the Cape as part of the 
invasion fleet in 1806.95 It was also at this very crossroads where invading Boer 
commandos and British troops would clash in a bloody skirmish that shook the 
foundations of the community. 
The rapid growth of rural towns around DRC congregations was a hallmark of 
the structural changes wrought by nineteenth century British rule in the Cape Colony, 
and had a profound effect on Cape Afrikaner identity and its relationship with 
authority. During Company rule, inhabitants of the Cape had been culturally, 
economically and educationally neglected by a business concern only interested in 
profit. The VOC made very little effort to improve physical infrastructure at the Cape 
and suppressed DRC efforts to cultivate spiritual and cultural developments which 
could interfere with company policy. In this environment, Cape Afrikaners developed 
a spirit of wilful independence, scornful of outside interference, while simultaneously 
longing for opportunities and vehicles of expression and distinction.96 During the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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early days of Company rule, few DRC parishes existed beyond the Cape peninsula. In 
1795 only 6 parishes existed, all of which were confined to the Cape Town area or to 
the outlying areas of the peninsula.97 As a result of the slow expansion under the 
VOC, inhabitants of rural areas like the Overberg had to travel vast distances to get 
married and have their children baptized. Between Caledon and Swellendam no 
churches existed until the 1840s, and many rural inhabitants had to travel to Cape 
Town.98 Under British rule the number of congregations increased rapidly, with 
number of churches reaching 14 in 1824, 25 in 1840, 36 in 1850, 49 in 1854, and 64 
in 1840. The gratitude towards the British authorities responsible for the proliferation 
of congregations has often been cited as a vital component of Cape Afrikaners’ 
deference to authority.99 Besides the role of churches to officiate the administrative 
needs of communities, DRC membership was also a way of denoting social status 
much in the same vein as other symbols and accoutrements associated with status and 
respectability.100 Initially, rural Cape Afrikaners had very little connection to religious 
and educational institutions, yet these remained very important as vehicles for social 
distinction, much like the legal distinctions from the Company period were to the 
development of status and identity.101  
The practice of establishing towns and churches by way of donations or loans 
from wealthy Cape Dutch farmers followed a common pattern in the development of 
Cape society throughout the early to mid nineteenth century. Wealthy Dutch farmers 
or previous VOC employees often funded these new kerkdorpe as a method of 
investment by securing future debt repayments at a time when access to capital and 
credit was limited.102 Records of the DRC council in Heidelberg indicate that the loan 
for the construction of the first church from JJ Gildenhuys was eventually repaid with 
interest to his son BW Gildenhuys in 1911.103 Patronage to churches was also a way 
of reinforcing the hierarchies of the old status system from the Company period, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the structure of new congregations usually adhered to existing stratifications, in which 
a family’s higher status was reflected in the seating arrangement of the church.104 
The DRC’s role in  Cape Afrikaner allegiance also extended from the very 
British nature of the church and its clergy, as well as the connection between the 
church and government. The procedure by which congregations acquired a new 
minister required that the church council recommend a candidate. Yet, the authority to 
appoint a minister always remained in the hands of the government.105 Most of the 
newly arrived clergy were British, with a proclivity towards ministers from Scottish 
origins.  In 1837, 12 out of 22 ministers were Scottish.106 The appointment of 
ministers of British origin meant that the DRC clergy in the Cape were less likely to 
assimilate within local Afrikaner communities, and dilute the DRC’s government-
aligned objectives. 107  As the DRC became the primary vehicle for the British 
educational transformation of the Cape, it was the hope of the Governor Lord Charles 
Somerset that the British clergy would encourage Cape Afrikaners in the untouched 
rural areas to send their children to English medium government schools operated by 
the DRC clergy.108  
The dynamic interplay between the DRC and rural communities would also 
become an important factor in Cape Afrikaners’ continually evolving relationship 
with authority. The Evangelical movements in the latter half of the nineteenth century  
became a vital part of orthodox DRC practice and further entrenched a spirit of 
obedience within Cape Afrikaner society. Partially inspired by emergent 
Romanticism, the movement was a response to an increasingly mechanistic 
worldview and chaotic world events. Recognising the need for rewarding people’s 
fortitude in upholding community order, as well as offering an antidote to stale 
orthodox worship practices, the Cape Revival of the 1860s focused on the importance 
of personal religious conversion and spiritual experience. The evangelic revivalist 
movements of mid century overwhelmed the liberal factions within the DRC, who 
espoused a more unemotional and modern interpretation of faith connected to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, pp. 204-205. 
105 P. Borcherds: An autobiographical memoir, p. 183. 
106 A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-
1850, p. 24. 
107 Ibid., p. 27. 
108 S. Duff: Changing Childhoods in the Cape Colony: Dutch Reformed Church Evangelicalism and 
Colonial Childhood, 1860-1895, p. 24. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 31 
democratic spirit and political machinations of the 1853 establishment of the Cape 
constitution.  
This embedded evangelical strain offers an explanation for the lack of political 
participation among Cape Afrikaners and their deference to the authority of 
government and monarchy.109 Records indicate that the Evangelical and Cape Revival 
movements had a profound impact on the congregation of Heidelberg throughout the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, with revivals occurring in the years 1860, 1868, 
1874, 1884 and 1889.110 The Revivals were very much a reaction towards the socio-
economic and material changes in colonial society of the time, like the commercial 
dominance by the British, the general commercialisation of colonial society, 
industrialisation, imperial rule, and the consolidation of power. Many Cape 
Afrikaners felt the need to recreate the patterns of social stratification from the old 
Dutch system in the wake of slave emancipation which appeared to many as a 
challenge to social order. As such, people gravitated towards revivalism with its 
components of emotion and predestination, providing them with a way to cope with 
the material and cultural changes resulting from economic expansion, urbanisation, 
drought, disease and mass immigration.111 The movements came to reflect Cape 
Afrikaner uncertainty about their identity and place within world.112 By causing a rift 
with the DRC, the revivals highlighted rural Cape Afrikaners’ reaction towards 
modern society. Their rejection of liberalism and progressiveness provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of the political apathy and respect for government 
authority.113 
Cape Afrikaner concerns about modernity within the British Cape Colony 
were compounded by Legislation of 1865 which mandated all government-funded 
education to be in English, and provided pressure to anglicise that continued 
throughout the nineteenth century. Afrikaners and the Dutch language were 
increasingly regarded as backwards. In nearby Swellendam, merchants and civil 
servants used social etiquette to differentiate themselves from Afrikaner farmers 
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whom they regarded as their inferior.114 Despite the emergence of such ethnic class 
prejudices, intermarriage, rural isolation and mutual dependence created a system in 
which old company employees and farmers could easily fit into new hierarchies and 
benefit from British capitalism and expanded markets, without having their identity 
challenged by British cultural imperialism.115  
Wealthy farmers or former company employees with established agricultural 
empires transformed into urban traders who used the new language as a tool without 
emotional ties. In Heidelberg, the Reitz and Van Reenen families used their wealth in 
agriculture and land to consolidate their influence and social position within the 
community.116 The community of Heidelberg also had a long history of contact with 
English traders and merchants like Barry & Nephews and the Moodies who operated 
the Port Beaufort Trading Company.117 Through intermarriage and commercial ties, 
other agrarian families started to amass great wealth in the surrounds of Heidelberg. 
The Du Preez family of the Krombeks River area became wealthy from their 
connections to the Barry shipping enterprise.118 Another of the town founders and first 
deacon of the church congregation, CJ Human119 went into a partnership with the 
Moodies, and over time the Human family became wealthy wool merchants in their 
own right.120 The discovery of diamonds in the 1870s benefitted the agricultural 
market of the Cape, as demand for produce increased rapidly in support of the 
diamond industry. Although wheat farmers prospered from increased prices, the 
diamond boom diverted investment capital away from the Southern Cape and made 
the market prone to volatile fluctuations based on mining booms and busts. 
 The period of expansion and affluence of the 1870s was followed by a short 
but severe recession in the 1880s during which Cape Afrikaners became 
simultaneously class aware as well as politically active in order to protect their new 
found affluence. The threat of cheap, foreign grain imports as well as the economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, p. 203. 
115 Ibid., p. 198. 
116 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 16; R. Ross: The origins of capitalist agriculture in the Cape Colony: a survey, in W. 
Beinart & P. Delius & S. Trapido (eds.): Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and 
dispossession in rural South Africa, 1850-1930, p. 68. 
117 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 16. 
118 Ibid., p. 32. 
119 Human b5c3d11 
120 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 172. 
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contraction of the market, spurred the wealthy farmers at the Cape into political action 
and in the late 1870s demands for protective tariffs started to appear. Taking 
advantage of the Cape being granted Responsible Government in 1872, some of the 
wealthy agricultural families started entering politics. 121  From Heidelberg, the 
businessman Johannes Urbanus Human122, son of CJ Human, became a member of 
parliament representing the district of Riversdale from 1874 to 1878.123 Various 
members of the Human family became politically involved and frequently competed 
with FW Reitz Snr and his friend Dr Henry White for seats on the Legislative Council 
and Legislative Assembly. The Humans represented the more conservative factions of 
society, while Reitz and White were advocates for progressive legislation like the 
separation of church and state.124   
However, political participation on this level was not that prevalent among 
Cape Afrikaners, and many remained politically apathetic and mostly unconcerned 
with parliamentary machinations except when it affected their livelihood. Most 
preferred to use their personal and economic connections with affluent and politically 
connected English middlemen to exert influence on government policy.125 In the 
community of Heidelberg, no other family except perhaps the Reitz’s, were more 
politically influential than the Barry’s. From an early stage, the economic power of 
the Barry’s and their infiltration into all aspects of local inhabitants’ lives had 
transformed them into the political surrogates for the Cape Afrikaner farmers in the 
Overberg region. From the inception of the 1852 Cape Parliament, and Representative 
Government of 1854 until the decline of the firm in the 1860s, the Barry’s dominated 
the Legislative Council, and indirectly prevented the necessity for many Cape 
Afrikaners to become politically involved and to exercise political decisions.126 
Despite the emergence of political mobilisation among Cape farmers, there 
was very little manifestation of ethnic solidarity, and Afrikaners remained divided 
among socio-economic classes. The amalgamation of the Zuidafrikaanse Boeren !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 H. Giliomee: Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915, pp. 
39-41. 
122 Human b3c3d11e6 
123 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 31. 
124 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of 
the Cape,p. 164 
125 H. Giliomee: Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915, p. 
42. 
126 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of 
the Cape, p. 266. 
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Beschermings Vereninging (BBV) and Genootskap vir Regte Afrikaners into the 
Afrikaner Bond did not result in the creation of an inclusive political party stretching 
across the class divide. Bond campaigns were mainly concerned with protecting the 
economic interests of agrarian elites by curbing the social mobility of bywoners and 
ensuring cheap supplies of Coloured labour.127 In an 1899 census of the electoral 
division of Swellendam, the ward of Heidelberg contained only 158 voters, the 
majority being Afrikaner Bond-supporting farmers.128 Before and during the existence 
of the Bond, measures designed to tie Black and Coloured labour to the land had been 
implemented. Securing labour had become a priority as the lure of the diamond fields 
resulted in large-scale defections for better pay and treatment. The Masters and 
Servants Laws implemented in 1856, the 1870s, and 1889 were designed to counter 
such trends and bestowed field cornets with extraordinary judicial powers to 
prosecute deserting labourers and punish stock thieves.129 The title of field cornet 
became a sign of social distinction within communities, as these positions were 
usually occupied by wealthy and educated farmers in possession of the necessary 
literacy and administrative skills. Town co-founder and church elder CJ Uys,130 was 
colloquially known as “Cornelis Veldkornet.” 131 Reports filed with the Swellendam 
magistrate’s office also indicate both CJ Human and his son had been field cornets in 
the Heidelberg ward of Stuurmanskraal.132 
What started to emerge in Cape society, was a division between rural 
Afrikaners who were politically uninvolved, and their urban counterparts composed 
of British and anglicised Dutch professionals and middlemen. Political clashes 
between the groups were very infrequent, unemotional, and rarely related to national 
and international diplomatic affairs in the British Empire. Rural Cape Afrikaners 
sought only protection for their way of life and despite outrages regarding British 
Imperial interference in 1877 during the First Anglo-Boer War, and the Jameson Raid 
of 1896, most espoused a colonial nationalism which prized their membership as part !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of 
the Cape, pp. 43, 45. 
128 (KAB) CCP 11/1/40: Voter roll for district of Swellendam, 1 January 1899, pp. 37-43. 
129 H. Giliomee: Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915, p. 
47. 
130 Uys b1c5d9e1 
131 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 30. 
132 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter by CJ Human to the resident magistrate of Swellendam, 6 March 
1874. 
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of the British Imperial world.133 What Cape Afrikaners came to despise was a 
progressive and “foreign” brand of imperial intervention which did not take into 
account the local conditions and history from which their culture had emerged. Those 
administrators and rulers who considered such factors and accommodated the unique 
culture at the Cape were usually held in high regard. Cecil John Rhodes was 
successful in courting Cape Afrikaners in his bid to use the Cape as a springboard into 
Africa, by providing them with protective agricultural tariffs, excise taxes on brandy, 
capital infrastructure in the Northern Cape, and labour protection in the form of the 
1894 Glen Grey Act.134  
The issue over tariffs in the 1870s and 1880s caused a split between the town 
and countryside, as the more progressive British urbanites preferred a more 
competitive free market system, while rural Afrikaners demanded protective 
measures. The clash between conservatism and progressivism reared its head again 
with the Scab Act of 1894, when Cape Afrikaners rejected new livestock dipping 
practices, which they considered an infringement on their rights as Cape Colonists by 
a distant and foreign government.135 Despite vocal opposition to incidents of imperial 
meddling, the majority of Cape Afrikaners remained loyal to authority and to the 
monarchy, which had become essential parts of their hybrid identity in Cape society. 
Cape Afrikaners had come to embody a unique and hybrid cultural identity with 
multiple loyalties resulting from the infusion of elements of British culture of which 
they adopted those most beneficial for their protection and survival.136 After nearly a 
century of mutual dependence and cross-cultural pollination, the rift between the 
Dutch and British cultures had almost been mended. Pressure to anglicise over the 
course of the nineteenth century held open the question of whether the Cape Dutch 
population should be completely absorbed, or whether a composite nationality be 
allowed to flourish. In reality, a hybrid culture had already developed. It was this 
culture that would come under severe strain during the war, as outsiders decided how 
the struggle over identity in the Cape Colony would be settled.137 It was in this 
cultural environment that the war in Heidelberg would play itself out.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 A. Thompson: The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939, p. 622; H. Giliomee: 
Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915, p. 48. 
134 A. Thompson: The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939, pp. 640-641. 
135 M. Tamarkin: Volk and flock: Ecology, identity and politics among Cape Afrikaners in the late 
nineteenth century, pp. 4-5. 
136 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, pp. 226-227. 
137 Ibid., p. 203. 
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1.3) Heidelberg at the start of the war 
 
At the start of the war, Heidelberg was very much a town in transition between 
two different time periods, yet scrutiny of community records gives little premonition 
of the coming war. The Dutch Reformed Church, around which community life 
revolved, had recently lost its long serving minister, Reverend AB Daneel.138 His 
replacement, Reverend AJ Van Wijk, only started in March of 1900, and according to 
his personal files, the young minister was initially more interested in sermons on the 
role of Darwinism in society than the issue of war.139 The Municipal Council, 
comprised of a mixture of English speaking merchants and professionals, as well as 
wealthy anglicised Afrikaners, was in the process of securing Heidelberg’s stake as 
the new eastern terminus of the Cape Town-Worcester railway.140 Most of those 
involved in the development and functioning of the town had been there for years. In 
some cases, Municipal Council members were second-generation inhabitants of 
Heidelberg with connections to both the English and Afrikaner sections of the 
community. Among these was the town medical practitioner, Dr Henry Grave 
Biggs,141 a first generation immigrant from Reading, England, who had been mayor of 
Heidelberg for many years.142 Other members were Afrikaner farmers who lived near 
town or anglicised civil servants from wealthy agricultural families like the mayor 
James Munnik143 and secretary James Du Preez.144  
The town also had a cosmopolitan nature, with a number of foreign dealers 
and civic employees originating from various parts of the globe. 74-year-old Albert 
White,145 the special justice of the peace, who had been acting as Heidelberg’s de 
facto magistrate since 1876, was born in Mauritius and often doubled as the town !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 64. 
139 (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 10 March 1900; (DRCA) K-
DIV 1423: Draft of sermon by Reverend AJ Van Wijk, 4 April 1900.  
140 (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 14 December 1899; The 
South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 12 May 1900, p. 2. 
141 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/730: Death notice of Henry Grave Biggs, no. 3173, 25 July 1913. 
142 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 121; (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 7 
March 1895. 
143 Munnik b1c1d8e6; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/17885: Death notice of Jacobus Adam Willem Munnik, no. 
138/51, 19 December 1950; (KAB) 1/SWM 11/28: Letter to the resident magistrate of Swellendam 
mentioning the mayor of Heidelberg, no. 170/192, 2 March 1903. 
144 Du Preez b6c6d5e1f2g2h4; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/23606: Death notice of Jacobus Du Preez, no. 
2288/55, 18  April 1955. 
145 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/457: Death notice of Albert White, no. 2879, 11 April 1902. 
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pharmacist along with his second wife Susanna Salomina Georgina Pietersen. White 
was a distant relation of Dr Henry White, the politician and well-known companion of 
FW Reitz Snr.146 Stephen George Hall,147 was a second-generation immigrant from 
the United States. A shoemaker by trade, Hall doubled as messenger to the court and 
the lockup keeper of Heidelberg’s diminutive jail.148 The town dentist and local 
photographer was Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt, a German immigrant from 
Hamburg who had married a local Afrikaner woman from Riversdale after his divorce 
in 1890.149 Nicolas Friedman150 was a first generation Jewish immigrant from Savell, 
Russia, who operated a general store across from the town church. Heidelberg’s 
biggest hotel, the Masonic, had been operated by the Swedish E.T Friberg for many 
years.151 As the railway had terminated at Swellendam, the Masonic Hotel had offered 
intermittent lodging and transport to the people of Riversdale on their way to catch the 
train.152  
Construction of the railway was a priority for the progressive Municipal 
Council which aimed to invigorate their small town by connecting it to modernity. 
The extension of the railway had resulted in high property prices for farms and urban 
homes in neighbouring Swellendam, as well as a boom in stock prices. The railway 
had also resulted in an influx of foreigners and strangers from remote parts of the 
country who sought to profit from the endeavour. The hope was that Swellendam 
would become another Oudtshoorn and that the towns of Heidelberg and Riversdale 
would share in its prosperity due to their relative proximity. The crippling droughts 
and reliance on ostrich farming kindled the hope among many farmers to sell their 
land to prospective ostrich farmers from the interior.153  
As the extension was scheduled to reach Riversdale by May 1901, Heidelberg 
would be in line to benefit from increased property prices, a proposed irrigation 
scheme to be undertaken by the railway company, and increased business from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 159. 
147 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2455: Death notice of Stephen George Hall, no. 1151, 6 May 1923; Hall b2 
148 (KAB) AG 754: Forwarded application for additional police constables, no. 22/1900, 17 February 
1900. 
149 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/811: Death notice of Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt, no. 314, 16 January 1916.  
150 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/7045: Death notice of Nicolas Friedman, no. 71517, 25 November 1940. 
151 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Application for transfer of liquor license from Friberg to Hanson, no. 
398/1900, 13 July 1900. 
152 The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 12 May 1900, p. 2. 
153 (SBA) INSP 1/1/167: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Swellendam Branch, 14 August 
1899, pp. 15-16. 
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influx of foreigners.154 Despite the optimistic outlook, the community remained 
divided along urban-rural and class lines. Many farmers displayed little interest or 
faith in what they perceived to be British institutions. The community’s long standing 
involvement with the English merchant house Barry & Nephews and appetite for 
future dealings with British institutions had somewhat soured since the insolvency of 
the Barry empire in 1865. So integral a part of the rural economy had the Barry’s been 
that farmers used the firm’s promissory notes to cover their losses during a series of 
droughts during the 1860s. With the collapse of the business, many farms went under 
the hammer as debtors called in the promissory notes. Even those lucky enough to 
keep their farms were required to sell off a portion of their land to cover their debts. 
As most farms were circular shaped, a triangular wedge of land had to be 
relinquished, giving rise to a local epithet called Barry se hoek.155 Fallout from the 
Barry insolvency may have prejudiced local farmers against British financial 
institutions. When the Riversdale branch of Standard Bank opened in 1877, reports 
indicated that local farmers showed a lack of interest and wariness in doing business 
with the bank.156 Local inhabitants with bank accounts at the branches of Swellendam 
and Heidelberg, were usually limited to Anglo-Afrikaner elites, wealthy farmers, and 
English merchants like the Du Preez, Munnik, Human, and Uys families.157 
On 8 February 1900, the secretary of the Municipal Council was instructed to 
request the appointment of additional police constables for patrolling the town at 
night.158 The nearby construction of the new railway extension resulted in the influx 
of a large number of Coloured workers into town. Complaints regarding public 
intoxication and rowdy behaviour at night had spurred the council into action.159 
According to the application sent to Swellendam’ s resident magistrate, Heidelberg’s 
police force at the time consisted only of two men, an ordinary policeman, John 
Daniel James Manuel, who had occupied the position for 3 years, and the lockup 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 (SBA) INSP 1/1/154: Branch Prospects. Inspection Report for Riversdale, 25 Augsut 1900, pp. 6-7. 
155 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of 
the Cape, pp. 272-273. 
156 A. Mabin & B. Conradie (eds.): The confidence of the whole country: Standard Bank reports on 
economic conditions in Southern Africa, 1865-1902, p. 66. 
157 (SBA) INSP 1/1/154: Liabilty return, Inspection report for Riversdale Branch, 25 August 1900, pp. 
8, 17, 27; (SBA) INSP 1/1/167: Liability return, Inspection report for Swellendam Branch, 14 
August 1899, pp. 4, 7, 19. 
158 (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 8 February 1900. 
159 (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Letter from Heidelberg Municipal Council to resident magistrate of 
Riversdale regarding security of town, no. 71/1900, 8 February 1900. 
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keeper who had to patrol the town when the other man was indisposed.160 In the 
months that followed, a further three requests for the appointment of additional police 
constables were submitted.161 As the war progressed into 1900, Swellendam became a 
major source of food supply in the military railway network.162  
The pressure to supply grains and meat was especially worrisome to the 
region’s inhabitants at the outbreak of the war. Since 1894, the district had 
experienced a very trying time as a result of a series of severe droughts. As such, the 
largest agricultural yields of 1899 came in the form of ostrich feathers and wool. Yet 
an inspections report from both the Swellendam and Riversdale branches of Standard 
Bank indicated that copious rains from the start of January 1900 had rejuvenated 
hopes for improved crop yields. The barley crop was expected to do exceptionally 
well and form the bulk of the harvest of 1900.163  
The region remained an important supplier of food and horses for British 
troops throughout the war. An 1898 livestock census shows that the area surrounding 
Swellendam was the leading producer of merino sheep and stallions in the Southern 
Cape. 164  Later military inventories confirmed that in the greater district of 
Swellendam, Heidelberg was the largest producer of wheat, maize, sugar and potatoes 
throughout the war.165 Security and protection of the town was therefore of paramount 
importance to the military. However, an 1899 inspection of the police force and jail 
indicated that the attitude toward town security was informal and generally 
undisciplined. The report stated that the town was in no way prepared for war, 
blaming the special justice of the peace and lockup keeper for failing to address issues 
of security.166 So it was in a state of flux and unpreparedness that the community of 
Heidelberg entered the war. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 (KAB) AG 754: Forwarded application for additional police constables, no. 22/1900, 17 February 
1900. 
161 (KAB) AG 754: Request for additional police constable, no. 42/1900, 6 April 1900; (KAB) AG 754: 
Request for additional police constable, no. 190/1900, 11 April 1900; (KAB) AG 754: Request for 
additional police constable no. 59/1900, 18 June 1900. 
162 M. Grant: The history of the war in South Africa, 1899-1902, p. 243. 
163 (SBA) INSP 1/1/154: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Riversdale Branch, 25 August 1900, 
pp. 6-7; (SBA) INSP 1/1/167: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Swellendam Branch, 8 
September 1900, pp. 8-9. 
164 (KAB) CO 6043: Statistical report on district of Swellendam, 31 December 1898, pp. 341, 431. 
165 (KAB) AG 936: Report by RM Holt Okes on local inventories, no. 139/1901, 20 December 1901. 
166 (KAB) CO 2207: Inspection report on Heidelberg lockup, no. 868, 20 February 1899. 
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Chapter 2 - Loyalty and Sympathy 
 
A cursory overview of genealogical records on the people of Heidelberg, 
provides a good example of the division in loyalties which existed among the 
inhabitants of the Cape. Two boys born during the course of the war were respectively 
christened with the names Paul Kruger and Buller. Paul Kruger was Paul Kruger 
Geldenhuys,167 the fifteenth son of Gerhardus Bernardus Geldenhuys,168 whose eldest 
son, Adriaan Johannes Geldenhuys169 fought on the Boer side in the ZAR and was 
eventually exiled to India after his capture.170 Buller was Adrian Ferdinand Buller 
Muhsfeldt,171 the seventh son of Heidelberg’s German dentist and photographer, 
Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt who had been a proud Anglophile. Even more 
astounding, was the fact that the pair were related. Buller’s mother, Elizabeth Susanna 
Geldenhuys,172 was the niece of Paul’s father, making them second cousins. Such 
phenomena were more commonplace than coincidence, and are clear indications of 
the extraordinary dynamics at play in the Cape during the South African War. Perhaps 
even more telling is the fact that in spite of his enthusiastic support of the British, the 
elder Muhsfeldt was the first person in Heidelberg to adopt three orphans from a ZAR 
concentration camp after the war.173  
 
2.1) Loyalty  
2.1.1) Displays of  loyalty 
2.1.1.1) Military service & law enforcement 
 
This study aims to transcend the traditional dichotomies which define 
allegiance in existing studies on the war in the Cape. Yet, some of their most visible 
outward manifestations are useful tools for analysing how inhabitants of the Cape 
Colony appeared to display their loyalty. These include service in Town Guards, as 
well as other organs of the Colonial Defence Force like the District Mounted Troop 
(DMT) and District Mounted Police (DMP). Membership of Heidelberg’s Town !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g7h15 
168 Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g7 
169 Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g7h2 
170 G. Geldenhuys: Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die verre suide, p. 47. 
171 Muhsfeldt b7 
172 Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g4h2 
173 G. Geldenhuys.: ’n Venster op die Hopkinse en die Muhsfeldts, p. 38. 
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Guard and other local law enforcement bodies provides a valuable profile of those 
inhabitants willing to openly display their loyalty, and serves as a convenient entry 
point for discerning patterns of allegiance. The republican invasions of the Cape 
Colony and subsequent rebellions necessitated military intervention by the Colonial 
authorities in order to restore law and order, and to prevent the conflict from erupting 
into civil war. Since the start of the war, Cape politicians had been extremely wary of 
directly involving the Colony in the conflict. Both the Schreiner and Sprigg 
governments were reluctant for the Cape to be used as a military launchpad into the 
republics, and dreaded the possibility of waging war against their own people who 
rebelled in support of the Boer Republics. In response to the challenge, the Sprigg 
ministry initiated a campaign for recruiting volunteers to defend the Cape. The result 
led to the creation of the Colonial Defence Force (CDF), a temporary military body 
akin to the later American National Guard or British Home Guard, which was 
expressly created to defend the Colony from invasion and deter local rebellion by 
establishing an extensive and visible local military presence. Volunteers were to 
report to their local resident magistrates or civil commissioners, an important 
symbolic gesture aimed to affirm their constitutional legitimacy and mitigate the legal 
conundrum of martial law application. By using volunteerism, the government could 
avoid calling up the local militia and prevent the possibility of aggravating the 
situation at the Cape into a state of civil war.174 
The CDF was comprised of various units, including Town Guards, mounted 
rifle divisions, as well as contingents of the regular police force. Out of a Cape 
population of 2 350 000, a total of 18000 men joined Town Guards, while 6000 
volunteered for service in the various mounted divisions. As only 517 000 of the 
colony was white, the majority of the volunteers were Coloured men who joined 
Town Guards.175 According to official memos issued by the CDF, Town Guards were 
to be used only for the defence of the town itself, and in the case of enemy invasion, 
as an auxiliary force in support of mounted units. Town Guards reported directly to 
the appointed local commandant, who in turn reported to the commanding officer of 
colonial forces for the area. Requisitions and pay were administered by the local civil 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 C. Strydom: Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, p. 93. 
175 Ibid., p. 94. 
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commissioner or resident magistrate who forwarded all requests to the Principal 
Paymaster of the CDF in Cape Town.176  
Heidelberg’s Town Guard was first called into service on 9 April 1901 and 
was only active until the end of the same month. Due to the small size of the town, it 
was considered a subdivision of Swellendam’s Town Guard and commanded by the 
same officer who had also served as temporary acting-commandant at Heidelberg 
during the period.177 The list of names and ranks were as follows: 
 
 
Swellendam native and later Afrikaner Nationalist writer, Maria Elizabeth Rothman 
(MER), provides insight into the operation and purpose of Town Guards in the region 
in her recollections of wartime Swellendam. According to her account, Town Guards 
were not regarded as serious fighting units by the townspeople and often met with 
scorn or ridicule. Their presence and public drill practices were a way for certain 
community members to display their loyalty to military authorities. A powerful albeit 
transparent psychological tool, Town Guards were also used to reaffirm allegiance 
and security within the community.178 A military intelligence report of the time seems 
to support the inhabitant’s perception by revealing that Swellendam’s Town Guard of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
176 (KAB) DD 7/13: Official memorandum by the GOC of the CDF, 13 February 1901, p. 2. 
177 (KAB) DD 4/171: Drill and pay sheets for Town Guard District of Swellendam, no. 61/1901 & 
62/1901, 6 June 1901. 
178 M. Rothmann: My beskeie deel: 'n outobiografiese vertelling, pp. 131-132. 
HJ Hanson (Lieutenant) SG Hall TH Miller 
JL Cantrell (Sergeant) JM Homan E Storer 
P Silbert (Sergeant) A Hoffman JL Swart 
W Osmond (Corporal) JH Human Gert Swart 
AWR White (Corporal) J Johnson PJ Uys 
DC Batten A Lombaard PJ Swart 
JC Bester WL Lombaard Isaac D Bosman 
HJM Biggs JDJ Manuel John D Bosman 
WH Bosman J Matthee Michael Gildenhuis 
S Cronje M Morrison Peter H Ralll 
Herbert Du Preez EM Morrison  
GM Du Preez     GCC Muhsfeldt  
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60 men were unarmed and mostly comprised of a cycling corps used for 
reconnaissance and message delivery.179  
Review of the biographical and genealogical records of those who served in 
Heidelberg’s Town Guard tends to support this view with regards to the majority of 
the individuals. GM Du Preez was Gerhardus Marthinus Du Preez,180 grandson of 
Hendrik Ryk Du Preez,181 the wealthy patriarch of the urbanised Du Preez family who 
served in Heidelberg’s first Municipal Council.182  GM Du Preez’s father, HM Du 
Preez183 was the owner of a general store in town.184 Herbert Du Preez refers to 
Herbert Francois Du Preez,185 son of Hendrik Ryk and uncle to GM Du Preez. The Du 
Preez’s were an influential family in the community who had become partially 
anglicised as was the custom of wealthy Afrikaners who had become involved in 
public life. Herbert Du Preez’s older brother was James Du Preez,186 secretary of 
Heidelberg’s Municipal Council. Interestingly, he was born as Jacobus Du Preez, but 
was colloquially known as James, and signed his name as such on all official 
municipal correspondence. 187  Incidentally, Heidelberg’s mayor, James Munnik, 
adopted the same affectation, having been born Jacobus Adam Willem Munnik.188 
The Du Preezs and Munniks represented the upper strata of Afrikaners keen to 
emulate the English as a way of showing their status with the community, having 
adopted British ideas on progress and social Darwinism.189 
In 1865, the Cape government had decided that instruction in all state-funded 
educational institutions would be done in English. As a result, a new generation of 
Anglo-Afrikaners, like the Du Preezs, were absorbed into the civil service. In 
neighbouring Swellendam, the commercial and economic sections of the urban !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
179 (TAB) HC 49: Swellendam Commandant letter to Agent Chowder, Intelligence report, 23 January 
1901. 
180 Du Preez b6c6d5e1f2g2h1i2 
181 Du Preez bdc6d5e1f2g2; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/485: Death notice of Hendrik Ryk Du Preez, no. 3225, 
6 August 1903. 
182 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 121. 
183 Du Preez b6c6d5e1f2g2h1 
184 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Complaints by H Du Preez and C Hirschmann regarding martial law, no. 
468/1902 & no. 467/1902, 1 May 1902. 
185 Du Preez bdc6d5e1f2g2h6 
186 Du Preez bdc6d5e1f2g2h4 
187 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/23606: Death notice of Jacobus Du Preez, no. 2288/55, 18 April 1955; (KAB) 
3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 8 February 1900. 
188 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/17885: Death notice of Jacobus Adam Willem Munnik, no. 138/51, 19 
December 1950. 
189 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, p. 225. 
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domain were dominated by English merchants like the Barry trading empire. As 
Afrikaners were regarded as unprogressive and conservative by English merchants 
and civil servants, even wealthy farmers were considered as their inferiors.190 In 
response, the newly acculturated Afrikaner elites started to adopt English social 
etiquette and affectations to differentiate them from their more traditional brethren. 
This trend continued into the war period, as MER recalls how she and her sister often 
conversed with each other in English as a way of setting themselves apart.191 Other 
manifestations of Anglophile behaviour to reflect status included pastimes and leisure 
activities.192 A photograph taken in 1864 on the lawn in front of the DRC church in 
Heidelberg, shows a host of characters, both English and Anglo-Afrikaners, 
participating in a game of croquet.193 The sport section from the regional paper, The 
South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, for the year 1900, contains numerous 
references to tennis matches between members of Riversdale and Swellendam’s civil 
service and Heidelberg’s own anglicised Afrikaner elites. 194  A photo, entitled 
Heidelberg tennis party at Swellendam, also reveals the eagerness for distinction 
among the upper strata of Afrikaners.195 A comparison between the Town Guard of 
1901 and the 1899 Heidelberg rugby team reveals a match of seven names.196 Unlike 
other larger towns in the Cape, like Oudtshoorn and Swellendam, Heidelberg did not 
have a large section of English citizens.197 Although most of the English speakers in 
the community lived in town they did not form the majority, and the town was mostly 
inhabited by a mixture of anglicised Afrikaners and foreign immigrants. Giliomee 
refers to this intermittent class as the Queen’s Afrikaners.198 Mainly educated at the 
aptly named Victoria College in Stellenbosch, they represented the bilingual, 
urbanised, Afrikaner middle-class trying to transform their rural communities in the 
modernisation drive at the turn of the century. As such, their subscription and that of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
190 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, p. 203. 
191 M. Rothmann: My beskeie deel: 'n outobiografiese vertelling, p. 78. 
192 A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-
1850, p. 26. 
193 (KAB) HOP: Croquet team circa 1865, no. 810 , Addendum A, Figure 13. 
194 The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser,  
195 (KAB) HOP: Tennis party at Swellendam, no. 1028, Addendum A, Figure 14. 
196 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 168. 
197 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 22. 
198 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, p. 193. 
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their offspring to certain ideas of British citizenship was an important affirmation of 
identity and status.199 
Peter H Rall was Pieter Hendrik de Necker Rall,200 from the farm Kruisrivier, 
whose father Johannes Cornelis Rall,201 also served on the Municipal Council.202 JH 
Human was Johannes Hendrik Human,203 the grandson of town founder CJ Human. 
JH Human was also the nephew of the member of parliament, Johannes Urbanus 
Human, and like his grandfather was field cornet for the ward of Stuurmanskraal.204 
The display of loyalty through service in the Town Guard seemed a natural extension 
for the wealthier strata of Heidelberg’s urban Afrikaners. Despite such displays, 
loyalism was a much more complex concept than the clear divisions which the 
context of war provided. For many of these men, loyalty was loosely based on a 
general idea of Britain and empire, which conformed more with colonial nationalism 
interspersed with provincial pride, than loyalty to the political course determined by 
Downing Street.205 For other community members, volunteer service to the ideal of 
empire seemed a more natural extension owing to their own heritage. HJM Biggs was 
Henry John Munro Biggs, 206  son of town doctor Henry Grave Biggs 207  and 
Heidelberg’s first mayor.208 AWR White was Albert William Robertson White,209 son 
of the local justice of the peace, Albert White.210 TH Miller was Thomas Henry 
Miller,211 the son of Richard Petrus Cornelis (Dick) Miller,212 who served as chairman 
of the Heidelberg Municipal Council.213 J Johnson was John Egleston Johnson.214 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
199 H. Bradford: Gentlemen and Boers: Afrikaner Nationalism, Gender, and Colonial Warfare in the 
South African War, in G. Cuthbertson & A. Grundlingh & M. Suttie (eds.): Writing a Wider War: 
Rethinking Gender, Race, and Identity in the South African War, 1899-1902, p. 37. 
200 Rall b1c2d7 
201 Rall b1c2 
202 (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 14 December 1899. 
203 Human b5c3d11e2f6 
204 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Request from field cornet JH Human to sell his horse, no. 553/1902, 4 March 
1902. 
205 A. Thompson: The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939, p. 620. 
206 Biggs b3 
207 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/730: Death notice of Henry Grave Biggs, no. 3173, 25 July 1913. 
208 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 159. 
209 White b4; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/653: Death notice of Albert William Robertson White, no. 2740, 7 
July 1910. 
210 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/457: Death notice of Albert White, no. 2879, 11 April 1902. 
211 Miller b3c1; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/19749: Death notice of Thomas Henry Miller, no. 3169/52, 11 June 
1952. 
212 Miller b3 
213 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/28: Approval of RPC Miller as special justice of the peace, no. 326/1901, 30 
August 1901. 
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Colloquially known as Jockey, Johnson and his brother William James Johnson,215 
operated a general store in town.216 British military authorities generally distrusted 
Cape Afrikaners due to the complexity in their loyalties and sympathy with the 
republics. As a result, recruitment for Town Guards were often limited to persons of 
more concrete British credentials.217  
The highest-ranking officer in the Town Guard was Lieutenant Henry Jones 
Hanson.218 Hanson had only recently arrived in Heidelberg when the war broke out, 
and purchased the local Masonic Hotel from ET Friberg.219 Born in Lincolnshire in 
1854, Hanson was a retired master mariner of the British Merchant Navy, and was, 
from the British military perspective, the obvious and more trustworthy choice for 
heading the Town Guard.220 As the new owner of the Masonic Hotel, Henry Hanson 
was also responsible for maintaining Heidelberg’s gunpowder magazine which was 
located next to the hotel.221 In a gesture belying his sympathies, minutes of the 
Municipal Council meetings recorded that Hanson offered the bell on his front gate to 
be used by the local police for enforcing curfew during the early stage of the war.222 
Although Hanson was the ranking officer with a military background, command of 
the Town Guard was relegated to Heidelberg assistant-commandant and chief 
constable for the district of Swellendam, John Alfred Fiveash.223 Born in Kent, 
England, in 1853, Fiveash was a career lawman who also served as inspector of the 
DMT.224 Fiveash had been stationed at Swellendam since 1897, and was tapped for 
the position of chief constable at Oudtshoorn. Fate intervened, and Fiveash was forced 
to turn down the promotion due to his wife’s failing health.225 For those of limited 
British pedigree, service in Heidelberg’s Town Guard followed other patterns of 
affiliation. For others, inclusion was purely incidental. P Silbert was the young Philip !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
214 Johnson b4; (KAB) MOOC/6/9/9903: Death notice of John Egleson Johnson, no. 84618, 3 March 
1943. 
215 Johnson b3 
216 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Johnson vs Roberts, no. 115/1901, 4 February 1901. 
217 B. Nasson: Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902, p. 46. 
218 (KAB) DD 6/104: Circular of CDF appointments, No. 14, 16 May 1901. 
219 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Request for transfer of liquor licence, no. 398/1900, 13 July 1900. 
220 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2887: Death notice of Henry Jones Hanson, no. 9784, 22 October 1925. 
221 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Approval for transfer of gunpowder license, no. 273/1900, 31 August 1900. 
222 (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 1 November 1900. 
223 (KAB) DD 4/171: Drill and pay sheets for Town Guard, District of Swellendam, no. 61/1901 & 
62/1901, 6 June 1901; (KAB) AG 936: Pay requisition for CDF officers, district of Swellendam, 
no. 75/1901. 
224 (KAB) AG 936: Appointment approval for J Fiveash, no. 37/1901, 23 April 1901; (KAB) MOOC 
6/9/4156: Death notice of John Alfred Fiveash, no. 43849, 26 August 1933. 
225 (KAB) AG 754: Report on disciplinary action against J Fiveash, no. 5/1900, 16 January 1900. 
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Silbert, a recently arrived Jewish immigrant from Luknik, Russia, who had been in 
partnership with the Friedman family.226 The Morrison brothers, Eduard Martinus 
(Boy) Morrison227 and Murdoch Frederick Morrison,228 were building contractors 
from Cape Town who had been busy renovating the foundations and walls of the 
Dutch Reformed Church when war broke out.229  
Those already involved in some form of local law enforcement were probably 
more inclined to be selected for inclusion in the Town Guard. JDJ Manuel had been 
Heidelberg’s first and only permanent police constable when the war broke out in 
1899.230 He had been assisted by lockup keeper Stephen G Hall, who had been 
replaced by William Osmond, making their inclusion to and rank within the Town 
Guard an inevitability.231 Thomas Henry Miller, along with Dirk Cornelius Batten,232 
Willem Lodewyk Lombaard,233 and Jan Matthee,234 had previously been appointed as 
temporary police constables by the Municipal Council to keep the peace in town 
while nearby construction of the railway was underway.235  Batten, Miller, and 
Lombaard would later join the District Mounted Police.236  
It would appear that proximity to town and family connections were also 
factors determining service in law enforcement bodies like the DMT and Town 
Guard. A striking feature of Heidelberg volunteers was the level of 
interconnectedness between the families. GCC Muhsfeldt was obviously the 
Anglophile dentist Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt. 237  Michael Gildenhuis was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
226 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/20275: Death notice of Philip Silbert, no. 5960/52, 25 October 1952. 
227 Morrison b6c4 
228 Morrison b6c3 
229 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, pp. 50, 52. 
230 (KAB) AG 754: Forwarded application for additional police constables, no. 22/1900, 17 February 
1900. 
231 (KAB) AG 749: Appointment of William Osmond, no. 93/99, 21 November 1899. 
232 (KAB) AG 754: Appointment of DC Batten, no. 32/1900, 9 March 1900. 
233 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Lex vs Van Reenen, arresting officer was WL Lombaard, no. 550/1900, 30 
April 1900. 
234 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Lex vs Otto, arresting officer was J Matthee, no. 361/1900, 10 October 
1900. 
235 (KAB) AG 754: Request for additional police constable, no. 42/1900, 6 April 1900; (KAB) AG 754: 
Request for additional police constable, no. 190/1900, 11 April 1900; (KAB) AG 754: Request for 
additional police constable no. 59/1900, 18 June 1900. 
236 (KAB) AG 936: Employment application of DC Batten, no. 70/1901, 19 June 1901; (KAB) AG 
936: Employment application of TH Miller, no. 88/1901, 13 August 1901; (KAB) AG 1013: 
Employment application of WL Lombaard, no. 82/1902, 18 June 1902. 
237 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/811: Death notice of Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt, no. 314, 16 January 1916. 
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probably Michael Hillegard Janse Van Rensburg Geldenhuys,238 who was the cousin 
of Muhsfeldt’s wife Elizabeth.239 A Lombaard was Antonie Jacobus Lombaard,240 a 
younger brother of Willem Lodewyk Lombaard.241 The Lombaard family lived on a 
smallholding next to the town pound,242 where three of the older Lombaard brothers 
farmed. They were Jan Hermanus Lombaard, the master of the pound,243 Christoffel 
Johannes Lombaard,244 and oldest brother Pieter Jacobus Lombaard.245  Pieter Jacobus 
Lombaard was married to Maria Elizabeth Batten,246 the sister of Dirk Cornelius 
Batten. The Lombaards, Battens, Millers and Johnsons were all related in some way. 
DC Batten’s other sister, Marianne Helen Batten247 was married to Dick Miller, 
Municipal Councilman and father of Thomas Henry Miller. Dick’s sister, Cornelia 
Dorothea Miller 248 was married to John James Johnson,249 the father of John Egleson 
and William Johnson. When DC Batten joined the DMP in 1901, he replaced Willem 
Jacobus Nothnagel,250 who was the brother of Susanna Wilhelmina Miller,251 wife of 
Thomas Miller. 
Although it is clear that many of Heidelberg’s sons were involved in loyal 
support of the British war effort, very few of them experienced actual military action. 
A notable exception was Gert Swart, who served in the Town Guard and also joined 
the DMT. He would eventually be deployed to Fraserburg where he did a 4 month 
tour of duty with the Cape Colonial Force fighting invading republican 
commandos.252 The other was Benjamin Moodie,253 who had joined the South African 
Light Horse Brigade at the start of 1900. Moodie had been a clerk in the Riversdale 
magistrate’s office, and was the son of Donald Moodie, the field cornet for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
238 Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g7h3; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/23540: Death notice of Michael Hillegard Janse 
Van Rensburg Geldenhuys, no. 649/55, 2 October 1954. 
239 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/811: Death notice of Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt, no. 314, 16 January 1916. 
240 Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g9 
241 Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g8 
242 (KAB) 3/HBG 2/1/1: Letter from CJ Lombaard to Heidelberg Municipal Council, 21 Sept 1892. 
243 Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g7; The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 26 January 1901, p. 
3. 
244 Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g3 
245 Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g1 
246 Batten b2c8 
247 Batten b2c3 
248 Miller b2 
249 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/181: Death notice of John James Johnson, no. 2278, May 1881. 
250 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/1107: Death notice of Willem Jacobus Nothnagel, no. 1591, 12 May 1918; 
Nothnagel b1c5 
251 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/16786: Death notice of Susanna Wilhelmina Nothnagel Miller, no. 324/50 , 25 
December 1949. 
252 (KAB) AG 1013: Report on war service by local mounted officers, no. 185/02, 26 June 1902. 
253 Moodie b4c1 
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Grootvadersbosch and Zuurbraak wards.254 Tragically, Moodie was wounded at the 
Battle of Diamond Hill near Pretoria and died on the 13th of June 1900.255 Although 
heritage, status and family traditions provide plausible factors for explaining patterns 
of allegiance in Heidelberg, the disruptive context of war and subsequent restrictions 
under martial law need to be considered to posit a more representative understanding 
for the non-ideological motivations behind displays of loyalty.  
 
 
2.1.1.2) Education 
 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, educational development in rural 
communities were primarily undertaken by local church congregations. As such, 
Heidelberg had two schools operating in close proximity to each other. The larger of 
the two was the public school, operating under the guardianship of the DRC, while the 
smaller English school was an extension of the Independent Church. The public 
school was supervised and directed by the DRC minister, Reverend AJ Van Wijk.256 
The wives of two men serving in the Town Guard were teachers at the schools. 
Susannah Wilhelmina Miller, wife of Thomas Miller, was a teacher at the 
Independent school,257 while Margaretha Johanna Petronella Hall, wife of Stephen 
Hall, taught at the DRC public school.258 The school became the staging ground for 
one of the more peculiar and particularly telling displays of loyalty during the war. 
Inspection reports, filed with the Superintendent General of Education’s office in 
1899, show that at the outbreak of the war, the DRC public school had 85 pupils 
enrolled, while the Independent English school had only 47 pupils.259 Curiously, by 
May of 1901, the number of pupils enrolled with the Independent English school had 
risen to 79, while enrolments in the DRC public school had significantly declined to 
57.260 After the war enrolment numbers returned to the balance prior to hostilities, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
254 The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 13 January 1900, p. 2. 
255 “Hero of the campaign,” The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 7 July 1900, p. 2. 
256 (KAB) SGE 2/95: Inspector’s report for district of Swellendam, no. 488, 15 August 1901. 
257 (KAB) SGE 2/80: Inspector’s report for district of Swellendam, no. 2389, 15 November 1900. 
258 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2455: Death notice of Stephen George Hall, no. 1151, 6 May 1923. 
259 (KAB) SGE 2/67: Inspector’s report for district of Swellendam, no. 2371, 21 November 1899. 
260 (KAB) SGE 2/95: Inspector’s report for district of Swellendam, no. 492, 9 May 1901; SGE 2/95: 
Inspector’s report for district of Swellendam, no. 488, 15 August 1901. 
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highlighting the peculiarity of the shift.261 It would appear that there might have been 
a concerted effort made by some community members to display their loyalty to the 
British authorities in this manner. However tempting extrapolations based on these 
figures may be, they remain speculative in light of the possibility that restrictions on 
movement under martial law may have prevented children living on farms from 
regular school attendance.  
 
 
 
2.1.1.3) Support of the Monarchy 
 
Like other towns in Cape, the people of Heidelberg had a special affection for 
the monarchy. In general the people of the Cape regarded the monarchy as above the 
fray, in much the same way as the church. Throughout the Cape, small rural towns 
displayed an outpouring of grief and solidarity on the death of Queen Victoria at the 
start of 1901.262 On a postcard commemorating the passing of the Queen and 
coronation of the new monarch, an inhabitant of Swellendam had scribbled her 
undying devotion to the monarchy and referred to the poignancy of the events, 
considering their context within the war.263 The monarchy was seen as disconnected 
from the political and military campaigns which precipitated the war and reflected 
Cape Afrikaner religious inclinations and political apathy regarding authority. A good 
example of the complex elements that composed Cape Afrikaner identity can be 
witnessed in the outpouring of support for the Royal visit of the Duke and Duchess of 
Cornwall and York in 1901. The visit by the future King George V and his wife, was 
intended as a reward to colonial subjects for their loyalty and service in the war, and 
included visits to Australia and Canada.264  
To the surprise of the royal couple, who had expected a less than cordial 
atmosphere given the context of war and recent suspension of the Cape constitution, 
they received a warm welcome at the Cape, which included the presentation of 100 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
261 (KAB) SGE 2/110: Inspector’s report for district of Swellendam, no. 1738, 23 September 1902; 
(KAB) SGE 2/110: Inspector’s report for district of Swellendam, no. 1740, 25 September 1902. 
262 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 24. 
263 B. Du Plessis Collection: Postcard from the district of Swellendam, 22 December 1901. 
264 P. Buckner: The Royal Tour of 1901 and the Construction of an Imperial Identity in South Africa, 
pp. 326, 328. 
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addresses from various towns and attended by a multitude of municipal delegations. 
The couple even visited rebel and republican POWs at Simon’s Town who also held 
the royals in high regard.265 Heidelberg’s Municipal Council requested permission 
from the Colonial Secretary to send their own delegation to partake in the festivities 
but like many other towns were denied access to the event.266 The barring of visits 
from rural delegations was due to the fact that plague had broken out in the Cape and 
it was feared that the gathering of large crowds could lead to the spread of the 
disease.267 Support of the crown, by participating in the welcoming festivities, was a 
way for people to demonstrate their loyalty while simultaneously decrying imperialist 
greed.268 To Cape Afrikaners the royal family reflected their own values of a-political, 
anti-capitalist, agrarian romanticism.269 
 
2.1.1.4) Self-identified Loyalists 
 
Although displays of loyalty by the Heidelberg community were in the 
majority of cases subtle and ascertained through inference, one notable incident 
bucked the trend and merits investigation. In January 1901, a secret agent working for 
military intelligence visited Heidelberg and made contact with local loyalists in town. 
While at the Masonic Hotel, the agent had been given a signed petition from loyalists, 
by the manager and bartender, Mr JL Cantrell. The petition requested more troops to 
enforce martial law, and expressed dissatisfaction over the presence of opinionated 
paroled POWs, as well as a lack of  official communication in English regarding the 
regulations of martial law. According to the petition, the town had only received one 
official proclamation since the start of the war, and that the proclamation had only 
been posted in Dutch in front of the court house. The loyalist reasserted their 
allegiance and assistance to the military authorities, while stressing their fears about 
looting  and ostracization. A choice excerpt from the petition states the following:  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
265 P. Buckner: The Royal Tour of 1901 and the Construction of an Imperial Identity in South Africa,  
pp. 336, 340. 
266 (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 6 June 1901. 
267 P. Buckner: The Royal Tour of 1901 and the Construction of an Imperial Identity in South Africa, p. 
327. 
268 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 52. 
269 Ibid., p. 27. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 52 
“We have had quite enough worry and annoyance from boycotting, and also the 
THREATENING – REBELLIOUS & TREASONABLE TALK of a large proportion of 
the Dutch inhabitants, assisted by several prisoners on parole in the village and 
vicinity..” 
 
The following citizens of Heidelberg had added their names to the list: 
 
Henry J Biggs (Surgeon Physician and Justice of Peace) 
Reverend PG Schierhout (Incumbent St Barnabas) 
P Phillipps Halliwell (Contractor) 
JW Farrell (Justice of Peace and Post Master) 
C Costley-White (Assistant Engineer) 
RW Howis (Assistant to Mr White) 
HJ Hanson (Storekeeper) 
JL Cantrell (Manager of above) 270 
 
Although there had been no reported incidents of intimidation in Heidelberg, 
the fact that loyalists elected to communicate their grievances via backdoor military 
channels suggest that subtle forms of intimidation may indeed have taken place. Like 
nearby Swellendam, the English section of the population was relatively small. As 
such, boycotting of English citizens may not have been necessary. According to 
reports from Swellendam, English stores were not boycotted because the English 
community felt so outnumbered that they dared only to display very mild loyalty. 
With the celebrations following the relief of Mafikeng, stores in Swellendam were 
supposed to close as a symbol of support for the British war effort. However, reports 
indicated that most shops were open due to fear of reprisals. Reports indicated that the 
English section of Swellendam had been affecting false sympathies for the Boer cause 
in order to appease the local Afrikaners.271 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
270 (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report from M Knocker, 19 January 1901. 
271 (TAB) HC 37: Intelligence report from M Knocker, 30 May 1900. 
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2.1.2) Alternative motivations behind displays of loyalty  
 
The following section will examine possible ulterior motives and 
circumstances for the people of Heidelberg to have become involved in support of the 
British war effort. Despite the large number of Coloured men who volunteered for 
service in Town Guards and scouting units during the war, volunteering among the 
white inhabitants of the Cape remained unpopular. Those who did volunteer were 
often met with scorn in their communities.272 While the question of whether such 
responses were motivated by sympathy for the republics or by class discrimination is 
still open for discussion, economic motivations for volunteering can be readily 
ascertained.  
As the war escalated, a demand for skilled local artisans to assist in the war 
effort was created. The South African War is to some degree also a story about modes 
of transport. The war stimulated the demand for blacksmiths, harness makers, farriers, 
wagon makers, carpenters, and transport drivers. As the British military opted for a 
centralised supply network and remount system, artisans and labourers not in close 
proximity to these depots could not benefit from the increased demand for their 
services.273 In fact most white artisans struggled to benefit from the war demand, as 
they were in direct competition with Coloured artisans who offered to work more 
cheaply and were willing to traverse the great distances to reap the economic benefits. 
Military transport contracts were also more likely to be granted to Coloured drivers, 
as the military tended to distrust and look down on poor whites.274 The nearest 
remount camp to Heidelberg was situated a considerable distance away at Worcester. 
The situation was compounded by the declaration of martial law in the Cape Colony. 
Severe restrictions were placed on the possession of items which could possibly aid 
the invading republican commandos. All horseshoes, nails, harnesses, and wagons 
were impounded or commandeered for military use. Aside from the inconvenience to 
individual farmers, this effectively killed off the local artisan industry by freezing 
their entire client base.275 
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272 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, pp. 105-106. 
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274 B. Nasson: Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902, p. 9. 
275 C. Strydom: Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, p. 129; J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in 
Kaapland, 1899-1902, pp. 83-84. 
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When reviewing the biographical information of certain individuals involved 
in the Town Guard and local law enforcement at Heidelberg, a pattern correlating 
with the economic depression of the artisan industry emerges. In an 1899 report on 
the state of Heidelberg’s prison, the inspector mentions that the newly appointed 
lockup keeper, William Osmond was a farrier by trade.276 DC Batten’s applications 
for employment in the municipal police and District Mounted Police stated his 
previous profession as blacksmith. 277  According to Thomas Henry Miller’s 
application for induction into the municipal police force, he was trained as a carpenter 
and wagon maker.278 Willem Lodewyk Lombaard’s employment application also list 
his previous profession as wagon maker.279  
According to a 1901 CDF employment memo, those enlisted in Town Guards 
were paid £1 and 10 shillings for year’s service, while recruits in mounted units were 
paid £2 and 10 shillings.280 Employment in Heidelberg’s regular police force may also 
have seemed more lucrative, as pay sheets of the time indicate that Miller, Manuel 
and Batten, received respective yearly salaries of £75, £80, and £75, which were 
considerably more than the average pay of £68 for police constables at 
Swellendam.281 Service in the District Mounted Police was also actively encouraged 
as a complementary part of the British remount system. In a letter from Captain Henry 
Nourse, head of the DMT, to the General Officer Commanding of the CDF, Nourse 
suggested that mounted troopers could be used for looking after remounts. As many 
of the recruits were Afrikaner farmers who had experience with horses, as well as 
land at their disposal for grazing, they could help to alleviate the shortage of horses 
while the British troops tasked with these duties recovered from the long sea journey 
to South Africa.282 
For Lombaard and his brother Antonie, service in the Town Guard might have 
been motivated purely by financial considerations. The Lombaard’s had apparently 
fallen on hard times in the period prior to the war.283 Like other subsistence Afrikaner 
farmers and the rural poor, they had been struck hard by the economic fluctuations in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
276 (KAB) CO 2207: Inspection report on Heidelberg lockup, no. 868, 20 February 1899. 
277 (KAB) AG 936: Employment application of DC Batten, no. 70/1901, 19 June 1901; (KAB) AG 
754: Employment application of DC Batten, no. 32/1900, 9 March 1900. 
278 (KAB) AG 754: Employment application of TH Miller, no. 47/1900, 1 May 1900. 
279 (KAB) AG 1013: Employment application of WL Lombaard, no. 82/1902, 18 June 1902. 
280 (KAB) DD 7/13: CDF employment memorandum, 5 May 1901. 
281 (KAB) AG 754: Police pay sheets for district of Swellendam, no. 123/1900, 24 August 1900. 
282(KAB) DD 7/13: Letter from H Nourse to GOC of the CDF, 25 Feb 1901. 
283 (KAB) 3/HBG 2/1/1: Letter from CJ Lombaard to Heidelberg Municipal Council, 21 Sept 1892. 
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the decades prior to the war, and did not benefit from the agricultural boom which had 
resulted from industrialisation. 284  Economic motivations often played a role in 
fighting on the British side, and Albert Grundlingh has shown how this was the case 
for poor republican farmers on the urban periphery who seized the opportunities for 
better remuneration, social mobility and dignity by joining the British.285 It is, 
however, doubtful that the majority of these men viewed their service in law 
enforcement in career terms. More likely, is the possibility that service in the Town 
Guard, mounted and regular police were only temporary methods for alleviating 
poverty and supplementing income while the restrictions of war legislation threatened 
and suppressed the earning potential of their chosen occupations.  
This may have been the case even prior to and after the war. DC Batten’s 
original application for police constable, states that he had previously been a 
temporary constable in Swellendam for a year.286 In May 1901, a year after his 
appointment as police constable, Thomas Henry Miller requested to resign from the 
position, stating that an increased demand for wagons and carts provided him with 
better financial opportunities should he return to his original trade.287 When heavy 
floods damaged the main road between Swellendam and Zuurbraak at the end of the 
war, JDJ Manuel resigned as police constable and returned to his original occupation 
of road maker by assisting in the repairs. 288 Records from the period directly 
following the end of the war indicate a surge of applications to mounted units like the 
DMT, which seem to confirm this hypothesis. Many rushed into these occupations 
which offered higher wages in order to satisfy the Colony’s defence demands in wake 
of the military withdrawal from the region.289 
The Cape Colony’s absorption into the war had a double edged effect. As the 
military needed to feed and supply its troops, farmers received higher prices for their 
goods. In a war already mired in administrative and logistical difficulties, efforts by 
military authorities to minimise bureaucratic lag resulted in farmers being paid 
directly. By foregoing the use of middlemen, local merchants and shop owners were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
284 B. Nasson: Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902, p. 6. 
285 A. Grundlingh: The dynamics of treason: Boer collaboration in the South African War of 1899-
1902, pp. 311-312. 
286 (KAB) AG 754: Employment application of DC Batten, no. 32/1900, 9 March 1900. 
287 (KAB) AG 936: Resignation letter of TH Miller, no. 46/1901, 1 May 1901. 
288 (KAB) AG 1013: Resignation letter of JDJ Manuel, no. 42/1902, 29 March 1902. 
289 (KAB) AG 1013: In the period from 1 November 1902 to December 1902, numerous applications to 
the DMT were received, no. 171/02, 1 November 1902. 
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severely undercut by military spending. A well-documented and widespread effect of 
martial law during the war in the Cape was the ruination of a large number of small 
country storekeepers. 290  Under martial law, the commandeering of horses and 
restrictions on travel damaged their enterprises and greatly affected their livelihood. 
In response, many affected displays of loyalty in the hope of receiving special 
courtesies absolving them from such restrictions.291  In May 1902, storekeepers 
Charles Hirschmann and HM Du Preez complained about not being able to sell liquor 
by the bottle and claimed to be losing their customers to Swellendam and Riversdale, 
where the practice was allowed.  
Another point of contention was the concessions made to private individuals 
to sell liquor in the Coloured locations at Buffeljags and Slang River. The restrictions 
on travel resulted in the majority of farmers buying liquor at these locations which 
were closer in proximity than Heidelberg.292 It is clear then that the traditional 
categories and divisions regarding allegiance are insufficient in providing satisfactory 
explanations for outward manifestations of loyalty. Andrew Thompson’s studies on 
loyalism of the period has shown that ethnic identities were fragmentary, and 
observable loyalty was often modulated by a range of factors, including local 
economic circumstance, family tradition, and regional patterns of settlement.293 While 
the tangible displays of loyalty among the people of Heidelberg could have been a 
reflection of ideological proclivities and patterns of family tradition, the role of 
monetary incentives, personal circumstance and economic pressures under martial law 
provide alternative explanations that invert the superficial and oversimplified 
dichotomies regarding allegiance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
290 A. Mabin & B. Conradie (eds.): The confidence of the whole country: Standard Bank reports on 
economic conditions in Southern Africa, 1865-1902, p. 506. 
291 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 185, 198. 
292 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Complaints by H Du Preez and C Hirschmann regarding martial law, no. 
468/1902 & no. 467/1902, 1 May 1902. 
293 A. Thompson: The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939, pp. 620-621. 
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2.2) Sympathy 
 
2.2.1) Family ties 
 
Studies of the impact of the South African War in the Cape Colony often make 
mention of how shared language, religion and ties of friendship and family with the 
Boer Republics compounded Cape Afrikaner feelings regarding the war and had been 
a crucial component in eliciting sympathy for the republican cause.294  
Yet many were conflicted regarding the war, as their complicated Cape 
identity, with its affinity for the monarchy and the rights and privileges as British 
subjects, weighed against their sympathy with the plight of their kinsmen. 295 
Republican appeals to Cape Afrikaners for assistance in the war played not only on 
the cultural and family ties between them, but also on the special position the 
republics occupied in the spiritual imagination of those sharing a common history and 
ancestry.296 Although modulated by nearly a century of British influence, the old 
Dutch strain of independence became embodied in the republics which to many at the 
Cape had become a kind of promised land for the rebellious and independent spirit of 
their past.297 Statements regarding sympathy with the republics resulting from family 
connections are often superficial and fail to convey the true level of 
interconnectedness which made this such an influential factor in determining Cape 
reactions to the war.  
Examining the case of Heidelberg reveals the extensiveness of the ties 
between the Cape and the republics, and provides an indication of how the conflict 
permeated the entire country. A cursory review of genealogical records of the most 
prominent Heidelberg families reveals a pattern of migration to the northern regions 
of the Orange Free State starting in the 1830s.298 In many cases these migrations 
resulted from droughts, shortages of land, and other financial difficulties within the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
294 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 53. 
295 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, p. 13. 
296 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, p. 221. 
297 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, p. 62. 
298 A review of genealogical records for prominent Heidelberg surnames like Fourie, Uys, Kleynhans, 
Eksteen, Moodie, Human, Scholtz, Gildenhuys reveal migratory patterns to the Orange Free State 
starting in the 1870s. 
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community. 299  In fact, ties between the greater Swellendam area, including 
Heidelberg, and the OFS had existed for many years. Since the 1780s, Swellendam 
was the host of a thriving artisan industry, which included blacksmiths, carpenters and 
wainwrights. Artisan families like the Steyns, Crouses, and Rothmanns had grown 
prosperous from building wagons intended for the  eastern frontier. In the 30 year 
period from 1830-1860, the demand for wagons had increased exponentially with the 
opening of the George/Outeniqua frontier which opened the route to the OFS. The 
demand for wagons from the OFS established a critical link between the two areas. 
Years of travel between the areas, created an affinity for the place people 
affectionately referred to as the Onderland. Marthinus Steyn, the father of MT Steyn, 
president of OFS during the war, was a blacksmith from Swellendam who met his 
wife in the OFS while there on business. In 1853, his blacksmith shop burned down, 
and he decided to permanently move to the OFS. Many local artisans followed suit 
during the 1860s when drought in the Overberg and a drop in the market for wagons 
threatened the local artisan industry with collapse. The discovery of diamonds also 
lured many families away to the prospect of a brighter future in the OFS.300 The Cape 
experienced an agricultural depression between the years of 1865 and 1870, resulting 
from the influx of large amounts of foreign capital with the establishment of imperial 
banks. This influx occurred after the speculative boom of the 1860s and caused a 
trade depression, which combined with a series of heavy droughts in the 1870s to spur 
migrations to the north.301  The 1881 collapse of the share market was followed by a 
recession, the first wave of which affected the Western Cape most severely. As 
imperial funding was withdrawn following the loss of the ZAR, already overextended 
merchants went bankrupt. As support for the war was no longer a necessity, banks 
discontinued their lines of credit.302 Some Heidelberg residents were among those 
who hade overextended themselves through speculative investments following the 
wake of mineral discoveries and had to leave the Cape when their lines of credit dried 
up.303  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
299 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, pp. 16, 30, 60. 
300 E. Burrows: Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of 
the Cape, pp. 75-76. 
301 M. De Kock: Selected subjects in the economic history of South Africa, p. 103. 
302 A. Mabin & B. Conradie (eds.): The confidence of the whole country: Standard Bank reports on 
economic conditions in Southern Africa, 1865-1902, p. 101 
303 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
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In other cases, the system of inheritance among Cape Afrikaners, which 
mandated that each son receive their own plot of land, had subdivided farms to the 
point of unsustainability. The second son and namesake of town co-founder, JJ 
Gildenhuys,304 moved to Lindley in the OFS in the late 1870s after squabbles over 
inheritance and land following the death of the family patriarch.305 Gildenhuys and his 
oldest two sons, Cornelis Petrus and Johannes, joined the Bethlehem commando and 
were captured near Dordrecht in the Eastern Cape near the end of the war.306 
Gildenhuys’s wife and younger children were captured on their farm at the start of 
1901 and interned at the Winburg concentration camp.307 As JJ Gildenhuys’s brothers, 
Burgert Wynand,308 Daniel Johannes,309 and Hans Jacob310 still resided at Heidelberg, 
they were likely to be concerned about the welfare of their brother. In September 
1902, Hans Jacob Gildenhuys enquired about the return of his brother and two 
nephews, who had been scheduled to return from captivity on the SS Armenian.311 
Others, like the grandsons of Benjamin Moodie, of the Moodie wool empire, moved 
to Ladybrand in the OFS in 1892 to expand the family trade enterprise. They were the 
brothers John Henry,312  James 313 and Thomas Moodie,314  nephews of Benjamin 
Moodie who died at the battle of Diamond Hill. Unlike their uncle, they fought on the 
republican side. James was captured near Koedoesrand on 21 February 1900, while 
Thomas was captured near Paardeberg on 27 February 1900 and later exiled to St. 
Helena.315  
Given the numerous connections to the Free State, the people of Heidelberg 
became intimately involved in the war as concerns over family in the republics 
escalated along with the war. In a letter to the resident magistrate of Swellendam, 
dated 8 January 1900, Heidelberg’s postman, John Rothman, threatened to resign if !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
304 Gildenhuys b6c4d2e3f2g10 
305 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 30; H. Hopkins: Maar een soos hy: die lewe van kommandant C. A. Van Niekerk, p. 
182. 
306 (ABWM): Prisoners of War Database, http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/database-
search/index.php?section=Prisoners_of_War#sectionHeader (17 August 2014). 
307 (VAB) SRC 90: Winburg concentration camp register, 17 January 1901, p. 167. 
308 Gildenhuys b6c4d2e3f2g9 
309 Gildenhuys b6c4d2e3f2g11 
310 Gildenhuys b6c4d2e3f2g12 
311 (TAB) SOPOW 58: Letter received from HJ Gildenhuys, no. 5539/02, 29 September 1902. 
312 Moodie b1c2d1 
313 Moodie b1c2d4 
314 Moodie b1c2d5 
315 (ABWM): Prisoners of War Database, http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/database-
search/index.php?section=Prisoners_of_War#sectionHeader (17 August 2014). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 60 
his request for a cart to deliver the mail was not granted. Rothman was responsible for 
delivery of the mail in the area between Heidelberg and Port Beaufort, a task which 
had been sufficiently accomplished on horseback prior to the war. According to his 
letter, the war had increased the volume of mail as to necessitate the use of a cart.316 
In a report to the Attorney General’s office on the community feeling regarding the 
war, the resident magistrate of Swellendam stated that although the people were quiet 
and well-behaved, they exhibited strong feelings of sympathy with the inhabitants of 
the OFS and ZAR due to extensive family ties.317  
 
2.2.2) Reaction of the Church 
 
At the heart of the community and at the crossroads of the issue over loyalty 
was the Dutch Reformed Church. Despite the complex motivations behind displays of 
loyalty and blurred ethnic identities of those involved, the church provided a thread of 
commonality which permeated the community. DRC records for Heidelberg indicate 
that most of the individuals who had served on the Municipal Council, Town Guard, 
police force, and mounted units, had been part of the large DRC congregation. Only a 
handful were affiliated with the Independent English Church, which consisted mostly 
of first generation British immigrants like the Hanson, Biggs and White families.318 
The generation of clergymen, like Reverend Van Wijk, who entered the service just 
prior to and during the South Africa War, were split regarding the role of the British 
Empire in the Cape. The young conservative faction, although sympathizing with the 
republics, were generally loyal and viewed the British Empire and monarchy as useful 
elements for Afrikaner progress.319  
As the war rapidly escalated and news of British military atrocities spread in 
the Cape, the DRC clergy became increasingly agitated and unsure of about the stance 
of the church. In nearby towns like Swellendam, congregational life was up-ended 
due to splits in the community regarding the war.320 Although the minutes of 
Heidelberg’s church council meetings during the war give little indication of bitter !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
316 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from postman John Rothman, no. 15/1900, 8 January 1900. 
317 (KAB) AG 754: Report by Resident Magistrate PB Borcherds on community feeling, no. 136/1900, 
24 December 1900. 
318 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, pp. 176-180. 
319 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, pp. 204-205. 
320 B. Nasson: Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902, p. 162. 
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divisions in the congregation, the restrictions on public meetings under martial law 
and mandated presence of the local commandant caused a disruption in regular 
meetings which may have obscured the prevailing mood of the community from 
coming to light.321 The earliest response from the DRC regarding the war was issued 
in the form of a memorial to Queen Victoria on 11 October 1899, after a sitting of the 
Ring of Swellendam held at Caledon. Records indicate that the discussion about the 
war had made a deep impact on all those present, especially the elders who 
accompanied the minister from their respective congregations. Accompanying 
Reverend Van Wijk at this particular meeting was DJ Gildenhuys. Many voiced their 
disapproval over the possibility of the Cape’s involvement. The grievances were 
condensed into a memorial to the Queen that cautioned her about the calamitous 
effect that a war on the loyal Dutch would have on Victoria’s person and throne.322  
Often cited in works on the impact of the South African War in the Cape 
Colony, is a reference to the October 1900 sitting of the DRC Ring of Swellendam in 
Napier.323 In fact, this infamous meeting of the synod was originally set to be held at 
Heidelberg.324 Due to war restrictions, it was decided that the Ring only meet once a 
year and the next sitting was scheduled to be held in Heidelberg in 1902.325 The 
conference resulted in the DRC’s first official ruling that condemned the war as 
immoral. The DRC decided not to intervene on the political front but decried the way 
in which the war was waged, especially in regards to the destruction of property by 
the British military.326 Instead of seeking mediation with the government, the DRC 
decided to concentrate its efforts on providing support funds to the destitute citizens 
of the republics and sending ministers to do relief work in concentration camps. The 
Ring’s declaration was a calculated response in a time of extreme local tension which 
threatened to tear apart Cape congregations.327 This tension was reflected in a sermon 
of Reverend Van Wijk dated 14 June 1900, in which the following words were 
underscored: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
321 (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, Between 22 May 1901 and 
18 January 1902 no meetings were recorded. At the final meeting for 1901 the minutes record the 
presence of “Den Commandant.”  
322 (DRCA) KR 44 R210/A: Minutes of the Ring of Swellendam, Caledon, 11 October 1899. 
323 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, p. 56; P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-
Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn, p. 221. 
324 (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 9 May 1900. 
325 (DRCA) KR 44 R210/A: Minutes of the Ring of Swellendam, Napier, 8-10 October 1900. 
326 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, p. 56. 
327 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 221-222. 
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“U lewen in een donkere tyd…” 328 
 
As the war progressed, the tone of Van Wijk’s sermons became more overtly 
sympathetic towards the plight of those in the OFS and ZAR. In a sermon filled with 
battlefield imagery, he used the analogy of a fallen son’s letter to his father to refer to 
the plight of the exiles from the republics and young men from the Cape fighting in 
the war. In what can be construed as a veiled plea for assisting the republics, the dying 
request of the son to his father is to treat the comrade carrying the letter as if he was 
the man’s own son.329  In Heidelberg, the church devoted its energies to hold 
collections and to raise funds for the war-ravaged and impoverished inhabitants in the 
Boer Republics. Given Heidelberg’s extensive family ties to the republics, fundraising 
activity was quite vigorous after the end of the war when such activities were again 
permitted. In March 1903, funds collected from a church bazaar for war orphans and 
widows, totalled £172. The £100 was to be split three ways, with equal amounts going 
to the ZAR, OFS, and Cape Colony. Interestingly, the remaining £72 was sent to 
General CC Froneman for the poor relief of the inhabitants of Winburg and 
Ladybrand.330 Froneman was infamous for the murder of JJ Morgendaal, an emissary 
in the Boer peace envoy sent to Kroonstad wich aimed to persuade General Christiaan 
De Wet to surrender in March 1901.331 The church also gave financial assistance to 
impoverished communities in Mafeking, Hoopstad and Bethal, and collected old 
clothes that were sent to various families in the OFS and ZAR.332 
 
 
2.2.3) Exiles 
 
Even before republican appeals for assistance, British authorities had feared 
the possibility of a general uprising in the Cape. As the remote areas of the Cape were 
invaded by republican commandos and rebellion erupted, gauging the attitude of local 
inhabitants became paramount in formulating policies in response to the tides of war. 
When the republican capitals fell in rapid succession during mid-1900, sympathies in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
328 (DRCA) K-DIV 1423: Draft of sermon by Reverend AJ Van Wijk, 14 June 1900, p. 1. 
329 (DRCA) K-DIV 1423: Draft of sermon by Reverend AJ Van Wijk, 24 February 1901, p. 12. 
330 (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 21 March 1903. 
331 “De Wet and Froneman: The murder of Morgendaal,” The Melbourne Argus, 15 March 1901, p. 5. 
332 (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 13 June 1903. 
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the Cape were exacerbated as numerous refugees, political exiles and paroled POWs 
streamed into the Colony for temporary refuge with family members. Records on the 
number of POWs paroled in the Cape vary, but contemporary sources place the 
number at 310 for the year of 1900.333 A report on community feeling during 
November 1900, conveys the fearfulness of authorities regarding the situation. The 
resident magistrate of Swellendam reported that although the district had been quiet 
and without incident, the influx of POWs on parole was worrisome as they could 
possibly influence those who were not thoroughly loyal.334 The main concern of 
authorities was that large numbers of these paroled POWS would spread rumours 
regarding the situation in the ZAR and OFS. The lack of information, restrictions on 
movement and communication under martial law, created an environment of paranoia 
and fear which was very conducive to rumour and suggestion. Authorities feared that 
the spread of such rumours by outsiders could fan the fires of cultural animosity.335 In 
fact, intelligence reports from the period suggest that military authorities even tried 
recruiting moderate POWs and exiles to the task of spreading pro-British propaganda 
in order to soothe the local populace. Mention is made of a POW in Swellendam, 
named Joseph Hoek, who was described as a man of good character and moderate 
opinion whose statements regarding the situation in the ZAR were exactly what was 
needed to defuse local tensions.336  
Scrutiny of records from the offices of the resident magistrate and Attorney 
General confirms that a large number of people from the OFS resided with family 
during the war. Under martial law, the British military would often deport undesirable 
or troublesome individuals from a region to go and live in another town where they 
had relatives. This practice was also applied to POWs from the recently conquered 
republics who were awaiting trial, and reflected the level of uncertainty regarding the 
punishment of republican belligerents and Cape rebels that hallmarked the early 
stages of the war.337 Although little official documentation regarding the practice 
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survived, studies have shown that in the Cape it was a readily and widespread tactic 
used to punish those accused of seditious talk and inciting rebellion.338  
A letter sent to Swellendam’s resident magistrate from Heidelberg’s special 
justice of the peace in August of 1902, containing a list of burghers who were 
scheduled to take the oath of allegiance to lift their parole, provides a good indication 
of the number of “foreign” persons residing in the area during the war.339 The list 
contains the following names:  
 
AC Higgo PW Duminy JL Herholdt 
James H De Villiers DF Scholtz HFS Van Eden 
APJ Van Der Poel JU Scholtz DJ Herholdt 
JHB Van Der Poel JJ Badenhorst SJS Marais 
PD Steyn AB Lombaard HC Taylor 
JM Homan HJ Van Aswegen James Rowing 
HA Eksteen HR Middleton  
MJ Van Rensburg JJ Rall  
 
PD Steyn was Pieter Daniel Steyn from the ZAR who along with his wife Lucy, 
arrived in the district during October 1899, and went to stay on his mother’s farm 
Steynsrust. His sister Barbara and her husband Wilfred Hubbard were also refugees 
from the ZAR, who had been living on the farm since September 1899.  AC Higgo, 
was Alfred Charles Higgo from the ZAR, who had arrived in Heidelberg in October 
1899 with his wife Elizabeth. They went to live with Elizabeth’s brother Jacobus 
Muller, on his farm Waterloo. They were accompanied by Higgo’s sister, Francis and 
her husband George Edward Hendriks.340  
MJ Van Rensburg and PW Duminy were paroled POWs from the OFS, who 
had previously been confined to Bredasdorp, but were eventually allowed to go and 
stay with family at Heidelberg in November 1900.341 Duminy resided with his family !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
338 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 132. 
339 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Report on paroled burghers who had taken oaths of allegiance, no. 735/1902, 
1 August 1902. 
340 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report on foreign persons in district by field cornet S Van Der Westhuysen 
in ward 1, no. 406/1901, 5 May 1901. 
341 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace on paroled prisoners, no. 752/1900, 12 
November 1900. 
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on the farm Boschheuwel until the end of the war, when he was spared exile and 
released for good behaviour.342 PJ Badenhorst and HJ Van Aswegen were two 
undesirables from the OFS, who were paroled from Cape Town to the district of 
Swellendam in August 1900.343 As was the practice, Van Aswegen was required to 
regularly report himself to the special justice of the peace, Albert White.344 Other 
individuals not included on the list but residing in Heidelberg during the war were 
three Kroonstad rebels guilty of perjury and contravening military law. They were the 
brothers Daantjie and David Victor, and Roeloff Beukes, who were sent to Heidelberg 
to live with family.345 
The severity of the restrictions placed on those who were subjected to the 
practice of exile was primarily determined by the nature and inclination of those 
responsible for their supervision, which included local commandants and civil 
commissioners.346 It would appear that for the most part, those sent to Heidelberg 
were generally well treated and allowed reasonable freedom of movement. JW 
Herholdt from the OFS, as well as HFS Van Eeden were allowed to move about freely 
and received early parole upon request.347 A notable exception was the case of DF 
Scholtz. Daniel Francois Scholtz 348 was born in Heidelberg in 1851, but had left for 
the OFS due to financial difficulties in 1881.349 The Scholtz family were intimately 
connected with one of Heidelberg’s old wealthy families, the Humans. Scholtz’s older 
sister Johanna Petronella, was married to the businessman and member of parliament, 
Johannes Urbanus Human.350 Daniel Francois Scholtz was married to Margaretha 
Albertina Human,351 the daughter of Jurgens Johannes Petrus Human,352 the brother 
of Johannes Urbanus and son of the town co-founder Cornelis Jacobus Human. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
342 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: letter from J Herholdt regarding parole, no. 316/1903, 23 March 1903. 
343 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: correspondence regarding prisoner transfers, no. 478/1900, 13 August 1900. 
344 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace on paroled prisoners, no. 797/1900, 24 
November 1900. 
345 (KAB) AG 754: Report on exiled individuals in the district of Swellendam, no. 63/1900, 2 July 
1900. 
346 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 111-112. 
347 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: letter from J Herholdt, no. 667/1902, 14 July 1902. 
348 Scholtz b3c13; (KAB) HOP: Daniel Francois Scholtz, no. 757 & no. 1163, Addendum A, Figure 12. 
349 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 60. 
350 Scholtz b3c8 
351 Human b5c3d11e2f7 
352 Human b5c3d11e2 
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Accordingly, both of Scholtz’s sons who were born in Heidelberg, were christened 
Jurgens Johannes Petrus Scholtz353 and Johannes Urbanus Scholtz.354  
DF Scholtz was arrested on his farm near Winburg in the OFS on 27 June 
1900.355 According to the substantial file on Scholtz, he had appropriated a flock of 
sheep from African labourers who had received the sheep after a roving commando 
had left them behind when they travelled through the district of Winburg. Scholtz had 
taken the sheep to his neighbour’s farm, who was away on commando duty with two 
of Scholtz’s sons. Scholtz had apparently used the neighbours farm to supply 
commandos with provisions. When searching the farm, British authorities found cut 
telegraph wire and a supply of dynamite detonators. Scholtz had signed the oath of 
neutrality after the British occupation of the OFS, and was therefore classified as a 
POW and undesirable alien. As punishment for his crimes, his farm was burnt down 
and he was exiled to Heidelberg to stay with friends or family for the remainder of the 
war.  
Scholtz’s wife and daughter were placed under house arrest and forced to stay 
with friends in Winburg.356 For most of his stay in Heidelberg, Scholtz resided with 
James Du Preez, secretary of the Heidelberg Municipal Council.357 According to a 
report filed by the acting resident magistrate of Riversdale, EH Samuels, in January 
1901, Scholtz had apparently been a thorn in the side of local authorities since setting 
foot in Heidelberg. Samuels had visited Heidelberg twice in January 1901, and was 
confronted by Scholtz on both occasions. Scholtz engaged Samuels about the 
atrocities committed by the British military in the OFS, and related how his  farm had 
been set ablaze when the military found dynamite intended for blasting, on his 
property. Scholtz’s vocal opposition had attracted the attention of the uncle of 
president Steyn who had been living with relatives in Riversdale. On the other 
occasion while Mr Steyn was visiting him at Heidelberg, Scholtz remarked that he 
had six sons involved in the war, and that in November of 1900 he encouraged them 
to fight till the end.358  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
353 Scholtz b3c13d1 
354 Scholtz b3c13d2 
355 (ABWM): Prisoners of War Database, http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/database-
search/index.php?section=Prisoners_of_War#sectionHeader (17 August 2014). 
356 (TAB) PMO 76: Correspondence regarding Scholtz, no.58/02, 5 December 1902. 
357 (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report, 23 January 1901. 
358 (KAB) AG 933: Report by CJ Roux, resident magistrate of Riversdale, on community feeling, no. 
3/1901, 14 January 1901. 
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Exactly how much of what Scholtz had said was serious or in jest will 
probably never be known, but it is evident that he intended to cause a stir among those 
prosecuting the war. According to records, Scholtz only had two sons. Johannes 
Urbanus Scholtz was captured near Paardeberg on 27 February 1900, paroled to 
Heidelberg, and eventually exiled to Bermuda. Jurgens Johannes Petrus Scholtz was 
captured near Venterstad on 27 December 1900, and exiled to St. Helena. 359 
According to the terms of DF Scholtz’s parole, he was only allowed to travel six miles 
from the centre of town and had to regularly report his whereabouts to the special 
justice of the peace.360 As he had grown up in Heidelberg and was on familiar terms 
with Albert White, Scholtz did not take the agreement seriously, and visited friends in 
Port Beaufort without permission at the start of 1901.361 When the military authorities 
became involved and queried the resident magistrate of Swellendam about Scholtz’s 
activities, he personally wrote to them complaining about what he regarded as 
ludicrous requirements. 362  Scholtz’s activities and statements were particularly 
worrisome to the authorities as reports suggested that the local inhabitants were 
greatly distressed about the situation in the OFS, especially in light of a circulating 
rumour about 500 Boer women in a Bloemfontein hospital who were being treated for 
venereal disease after being raped. Combined with Scholtz’s frequent denouncement 
of British atrocities, it was feared that local women were especially prone to believing 
such rumours.363 Scholtz became such a disruption to village life that authorities 
considered removing him to Port Elizabeth after complaints from some loyalists.364 
Scholtz was eventually paroled in mid 1902, and returned to the OFS having survived 
the wrath of the military to whom he had caused so much chagrin.365  
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
359 (ABWM): Prisoners of War Database, http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/database-
search/index.php?section=Prisoners_of_War#sectionHeader (17 August 2014). 
360 (KAB) AG 933: Report by CJ Roux, resident magistrate of Riversdale, on community feeling, no. 
3/1901, 14 January 1901. 
361 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace on DF Scholtz, no. 17/1901, 5 January 
1901. 
362 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from DF Scholtz, no. 25/1901, 7 January 1901. 
363 (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report, 23 January 1901. 
364 (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report from M Knocker, 16 January 1901. 
365 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: letter from J Herholdt, no. 667/1902, 14 July 1902. 
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2.2.4) Rebellion 
 
During the South African War, a total of 3437 inhabitants of the Cape Colony 
joined the republics in taking up arms against the British. The Cape rebels were 
classified in two groupings. Class I Rebels were those who had joined the republicans 
in open warfare against the British, as well as those individuals considered ringleaders 
who incited rebellion among their fellow citizens. Class II rebels, who formed the 
majority of those prosecuted for high treason, was anyone who assisted the enemy by 
providing information and provisions, or had failed to report their presence.366 In 
November 1899, the resident magistrate of Swellendam made his first report on 
suspected rebel activity in the area of Heidelberg. In the report he mentioned that the 
only persons known to have joined the enemy were two young men who had left the 
area for the OFS before the start of the war.367 As such, they were unlikely to be 
classified as rebels dependent on the condition that they renounced their British 
citizenship upon arrival in the OFS. Records indicate that during the war only one 
Cape rebel came from Heidelberg. In all likelihood, the two young men referred to in 
the magistrate’s report, were the 30 year old Johannes Jurie Lombaard and his 
younger brother Andries Benjamin Lombaard. The older Lombaard left Heidelberg in 
March 1899 for Heilbron in the OFS where his younger brother had already settled in 
since the start of the year.368 Astonishingly, Johannes Jurie Lombaard, 369 and Andries 
Benjamin Lombaard, 370  were the siblings of Willem Lodewyk 371  and Antonie 
Lombaard372 who served in Heidelberg’s Town Guard.  
Given the circumstances of the Lombaard family, financial motivations may 
have been behind the brothers’ decision to move to the OFS.373 Evidence supports this 
hypothesis as records indicate that Johannes Jurie Lombaard went to Heilbron, to 
fight in the war as a second for an English Free State burgher and objector, a Mr J 
Pierce. Lombaard was captured at Rhenoster River on 11 June 1900, and tried for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
366 J. Snyman: Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale 
verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902), p. 30. 
367 (KAB) AG 754: Report by PB Borcherds on rebels in district of Swellendam, no. 93/99, 6 
November 1899. 
368 (KAB) AG 3537: Class II POWs in Ward 7, Vol. 112, no. 125/1900, 11 June 1900. 
369 Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g4 
370 Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g5 
371 Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g8 
372 Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g9 
373 (KAB) 3/HBG 2/1/1: Letter from CJ Lombaard to Heidelberg Municipal Council, 21 Sept 1892. 
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high treason as a Cape rebel, due to the fact that he had not been in the OFS long 
enough to take the oath of allegiance and renounce his British citizenship.374 
According to reports, Lombaard had escaped captivity three times, once from a 
British column just after his capture, once from a train en route to the Cape, and once 
more from the POW camp at Simonstown, before being exiled to Ceylon. 375 
Lombaard’s brother, Andries Benjamin also fought on the Boer side, but was spared 
prosecution as a rebel, having become a naturalised citizen of the OFS at the start of 
1899, and was released on parole to Heidelberg.376 He wa,s however, required to give 
evidence against his brother before the resident magistrate of Swellendam on 7 
December 1900. The younger Lombaard was accompanied by William Osmond and 
Captain Fiveash, and related the tale of his brother’s decision to fight in the war. AB 
Lombaard stated that he was a poor man, and asked for his travel expenses to be 
reimbursed as he and his family were struggling financially.377 The extraordinary 
story of the Lombaard family truly embodies the complexities in allegiance which 
hallmarked the experience of Cape Afrikaners during the war. 
 
The only other notable case relating to the issue of rebellion at Heidelberg 
involved an incident which first appeared in The Cape Times on 20 September 
1901.378 Rebellion often held appeal to young men in search of adventure, a feature 
common to all wars and revolutions.379 Such was the case of David Cornelius Brandt, 
a young man working as a labourer on the farm Keerom near Montagu. Brandt 
spontaneously joined Scheepers’ commando on 6 September 1901, when they passed 
through the region.380 The commando was engaged at Kogmanskloof by a detachment 
of the 4th West Yorkshire Regiment, under command of Captain Fiveash.381 Brandt 
remained with Scheepers’ commando for 6 days before changing his mind and 
surrendering himself to authorities. As he was originally from Stinkfontein, 
Worcester, Brandt was extradited from Montagu to stand trial at Worcester. He was 
tried by the civil court and, given his decision to surrender, was spared treason !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
374 (KAB) AG 3537: Class II POWs in Ward 7, Vol. 112, no. 125/1900, 11 June 1900. 
375 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/28: Correspondence regarding Johannes Jurie Lombaard, no. 146/1902. 
376 (KAB) AG 3537: Class II POWs in Ward 7, Vol. 112, no. 125/1900, 11 June 1900. 
377 (KAB) AG 754: Statement and claim by AB Lombaard, no. 131/1900, 7 December 1900. 
378 “Worcester Boer recruit captured near Swellendam,” The Cape Times, 20 September 1901, p. 5. 
379 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, p. 71. 
380 (KAB) AG 2097: List of persons who joined the enemy, 1899-1902. 
381 (KAB) AG 1013: Report on war service by local mounted officers, no. 185/02, 26 June 1902. 
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charges and only sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment.382 During his trial, Brandt 
testified that while in the company of the commando, he ascertained that a number of 
those riding with Scheepers had previously been residents of Swellendam and 
Heidelberg. Brandt identified them as Jan Nel from Swellendam, and the brothers Jan 
and Piet Marais from Heidelberg. These men had apparently left the district in the 
years prior to the war and accompanied the commando to act as guides given their 
knowledge of the local terrain.383 
 
 
2.2.5) Notable displays of sympathy 
 
In other areas of the Southern Cape, where the majority of town inhabitants 
were English, support for the republics and displays of sympathy were usually subtle 
and without incident.384 In Heidelberg, where loyalists were in the minority, the 
situation was reversed and tensions regarding the war often flared up. Like other 
regions in the Cape, the prominent and wealthy inhabitants of Heidelberg usually kept 
their heads down and refused to openly declare their support for either side.385 Yet, a 
number of incidents, mostly recorded in the normal case files of the local magistrate, 
warrant mention. These cases relate to incidents where the local inhabitants openly 
displayed forms of sympathy or support for the Boer Republics and their cause. 
Incidents prosecuted under martial law are reviewed in a separate section of this 
thesis. A good example of the nature of seditious actions undertaken by the people in 
the region can be found in an incident in Swellendam, when two brothers from the 
Tomlinson family, prevented the British from firing a victory salute after the relief of 
Mafeking, by rolling down the cannons from the mountain during the previous 
night.386 Probably the first incident sparking the powder keg of community tensions 
occurred on 30 April 1900, when a farmer called William Van Reenen was locked up 
after drunkenly shouting anti-British epithets at police constable William Lodewyk 
Lombaard.387 A similar incident occurred in October of the same year, when a Michel !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
382 D. Shearing & T. Shearing: Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave, p. 194. 
383 (KAB) PMO 81: Report on statement of David Cornelius Brandt, no. R9058, 20 September 1901. 
384 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 49. 
385 C. Strydom: Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, p. 92. 
386 L. Tomlinson: Geskiedkundige Swellendam, p. 104. 
387 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Lex vs Van Reenen, no. 550/1900, 30 April 1900. 
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Otto was arrested for public intoxication and cursing constables Jan Matthee and 
William Osmond in the main street of town.388 In March of 1901, a man called 
Stephan Fouchee was fined £1 or one month’s hard labour after drunkenly cursing 
local shopkeeper, William Johnson, while outside his home. Fouchee threatened to 
break Johnson’s neck if he should come out. As martial law was in effect, Johnson 
had been unable to summon a police constable and could only do so on the following 
day.389 Apparently Fouchee had a reputation for conflict with the English-speaking 
inhabitants of town and was arrested three times in one month before being 
transferred to the Swellendam jail.390 
In May of 1901, a particularly telling incident occurred when Jan Crous 
assaulted town mayor, James Munnik by kicking his pipe from his mouth while the 
two were engaged in an argument over the war while playing billiards at the 
Heidelberg Hotel.391 Crous and Munnik were well acquainted, having served together 
on the Municipal Council and had chaired a committee inspecting flood damage 
caused by the Duivenhoks River.392 Crous was sentenced to an undisclosed fine or a 
week’s hard labour, and opted for the fine.393 Perhaps the most interesting incident to 
occur was the dismissal of Willem Jacobus Nothnagel, a trooper in the District 
Mounted Police. Nothnagel was dismissed after reports of seditious comments he had 
made at the end of 1900, came to the attention of the resident magistrate of 
Swellendam. Nothnagel had served in the DMP since 1888, and was stationed in the 
area of Slang River.394 At Nothnagel’s trial, the lockup keeper, William Osmond, 
testified that the police constables at Heidelberg had to report any internal seditious 
comments and behaviour to him, which he was to record in his gaolers book. In a 
private conversation between Nothnagel and constable JDJ Manuel which had taken 
place in December of 1900, Nothnagel had apparently said that if the Boers should 
ever invade Heidelberg and the police were called out to fight, he would shoot 
Manuel and join the Boers. In a previous conversation with constable Jan Matthee, 
Nothnagel had stated that he wished the Boers would drive the English into the sea. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
388 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Lex vs Otto, no. 361/1900, 10 October 1900. 
389 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Johnson vs Fouchee, no. 210/1901, 2 March 1901. 
390 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Request for prisoner transfer from Heidelberg special justice of the peace, 
no. 220/1901, 6 March 1901. 
391 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Munnik vs Crous, no. 465/1901, 22 May 1901. 
392 (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 14 December 1899. 
393 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Munnik vs Crous, no. 465/1901, 22 May 1901. 
394 (KAB) AG 754: Application for leave by WJ Nothnagel, no. 86/99, 10 October 1899. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 72 
As was procedure, Osmond recorded the events in his gaoler’s book, as well as 
personal diary, but refrained from informing Heidelberg’s commandant. Osmond 
stated that after having known Nothnagel for 12 years, he was sure that he was not 
loyal but could not prove it, and their friendship prevented him from taking the matter 
further. Constable Manuel was also unwilling to sign an affidavit regarding the 
conversation, and was apparently more upset that Nothnagel had said he would shoot 
him first.395 Probably in an attempt to keep the incident quiet, Nothnagel was not 
prosecuted for sedition under martial law, as he was subsequently dismissed with one 
month’s salary.396 
Reports made to the Attorney General’s office regarding the community 
feeling about the war, indicate that authorities were very concerned about the spread 
of false rumours of British atrocities which could potentially incite rebellion and 
generate sympathy for the Boer Republics.397 In July 1901, Willem Stassen of 
Dassiefontein was charged with using seditious language and spreading rumours after 
telling his neighbours that the Boers in the ZAR were killing wagons full of British 
soldiers, and that in the event of a Boer invasion, he would point out members of the 
district mounted units to the Boers for execution. Stassen was found guilty on both 
charges and sentenced to 6 months hard labour, but, in consideration of his large 
family, his sentence was suspended.398 The spread of rumours was an unintended side 
effect resulting from censorship and restriction of movement under the regulations of 
martial law, and contributed significantly to creating sympathy for the republics and 
generating ethnic tension in the Cape.399 Another curious incident occurred near the 
end of the war. A number of soldiers temporarily stationed at Heidelberg were court-
martialled for drunkenness. In the subsequent investigation, an analysis of the brandy 
led the authorities to believe that a local canteen owner had drugged the soldiers. 
Apparently inefficient evidence prevented prosecution and the identity of the man in 
question was never revealed.400 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
395 (KAB) AG 936: Testimony of William Osmond, no. 53/1901, 1 June 1901. 
396 (KAB) AG 936: Dismissal of WJ Nothnagel, no. 48/1901, 18 May 1901. 
397 (KAB) AG 754: Report by PB Borcherds on community feeling, no. 127/1900, 3 December 1900. 
398 (KAB) AG 3635: Military court case against W Stassen, no. 470/92, 2 July 1901. 
399 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 67. 
400 (KAB) AG 1013: Letter from Commandant Nelson regarding court-martial, no. 12/1902, 24 January 
1902. 
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Chapter 3 – Law and Order  
 
This section details cases and incidents tried under martial law. From January 
1901 to April 1902, the Swellednam’s magistrate’s office in conjunction with military 
courts tried a total of 88 cases and issued fines amounting to £142.401 As these figures 
represented the entire district of Swellendam, including Heidelberg, efforts were made 
to distinguish the cases only pertaining to the community of Heidelberg. In order to 
do so, the minutes of  Heidelberg’s church council meetings were used to determine 
the relevant cases.402 Throughout the war, a main point of contention in the Cape 
revolved around the application of martial law in the Colony. The restrictions and 
prosecutions under martial law were the most determinant factors in altering the 
identity of Cape Afrikaners. Under martial law, the right and privileges which British 
citizenship had extended to Cape Afrikaners were summarily suspended. Martial law 
was used in support of the war by way of commandeering the goods and property of 
Cape Afrikaners. The expropriation of property challenged their livelihood and severe 
restrictions on movement bound them to conscripted patterns of consumption.  
The paternalism and constitutionalism of the preceding British century had 
helped to create and strengthen the social hierarchies which were the sources of power 
and control at the heart of Cape Afrikaner society. The enforcement of martial law 
also opened up a brief window for the marginalised sections of Cape society to assert 
themselves by challenging the old dispensation. The poor and landless, including 
white bywoners and Coloured farm labourers, seized the opportunity for bettering 
their lives and settling longstanding grievances. This double assault on security and 
power from outside and within created resentment and insecurity among a new 
generation of Cape Afrikaners. Their experience of shared suffering formed the 
foundations and undercurrents of a new ethnic identity. At the heart of the tension and 
bitterness regarding the application of martial law was a cultural clash aggravated by 
the increasing difficulties created by the war. Surridge posits that the hatred fostered 
among Cape Afrikaners, resulted from the conflicting demands of political 
responsibility and military requirements, modulated by British involvement from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
401 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Reports on cases tried under martial law, no. 484/1902, 30 April 1902. 
402 (DRCA) GEM-K 596: A 1904 church council decision to subdivide the congregation into 10 wards 
included a complete list of the farms allocated to each ward. Cases tried under martial law in the 
district of Swellendam were compared to these lists to ascertain which cases were relevant to the 
community of Heidelberg. Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 15 March 1904. 
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abroad.403 From the start, Alfred Milner was at odds with political culture at the Cape. 
He distrusted the intentions of local politicians, and became frustrated by their 
hesitancy to declare martial law and indecisiveness over the issue of rebel 
disenfranchisement. This frustrated not only Milner, but also an increasingly 
beleaguered military command, by stunting their ability to effectively counter the 
invasion and contain the rebellion.  
The tension between politicians and the military was compounded by changes 
in both local government and military command, which prevented consensus on 
formulating a cohesive policy for implementing martial law. The frustration and 
distrust created in the process filtered down to local administrators and military 
authorities responsible for prosecuting the war. The Cape government’s insistence on 
including civil authorities in the application of martial law resulted in local 
commissioners and magistrates becoming burdened with heavy administrative 
workloads, while military commanders, already vexed by what they considered as 
disloyal behaviour, became increasingly distrustful of the populace under their 
supervision.  
The British military had arrived at the Cape and entered the war in possession 
of a culture shaped by a history of colonial warfare which proved insufficient 
preparation for the situation in the field. Despite widespread usage of martial law to 
suppress rebellion in other colonies, the military had never before attempted the 
practice on a predominantly European population. To Cape Afrikaners, the military 
authorities seemed to espouse a totally foreign approach to governance that assaulted 
their liberties as British citizens and discriminated against their language and ties with 
the republics. By indiscriminately lumping together Cape Afrikaners, the war had set 
in motion a process of ethnic self-identification that would eventually transcend the 
complexities in identity and provide a platform for the later ethnic solidarity of 
Afrikaner Nationalism.  
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
403 K. Surridge: Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 
1899-1902, p. 35. 
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3.1) Cultural clashes and administrative frustrations  
 
3.1.1) Political context and background 
 
In order to fully comprehend the tension between the two different visions 
regarding the future of South Africa which came to a head during the war, requires a 
better understanding of the political context which directly preceded and characterised 
the war. It can be said that ever since his arrival on South African shores, the High 
Commissioner, Alfred Milner, was at odds with the prevailing culture of the Cape 
Colony. As the majority of Cape inhabitants were Dutch or Afrikaners, Milner’s 
perception of them certainly played a major role in his approach to the war in South 
Africa. In light of emergent European tendencies towards nationalism, like the rise of 
the German state and subsequent geopolitical power plays by proxy of colonial 
expansion, overprotective imperialists like Milner feared the possibility of pan-
Afrikaner republican nationalism which the ZAR and OFS seemed to embody. This 
fear had been sparked by what appeared to be signs of ethnic solidarity in the outrage 
among Cape Afrikaners following the first Boer War of 1880-1881.  
Yet, such fears proved to be unfounded and quietened down with the 
introduction of Responsible Government in the 1880s. The affectionate bond between 
Rhodes and Cape Afrikaners, during his premiership of 1890-1895, also did much to 
placate these fears. Rhodes gained the support of the Afrikaner Bond, a vital 
component in the plans for altering the nature of rule involving the Cape Afrikaners. 
The Jameson Raid at the end of 1895, severely damaged the possibility of a Cape 
government open to Milner’s vision of imperial hegemony. Despite having the pro-
empire Gordon Sprigg as prime minister of the Cape, Sprigg’s connections with 
Rhodes and hard-line jingoes alienated him from the Bond majority in the Cape 
parliament. As a result, Milner became convinced that the pro-imperial faction of 
loyalists in the parliament were vital for the success of the war.404 
Milner did not trust the members of parliament elected in September 1898, as 
many belonged to the Afrikaner Bond.405 They comprised the new government 
headed by WP Schreiner which came to power in April 1899. Milner viewed the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
404 M. Tamarkin: Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point 
of return to a dead end, pp. 392-394. 
405 J. Galbraith: British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and 
Mismanagement, p. 83. 
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government with its large faction of Bond members as disloyal and detrimental to the 
war effort. As he could not trust the new government, Milner became resigned to the 
idea that in order to conquer the Boer Republics, he had to simultaneously conquer 
the Cape as well.406 In reality, the Cape wanted no part in the coming war, and the 
government exhausted attempts to keep the Colony from becoming involved. This 
desire was perhaps best expressed in a speech Schreiner made in August 1899, when 
he stated the desire for the Cape to be “…a little place of peace…” outside the 
confusion of war. 407  Unlike Milner, Schreiner understood the multifaceted 
composition of Cape identity.408 Milner could not fathom this hybrid identity, nor had 
he the patience to try and comprehend its contradicting manifestations. As a 
committed imperialist during a period of imperial decline, Milner was very much a 
man out of time. Also, the political culture at the Cape did not congeal with his radical 
and impatient temperament which regarded the democratic process and tolerance for 
local complexities with contempt.409 As he needed their support to effectively conduct 
the war, Milner grew exasperated with the neutral stance of Cape Afrikaners who 
insisted that the Cape not become involved in the conflict. Milner regarded this as 
fence sitting and vowed to either bypass this multi-faceted political creature or resolve 
it by obliteration.410 As the war progressed and the republican capitals fell, Milner 
became convinced that meetings held by the Afrikaner Bond in mid-1900 were aimed 
to generate popular support for a political motion to grant the republics semi-
independence. Milner believed that this would inadvertently increase rebellion in the 
Cape, and set about to neutralize the influence of the Afrikaner Bond.411 
Another point of contention for Milner, and later the military authorities, was 
the reluctance of the Cape government to declare martial law. The government was 
very hesitant to declare martial law in the areas of the Cape not affected by the first 
republican invasion, as it feared the possibility of alienating the electorate. 412 Initially 
the military supported this decision as it feared that the deployment of additional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
406 M. Tamarkin: Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point 
of return to a dead end, pp. 397-399. 
407 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, p. 15. 
408 M. Tamarkin: Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point 
of return to a dead end, pp. 408-409. 
409 Ibid., p. 393. 
410 Ibid., p. 396. 
411 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, p. 74. 
412 J. Snyman: Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale 
verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902), p. 14. 
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troops to enforce martial law would hamper the war effort by diverting manpower 
from the republican front.413 As a result, the first period of martial law from October 
1899 to June 1900 was characterised by the lack of military intervention in the 
prosecution of offenders. Military high command was willing to let the majority of 
cases be tried by civil authorities in order to speed up the process and leave the 
military to get on with their prime task of soldiering.414 During negotiations with the 
Schreiner government regarding martial law prosecutions, Milner suggested that civil 
magistrates and judges should be present at court-martial proceedings. For Milner this 
was a gesture which acknowledged the legitimacy of local government and an attempt 
to find middle ground with the increasingly hostile Schreiner ministry. The suggestion 
also had practical implications, as local magistrates and civil commissioners had local 
knowledge regarding customs and language, which would make the task easier.  
Despite the generousness of the offer, the Cape government rejected the notion 
of suspending the constitutional rights of its citizens, a decision which Milner 
regarded as an act of subterfuge, and evidence of the government’s disloyalty.415 
Eventually, a compromise was reached by way of the Special Indemnity Act of 1900, 
which indemnified those administering martial law and created special courts for 
prosecuting rebels who had committed acts of treason within the period stretching 
from 11 October 1899 to 12 October 1900. These special courts were composed of 
civil authorities according to the wishes of the Schreiner government. Unfortunately, 
the matter of prosecution was further complicated by the second invasion and the 
issue over rebel amnesty and disenfranchisement.416 
On 13 June 1900, the Schreiner government resigned over its inability to reach 
a consensus on the issue of rebel disenfranchisement. The government was evenly 
split regarding amnesty for rebels, but deadlocked on the proposal that Cape rebels 
lose the right to vote, and on 18 June a new government headed by Sprigg came into 
office.417 The Schreiner government’s constitutional debates surrounding the Special 
Indemnity Act had caused great frustration among military authorities trying to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
413 J. Galbraith: British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and 
Mismanagement, p. 70. 
414 K. Surridge: Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 
1899-1902, pp. 43-44. 
415 Ibid., p. 40. 
416 C. Strydom: Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, pp. 124-125. 
417 J. Snyman: Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale 
verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902), pp. 23-24. 
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subdue rebellion in the isolated parts of the Cape. As a result, the frustration filtered 
down through the ranks and created a tension between the military and civilian 
sections of Cape society.418 To Milner, the election of the Sprigg ministry appeared 
beneficial at first, as the new government approved the colony-wide extension of 
martial law on 17 January 1901. It became apparent however, that the Sprigg 
government shared the Schreiner ministry’s distrust of the military.419 The Attorney 
General, James Rose-Innes, detested the fact that the application of martial law often 
reflected the personal preferences and peccadilloes of local commandants, and 
actively voiced his opposition towards military involvement.420 In an attempt to 
respond to the invasion more efficiently, Kitchener proposed leniency to rebels who 
had been sentenced to death by limiting their punishment to political 
disenfranchisement. Milner and the British government were unsure about the 
proposal, believing that examples were needed to be made in order to deter further 
rebellion. The Sprigg government was outraged by the suggestion of 
disenfranchisement, as this would undermine the legitimacy of the Cape government 
and void the constitutional rights of their citizens.421  
The speed of the second invasion into the Cape had caught both the military 
and government off-guard, causing massive administrative backlogs and 
organisational lags in the prosecution of martial law cases.422 Military authorities 
became increasingly frustrated by the government’s inability to formulate clear 
policies for responding to the situation on the ground. As a result, the frustration and 
distrust at the top often filtered down to local military authorities and civil 
commissioners. In the end, it was the civilian population that received the brunt of the 
frustrations resulting from political intrigues, and the mood and temperament of those 
responsible for upholding martial law came to determine the severity of punishment 
for transgressions. 
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3.1.2) Commandants and Commanders 
 
During the war, the Cape Colony was divided into different areas under 
military administration. Each area was divided into smaller districts usually centred 
around the major town in the region. Each town was assigned a commandant to 
oversee the application of martial law. Local commandants reported to the officer 
commanding or commandant of their respective region. Area commanders were 
usually drawn from the British Imperial Yeomanry responsible for safeguarding the 
Cape from republican forces. Heidelberg was located within area designation no. 5, 
otherwise known as the Southern Area. As Heidelberg was situated within the region 
of Swellendam, it fell under the jurisdiction and control of Swellendam’s 
commandant and resident magistrate. 423  The application of martial law and 
accommodation of the civilian population was often determined by the temperament 
of local commandants.  
While some could be harsh, the majority in the Southern Cape were lenient, 
owing to the fact that rebellion in this region was less common.424 Still, temperaments 
varied, and at neighbouring Riversdale, Commandant Lumsdaine had a reputation for 
cruelty and invasiveness. Riversdale’s inhabitants were subject to extensive searches 
of their homes and were forced to wear mourning clothes after the death of Queen 
Victoria.425 Swellendam’s commandant, Captain A. Nelson, was more lenient and had 
a reputation for being more considerate of the needs of the local population.426 The 
situation at Heidelberg, however, was more complicated. In a letter to the resident 
magistrate of Swellendam, the commander for the Southern Area considered the 
magistrate’s proposed solutions for issuing permits at Heidelberg and Barrydale, and 
made the following statement:  
 
“Owing to the importance of the two villages Heidelberg and Barrydale in your 
district, I shall be glad to know what steps you propose taking for the administration 
of these places.  I have hitherto been obliged to appoint an Assistant Commandant at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
423 (KAB) DD 6/104: Circular of CDF orders, no.11, 27 April 1901. 
424 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 111-112. 
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Heidelberg, as besides having the reputation of being very disloyal, it is also in an 
important position both strategically and commercially.” 427 
 
The fact that the area commandant regarded Heidelberg with a degree of 
disdain, warrants further investigation. The officer commanding for area no. 5 and the 
man in question, was Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Arthur Burke.428 Burke had been 
stationed at Oudtshoorn where the headquarters of the Southern Area was situated, 
but in April of 1901 requested it to be relocated to Swellendam, which had better 
supplies, access to communication and was more strategically situated due to its 
geography and proximity to the railway.429 The relocation may also have been 
motivated by Burke’s desire to intercept the encroaching republican commandos 
which had entered the Southern Cape during 1901.430 Burke was a career military 
officer and veteran of numerous military campaigns in Africa. Originally part of the 
7th Dragoon Guards, Burke had been deployed to Egypt and took part in the battle of 
Tel-el-Kebir in 1882.431 Like the rest of the British officer corps deployed in South 
Africa during the war, Burke had gained experience in occupying foreign territory 
during the preceding decades of colonial warfare. Men like Burke embodied a 
different culture and mindset shaped by a life in the military and an older era of 
colonial warfare, which did not prepare them for policing a problematic area like the 
Cape.432 While the British military had some previous experience in using martial law 
to subdue colonial rebellions, the practice had never before been attempted on such a 
large scale and never on a large European population with a history of political 
rights.433 
Information on assistant commandants at Heidelberg is very sparse, owing to 
the fragile state of archival material in the files of the Colonial Defence Force. The 
fact that Heidelberg was regarded as a subdivision of Swellendam, also resulted in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
427 (KAB) AG 936: Correspondence between Lieutenant-Colonel Burke and resident magistrate of 
Swellendam, no. 135/1901, 9 December 1901. 
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regular omissions and misfilings. Available records indicate that from 30 April 1901 
until 2 August 1901, Captain John Alfred Fiveash, the chief constable of Swellendam, 
was the acting commandant at Heidelberg, for which he was paid the sum of £35 and 
12 shillings.434 Aside from the numerous reports by intelligence agents which inflated 
the degree of disloyalty in the region, an alternative explanation for Burke’s distrust 
of Heidelberg, and the appointment of Fiveash, may be had in a curious incident 
involving a previous assistant-commandant. On 5 February 1901, the resident 
magistrate of Swellendam received a letter from the commandant at Heidelberg in 
which he forwarded his decision for granting a large number of passes and permits to 
local applicants. According to the signature on the letter, the commandant was a 
Captain H Levoy.435 A military intelligence report filed with the Defence Department, 
which includes correspondence between the resident magistrates of Oudtshoorn and 
Riversdale dated 20 February 1901, reveals that Levoy was in fact a confidence man 
of sorts. According to the report, Levoy had offered his services as a spy and procurer 
of supplies to the republics at the outbreak of war. While at Heidelberg, he had been 
very lax in enforcing martial law, and issued passes to anyone willing to offer him a 
sizeable bribe. Levoy had also caused problems in Riversdale, where he had raised a 
Town Guard drawn from unscrupulous local characters, handed out weapons to 
untrustworthy individuals, and accepted bribes for granting passes and permits. He 
also inconvenienced the local inhabitants by taking control over some aspects of the 
Resident Magistrate’s job.436  
Inspection reports from the Riversdale branch of Standard Bank seem confirm 
these activities. Records indicate a drop in fixed deposits and overdraughts, while 
large cash withdrawals in the region of £20 000 were made in a six month period 
since the start of 1901.437 A similar currency panic had swept Swellendam in February 
1901, shortly after martial law was declared. Large withdrawals of cash and treasury 
drafts were made as residents feared for their savings with both the British military 
and Republican commandos in the vicinity.438 After leaving Heidelberg, Levoy joined 
Warren’s Mounted Division in their drive to enlist recruits. At Oudtshoorn he used his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
434 (KAB) DD 4/155: Pay sheets for Town Guard of Heidelberg, no. 179/1902, 2 August 1902; (KAB) 
AG 936: Pay requisition for CDF officers, district of Swellendam, no. 75/1901. 
435 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from H Levoy regarding permits and passes, no. 124/1901, 5 February 
1901. 
436 (TAB) HC 50: Intelligence report from Riversdale, 7 February 1901. 
437 (SBA) INSP 1/1/154: Fixed deposits, Inspection Report for Riversdale Branch, 27 July 1901, p. 4. 
438 (SBA) GMO 3/1/37: Report on Swellendam currency panic, 20 February 1901, p. 484. 
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military credentials to expropriate supplies and animals from local farmers which he 
would then sell for his own profit.439 Articles published in the Het Zuid-Westen during 
March 1901, confirm these activities, reporting on men going about the region 
collecting forage and horses while falsely proclaiming to be acting on the behalf of 
military authorities.440 In the intelligence report, the resident magistrate mentioned the 
need for an imperial officer to be stationed at Heidelberg in order to prevent any 
further setbacks.441 
The actions of inept and corrupt commandants like Levoy not only damaged 
local economies, but also did great harm to the already fragile relationships between 
Afrikaners and their English countrymen. The arbitrary nature of martial law was in 
itself a potential powder keg which was often ignited when individuals morally unfit 
for positions of authority were added to the mix. By August 1901, all business in the 
southwestern districts was suspended in some form due to the maladministration of 
martial law. The General Manager’s Office of Standard Bank became greatly 
concerned with the situation and blamed the poor choices in local commandants for 
exacerbating the situation.442 In December 1901, the General Manager’s Office issued 
the following statement regarding the situation: 
 
“It is quite clear, however that throughout the whole of the Cape Colony there is a 
strong feeling -  not by any means confined to the Dutch – that the action of 
Commandants under Martial Law has often been capricious and arbitrary, and 
though we think there is much to be said in defence of their action, it would be idle to 
deny that the belief exists that unnecessary losses have been inflicted on Colonists, 
irrespective of their loyalty, and such a belief may lead to momentous consequences 
when Parliament reassembles.” 443 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
439 (KAB) DD 7/17: Report by magistrate of Oudtshoorn, 20 February 1901. 
440 Het Zuid-Westen, 4 March 1901, p. 2. 
441 (KAB) DD 7/17: Report by magistrate of Oudtshoorn, 20 February 1901. 
442 (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: The Situation Cape Colony, 11 September 1901, pp. 365-367. 
443 (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: Martial Law, 18 December 1901, p. 788. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 83 
3.1.3) Neither here nor there 
 
Another possible reason for the military’s distrust of Heidelberg owes to its 
location in an administrative grey area, as well as its history of relative isolation and 
autonomy. Heidelberg was located on the eastern edge of the district of Swellendam, 
and was geographically closer to Riversdale. Many inhabitants just across the border, 
in the Riversdale district, associated themselves with Heidelberg, and many belonged 
to the local DRC congregation.444 In fact, there had been disputes over the borders of 
the respective church congregations of Riversdale and Heidelberg since 1884.445 In 
the legal sphere, the magistrate’s court fell under the jurisdiction of Swellendam, 
while the jail was administered by officials at Riversdale.446 As a result of its location 
between two major towns, and periodic uncertainty regarding its administrative 
position, Heidelberg often had to make do without official input and had grown 
accustomed to a degree of autonomy. This independence would bring it into odds with 
the military and civil authorities during the course of the war. As such, it is 
unsurprising that a military agent made the following statement in a 1901 report:  
 
“This district is an absolutely undefined one; the people do not know under which 
they come, Swellendam or Riversdale, and I think you will find it advisable to 
recommend a Military man to be stationed -  at Riversdale for preferences, to take 
charge of these parts.” 447 
 
A hallmark of the war in the Cape, was that geographically isolated towns, and areas 
of unresolved authority were more prone to clashes between the military and civilian 
population.448 Tamarkin argues that the old Dutch spirit of independence survived in 
areas where the inhabitants lived lives unfettered by government interference.449 In 
the case of Heidelberg, this spirit of independence manifested itself in a dispute !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
444 (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Request for travel permits by AJ Van Wijk, no. 706/1901, 16 December 
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447 (TAB) HC 51: Agent Murphy report from Heidelberg to C Leibrandt, 15 February 1901. 
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449 M. Tamarkin: Volk and flock: Ecology, identity and politics among Cape Afrikaners in the late 
nineteenth century, pp. 192-193. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 84 
between the Municipal Council and authorities at Swellendam regarding the use of 
language in official publications. In October 1900, the Heidelberg Municipal Council 
published the new municipal regulations in Dutch. On 25 October, the council 
received instructions from Swellendam’s resident magistrate to have the new 
regulations republished in English as well as in Dutch. According to martial law, all 
official publications were to be published in both languages.450  
The council responded angrily, and in a letter to the magistrate, secretary 
James Du Preez stated that the council viewed republication as unnecessary, owing to 
the fact that less than two percent of the town’s population could not read Dutch, and 
that regulations had always been published in Dutch. He asserted that republication in 
English was unconstitutional, scolded the magistrate for proposing such a hindrance, 
and vowed to write to the Colonial Secretary.451 During the following day’s meeting 
of the Municipal Council, it was decided that a request to supply the town with 
martial law regulations printed only in Dutch would be made.452 According to martial 
law, household meetings to elect new officials to the Municipal Council were required 
to be held in English and witnessed by the local commandant.453 In February 1901, 
the resident magistrate of Swellendam informed the Colonial Office that the 
Municipal Council disregarded these regulations by abandoning the meeting attended 
by the commandant and reconvened the election meeting elsewhere without official 
consent.454 
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3.1.4) Magistrates and the Military 
 
Petitions by prominent persons in local institutions were a common occurrence 
during the war, and placed massive pressure on civil commissioners and magistrates 
whose loyalty was already questioned by the military.455 The war placed intense 
workloads and pressure on these civil servants, who had to assist commandants in 
martial law prosecutions, as well as attending to normal civil cases. In addition to 
these responsibilities, magistrates and civil commissioners were also responsible for 
reimbursing the local inhabitants for commandeered goods. 456 A report on the 
administrative costs incurred under martial law indicates that Heidelberg and the 
authorities did not have an amiable relationship. Apparently, the administration of 
martial law at Heidelberg had been a costly affair due to the appointment of 
individuals to issue travel passes and permits. The two men appointed were Dick 
Miller, a Municipal Councilman, and Costly White, a recently arrived British engineer 
overseeing construction of the railway extension into Heidelberg.457 The task was 
usually performed by local magistrates, but according to the report, prior to the 
appointment of the aforementioned individuals, it had been delegated to 
Swellendam’s chief constable, John Fiveash, who had to constantly travel between 
towns.  
In the report, the resident magistrate of Swellendam requested the appointment 
of an additional junior clerk in order to process the high volume of requests.458 Before 
the declaration of martial law and arrival of the Imperial Yeomanry, Heidelberg was 
to be administered by the Swellendam commandant, Major Murray. Yet, reports from 
the time indicate that Murray was quickly ousted from the position and replaced by an 
imperial officer due to his leniency. Murray had apparently refused a request from 
local loyalists to hold a public meeting which condemned a Bond congress in 
Worcester which denounced Milner.459 During the early stages of martial law, when 
Heidelberg had not yet been assigned a military commandant, the magistracy and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
455 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 137. 
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457 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/28: Approval of RPC Miller as special justice of the peace, no. 326/1901, 30 
August 1901; (KAB) AG 936: Request by resident magistrate Holt Okes to appoint C White, no. 
135/1901, 9 December 1901. 
458 (KAB) AG 1013: Report on administrative expenses under martial law, no. 13/1902, 29 Jan 1902. 
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commandants at nearby Riversdale were tasked with these functions. Aside from their 
increased workload, the situation was exacerbated and mired in confusion due to 
Heidelberg’s administrative ambivalence. As was the case in many towns during the 
war, these administrators were unsure about their duties and extent of authority. An 
intelligence officer described the situation in his report as follows:  
 
“These fellows do not as a matter of fact know their positions, nor their powers, and 
everything is really chaos.” 460 
 
EH Samuels, the Resident Magistrate of Riversdale, was appointed as acting 
Commandant but was soon replaced as authorities viewed him as being physically 
unfit for duty, and for outsourcing the commandeering of horses to a private firm who 
mistakenly sold the horses for profit, instead of sequestering the animals for military 
use. Samuels had also been wary of affronting the local farmers and avoided seizing 
any arms and ammunition from the community. 461  He was replaced by a Mr 
Schotland who did not fare much better, with reports declaring: 
 
“The A.R. Magistrate, Riversdale, (Mr Schotland) though a very good man and one 
who thoroughly understand his magisterial duties, does not know anything about the 
duties of Commandant, in which capacity he is acting at present.” 462 
 
Both the civil commissioners responsible for Heidelberg had occupied their positions 
for many years, and were not prepared for the pressures and challenges created by the 
war. Heidelberg’s long serving special justice of the peace and de facto magistrate, 
Albert White, was a much loved character in the town and community, known for his 
good natured and informal approach to legal matters.463 Despite White’s British 
pedigree, it appears that military authorities considered him untrustworthy due to his 
affinity and connection with the local community. In a letter to the resident magistrate 
of Swellendam, Henry Jones Hanson complained about being unable to sell 
gunpowder and shot because White was not authorized to issue the required permits !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
460 (TAB) HC 50: Intelligence Report, 7 February 1901. 
461 (TAB) HC 51: Intelligence Report, 22 February 1901. 
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463 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
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under martial law. Local farmers and inhabitants of town had to travel to Riversdale, 
as it was the nearest location with a resident magistrate authorised to issue such 
permits.464 In December 1900, Albert White was reprimanded for illegally issuing a 
gunpowder permit to one Daniel Bester. In a letter to Swelledam’s magistrate, White 
apologized for the incident, claiming that it had been done out of force of habit.465 
White also earned the scorn of area commander Burke, when reports about DF 
Scholtz’s parole violations started to surface at the end of 1900. He was reprimanded 
by the resident magistrate for not reporting Scholtz’s insubordinate behaviour and 
failure to report himself to White on a regular basis.466 When Scholtz left for Port 
Beaufort without White’s permission, an outraged Burke railed against the aging 
special justice for his behaviour.467 The pressures of war took their toll, and White 
died before the end of hostilities on 11 April 1902. He was replaced by a new special 
justice, WF Rogers, who was the first official at Heidelberg authorized to issue passes 
and permits.468 In a touching letter to the resident magistrate of Swellendam written in 
February 1901, White stated what can be considered as a good summation of the 
position in which many administrators caught up in the war found themselves: 
 
“We have had another fine rain, I wish this war will soon end for it does throw 
everything six and sevens, even in our work.” 469 
 
The resident magistrate of Swellendam was the 60 year old, Petrus Borchardus 
Borcherds,470 who had occupied the position for  41 years prior to the war.471 
Borcherds was descended from a long line of Anglo-Afrikaner civil servants and DRC 
ministers who formed part of a multigenerational civil service resulting from British 
reforms to government institutions. The discontinuation of the landdrost system and 
creation of magistrates, along with the rapid creation of new magisterial districts in an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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465 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Letter from A White, no. 840/1900, 13 December 1900. 
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17 August 1902. 
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attempt to establish authority and entrench order in the rural districts from 1827 to 
1855, had resulted in the creation of a new class of Cape Afrikaners like the 
Borcherds family. 472  Borcherds’ great-grandfather was the Reverend Meent 
Borcherds, who had been appointed by the VOC as minister to the Cape Town 
congregation in 1784. Borcherds’ grandfather and namesake, PB Borcherds,473 had 
been the Civil Commissioner and Magistrate for Cape Town.474  
The elder Borcherds led a fascinating life and epitomised the duality in 
identity and allegiance of Cape Afrikaners. He was born a Dutchman in 1786 during 
the rule of the VOC, apprenticed as a clerk in the landdrost system, witnessed the 
transition to British rule, became absorbed into the newly anglicised bureaucracy, and 
died a loyal British subject in 1871.475 Borcherds’ autobiographical memoir is a 
fascinating read and insightful window into the profound institutional and cultural 
changes which shaped Cape Colonial society during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Like Albert White, Borcherds shared an intimate connection to the town of 
Heidelberg and the wider district. His uncle and namesake, Reverend Petrus 
Borchardus Borcherds,476 had been Heidelberg’s first provisional clergyman from 
1856 to 1858, and was also responsible for naming the town.477  
As the resident magistrate for the large district of Swellendam, Borcherds had 
to endure a massive workload during the war, and was often the recipient of the ire 
and distrust of military authorities. In March 1901, a farmer named Jacob 
Schoonwinkel and his son were charged with contravening martial law by stockpiling 
large amounts of firearms, ammunition and horseshoes. In the trial over which 
Borcherds presided, it became apparent that the son, who had harboured republican 
sympathies, was responsible for the stockpile. As the young man was only 16 years 
old, Borcherds acted leniently by finding only the father guilty and fining him £15 or 
2 months imprisonment.478 In another case dated 11 March 1901, a local field cornet 
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was accused of concealing a weapon on his farm. Borcherds declared the man 
innocent on the concealment charge but fined him £5 for resisting arrest.479 
On 12 March 1901, Major Cuthbertson, the commandant at Ashton, and a 
local man, P Ashenden, who claimed to represent a faction of loyalists, sent an 
official complaint  to CDF headquarters about the leniency of Borcherds’ sentences. 
They requested that Schoonwinkel’s fine be increased to £17 and that Borcherds be 
reprimanded for conduct which outraged the loyalist community and set a bad 
example. The letter was accompanied by remarks from Lieutenant-Colonel Burke 
regarding his suspicions about Borcherds. 480  An intelligence report from 1900 
confirmed that the military authorities were hostile towards Borcherds and doubted 
his loyalty, describing him as: “…aged and very luke-warm, neither fish, flesh nor red 
herring.” 481  
Aside from his connection to Heidelberg, there may have been another reason 
that Borcherds’ loyalty was questioned. His cousin, Meent Borcherds, 482  was 
employed as the night watchman at Riversdale jail. Meent Borcherds’ son, AW 
Borcherds,483 worked at Riversdale Post Office prior to moving to the ZAR just 
before the outbreak of the war. He was recruited for commando duty in 
Potchefstroom, and fought at the battle of Magersfontein near Kimberley. On his way 
to Pretoria, he was captured and  sent to Delgoa Bay for transport to the Greenpoint 
POW camp via Mosselbay. Authorities regarded him and his father as great rebels.484 
When Borcherds commuted William Stassen’s sentence of 6 months imprisonment 
regarding the spread of rumours and use of seditious language, Swellendam’s 
commandant, Captain Nelson, undersigned the case with highly indignant remarks 
regarding Borcherds’ decision.485 The war took its toll on the aging Borcherds who 
submitted numerous applications for leave, and was eventually placed on an indefinite 
leave of absence due to cardiovascular complications.486 Borcherds died of heart 
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disease on 17 August 1902, and was succeeded by Holt Okes who had been his 
temporary replacement.487 
 
3.1.5) Beleaguered law enforcement 
 
Due to the low number of volunteers in the Colonial Defence Force, and the 
general unwillingness of white Cape Colonists to take up arms in defence of the 
Colony, the High Commissioner and the British military became increasingly 
distrustful of local inhabitants. Massive expenditure and military setbacks in the 
republics, coupled with the dawning realisation about the Boer resolve to fight and the 
longevity of the war, affected the attitude of military authorities towards the Cape 
Colony. To many, the problems at the Cape were an unwanted hindrance, and these 
frustrations aggravated their distrust of the populace.488  Not even those inhabitants 
willing to serve in the protection of the Colony were completely trusted by their 
British overseers, and were often regarded as untrustworthy and incompetent. In a 
letter to the GOC of the Colonial Defence Force, Lieutenant Colonel Burke requested 
12 additional men to increase the safety at Barrydale and “…especially at 
Heidelberg.”489A surprise inspection of Heidelberg’s police force in August 1900, had 
deemed that officers Miller, Batten, and Manuel were too far removed from proper 
supervision to keep them sufficiently sharp and effective in their duties.490 Police 
enforcement of martial law during the early stages of the war had apparently been a 
contentious issue in the community.  
In May 1901, Thomas Henry Miller submitted his resignation to the resident 
magistrate of Swellendam, stating that he was concerned for the safety of his wife 
while he was on the night shift from 9 pm to 5 am, and that the nature of the work did 
not agree with him. The application of martial law by volunteers to local law 
enforcement units was more often than not met with scorn. Reports from March 1901 
indicate that local Afrikaners who had joined the CDF had become very much out of 
favour with those who declined to sign up. The report mentions how members of 
mounted police units and town guardsmen had been insulted while visiting the farm !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
487 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/458: Death notice of Petrus Borchardus Borcherds, no. 3145, 17 August 1902. 
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of Jan Uys near Slang River in the Heidelberg area.491 Another report recalls the 
testimony of the Chief Constable, in which he bemoans the ill-treatment of a private 
constable by one of the local farmers while out on a four day patrol. He was not 
offered any food or shelter by local farmers while on patrol.492 Despite Miller’s 
protestations, his resignation was initially refused.493 In an accompanying letter from 
the Municipal Council, secretary James Du Preez explained to the magistrate that the 
enforcement of martial law by the municipal police had resulted in unease within the 
community. Du Preez insisted that Miller be allowed to resign and also requested that 
the municipal police force be exempt from the enforcement of martial law.494 
Concerns over loyalty and willingness to serve also extended to those serving 
in mounted units like the DMP and DMT. Intelligence reports on the effectiveness of 
rural police units compiled during the course of 1900 suggests that military officials 
held these units in very low regard, and went as far as describing them as useless and 
disloyal. Some were of the opinion that those recruited into the defence of the Colony 
were usually drawn from the lower classes of Afrikaners, and as such could not be 
relied on to do their duty. Newly recruited private constables were described as being 
the worst as they had friendship and family connections to the people in the district 
and were therefore compromised, as well as prone to let acts of treason go unreported. 
Chief constables were regarded as the most loyal assets as most of them had been 
sourced directly from Britain. Yet they were also prone to idleness having reached the 
pinnacle of their profession and could be coerced by local magistrates who were 
fearful of the local farmers.495  
On 29 July 1901, Heidelberg’s resident surgeon, Dr Henry Biggs, had to write 
a report on the incapacitation and illness of James Albert Mitchell, a trooper in the 
District Mounted Police. Military authorities were concerned about Mitchell’s 
willingness to do his duty and Biggs had to confirm the diagnosis of Riversdale’s 
surgeon which stated that Mitchell was unable to perform his duties due to 
inflammation of the liver.496 Mitchell died on 25 August 1901 and was replaced by 
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Thomas Henry Miller. 497  In all, the military’s distrust of the Cape population 
significantly contributed to the often harsh and arbitrary fashion in which martial law 
was implemented and administered. This distrust was essentially rooted in frustration 
resulting from larger logistical issues and an inability to comprehend local customs 
and culture. To the inhabitants of the Cape, especially Afrikaners, it appeared as if 
their way of life was challenged by an outside and foreign force determined to single 
them out for punishment. The identification of outsiders or “others” has been shown 
to be a vital psychological element in the emergence of ethnic nationalism, despite the 
absence of a clearly defined political ideology.498 
 
 
3.1.6) The role of spies 
 
During the war, dozens of secret agents employed by the British military 
travelled throughout the Cape Colony gathering intelligence on rebellious individuals 
and possible acts of treason. These agents reported to an intermediary in Cape Town, 
who then relayed the information to British military command and the High 
Commissioner’s office.499 The district of Heidelberg and the surrounding areas also 
played host to several of these agents, who made recommendations to local military 
officials regarding local inhabitants. As was the case in other areas of the Cape 
Colony, intelligence agents often based their reports on dubious sources coloured by 
personal prejudices and opportunities for score settling. Agents were also prone to 
overzealousness and fabrication in order to remain employed and for ingratiating 
themselves with military command. As a result, the manner in which military officials 
such as commandants treated the local populace was often the direct outcome of the 
reports filed by these men, and could determine the severity by which martial law 
regulations were applied. 500  
The first two agents to visit Heidelberg, apparently had such a disheartening 
experience, that their animosity towards the inhabitants may have prejudiced future 
reports indefinitely. The first agent to frequent the area was codenamed Reynecke, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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who made contact with local loyalists at the Masonic Hotel and the post office. 
Apparently, the unidentified loyalists, either through careless overzealousness or 
contempt for the said agent, had revealed the true motivation behind his presence to 
their fellow townsfolk. When the second agent, codenamed M Knocker arrived to 
replace Reynecke, the locals had taken great satisfaction in informing him that they 
knew who he really was. He recommended that future agents not make their mission 
known to the indiscreet loyalists, and that they should not frequent the Masonic Hotel 
as it only played host to loyalist elements in town. The Heidelberg Hotel also known 
as Swart’s Bar, was preferable, as it was frequented by the more rebellious 
inhabitants.501 In Knocker’s previous intelligence report on 19 January 1901, he 
included a signed statement by self-identified loyalists, who reaffirmed their 
allegiance and asked for the removal of paroled POWs from town. One of the 
undersigned was the Post Master, Mr JW Farrell.502 Surprisingly, in Knocker’s final 
report on 23 February 1901, he called for the removal of Mr Farrell, citing the man’s 
affinity for whiskey and lack of attention to his office. He also admonished Farrell for 
letting an assistant Telegraph clerk, named Morrison, to speak out of turn and to do as 
he pleased.503 The timing of these events may be purely coincidental, yet there 
appeared to be some vindictiveness towards Mr Farrell on behalf of agent Knocker. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the new agent codenamed Murphy continued in this trend in 
his report on the 23rd of February 1901, stating: 
 
“I find that these two districts, Riversdale and Heidelberg, are really about the as bad 
as possibly can be, not only in the outlying parts, but the towns themselves. The 
inhabitants are ripe for anything that comes their way. The few loyalists here have 
rather a rough time, and the presence of someone in authority would not only have 
the effect of making matters easier for them, but keeping the others in check.” The 
rebel portion of the community are pretty strong, and make their presence felt. I can 
assure you it only requires a man here, one who can speak the language, to keep them 
properly in hand and prevent unpleasantness. I have ridden through the greater 
portion of these districts and find the farmers rather a bad lot. They do not take the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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trouble to disguise their feelings at all, and would join to a man, any party that should 
come their way; they are very different to those I came across in Mossel Bay 
district.”504 
 
Throughout his stay in Heidelberg and the surrounding districts, agent Murphy 
continued decrying the disloyalty of the local inhabitants. In a later report, he 
commented on the treasonous nature of the civilians in the Swellendam area, stating a 
belief that they were in constant communication with roving commandos in the 
mountains.505 These reports do not seem to have reflected the reality of the situation, 
given the extremely small number of local inhabitants tried for treason under martial 
law. Even during the high point of commando activity in the area, including 
Scheepers’ invasion of Barrydale and the attack on Heidelberg, not a single person 
joined the commandos.506 Yet military despatches based on these intelligence reports 
had estimated that a minimum of 1000 locals would join the Boer commandos, should 
they enter the district.507 There can exist little doubt that these intelligence reports 
greatly affected the way military authorities regarded the local inhabitants. The fact 
that the manner in which martial law was enforced varied according to the 
temperament and disposition of individual commandants, such reports could very well 
have been the deciding factor in determining how inhabitants experienced the war. An 
intelligence report by Allen G Davison from Zuurbraak to the Pro-British 
commandant of Ashton, Major Cuthbertson, provided a chilling example. Davison 
declared that he was convinced all Afrikaner farmers were hostile despite their 
proclamations of loyalty, and states: 
 
“I can only add that the present is no time to consider the feelings of the disloyal 
Dutch, they should be made to feel the full weight of British Supremacy, and to learn 
who are masters and rulers in this country.” 508 
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3.2) Challenges to the status quo 
 
During the initial period of martial law, enforcement was very lenient and 
great care was taken as not to alienate and aggrieve the Cape Colonists. This soft 
approach was a reflection of the cautiousness of the colonial government under the 
Schreiner administration, as well as the British military’s lack of experience in 
implementing martial law and desire to employ the entirety of their manpower in the 
republics.509 General law and order was restored as rebel activity in the Northern Cape 
and Midlands started to subdue by mid-1900 after the occupation of the republican 
capitals. Civil authorities in these regions quickly returned to power, even more so in 
the yet to be affected Southern Cape regions.510 The situation changed rapidly when 
on the night of 15 December 1900, Scheepers and Kritzinger’s forces crossed the 
Orange River into the Colony. The second invasion differed markedly from the first, 
as the invaders no longer intended to conquer and indefinitely occupy Cape territory. 
Instead their aim was to incite a general uprising and gather recruits for the republican 
cause.511  In response, martial law was again declared in areas where invading 
commandos operated, and eventually extended to the entire Colony on 17 January 
1901. In the Southern Cape, martial law regulations first appeared in the Het Zuid-
Westen on 18 February 1901. These included the restriction on selling liquor after 10 
pm, a ban on any seditious language and publications, a strict curfew which 
prohibited citizens from leaving their homes after 10 pm, and prohibition of all public 
meetings and travel outside of the area under martial law without the consent of the 
local commandant or resident magistrate.512  
Records on expenditures for the reimbursement of commandeered goods 
indicated that those responsible for martial law administration were initially keen on 
paying out Heidelberg farmers for their losses.513 In fact, reports from the Riversdale 
branch of Standard Bank indicated a drop in advances, as farmers were making large 
cash profits from cattle sales due to increased war demand.514 In general, responses to 
losses incurred by farmers subjected to martial law varied according to the different 
colonial administrations in power. While the Schreiner ministry was more willing to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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reimburse losses in order to prevent alienating the electorate, the speed of the second 
invasion and large scale rebellions resulted in the British military pushing for harsher 
penalties. While the Sprigg ministry was more compliant to the will of the Home 
Office, the adoption of harsher methods of enforcement rankled the judiciary and the 
office of the Attorney General tried desperately to protect the rights of the Cape 
citizenry. Ultimately, the application of martial was an arbitrary affair determined by 
the demeanour of local commandants and their subordinates.515  
 
3.2.1) Restriction of movement 
 
The severe movement restrictions under martial law intruded into every aspect 
of the lives of those who had to live through this period. In order to replenish supplies, 
all inhabitants of a field cornetcy were required to do their shopping at a designated 
depot on the same day. As farmers were not allowed to store hay or grind wheat to 
make flour, food supplies usually lasted only 14 days. Besides impeding the physical 
welfare of the population, these regulations on movement also affected shopkeepers 
by severing them from their clientele. 516  In a letter addressed to the resident 
magistrate, HH Fouche from Malgas requested financial help as the expropriation of 
food supplies from his farm and inability to replenish, them given the restrictions on 
movement, had left him and his family starving.517 Simple daily activities became 
subject to scrutiny and suspicion. On 5 February 1901, HJ Van Der Merwe wrote to 
the resident magistrate, requesting a pass to go to the post office.518 The following day 
Van Der Merwe again queried the magistrate on the matter and mentioned how the 
inability to freely move about had made the sale of something as small as a gross of 
eggs impossible without a pass.519 In fact, this section of the resident magistrate’s files 
is littered with numerous requests for travel passes. Even normal community activities 
were disrupted, as can be ascertained when examining a request sent by Reverend AJ 
Van Wijk for inhabitants from a Riversdale farm to receive passes in order to cross 
into the Swellendam area and get married at Heidelberg.520 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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3.2.2) Challenges to basic livelihood 
 
The restrictions and expropriations imposed by martial law had a significant 
impact on farming communities like Heidelberg, as the equipment, manpower and 
supplies needed to cultivate and maintain crops were extremely limited during the 
war. As a result, agricultural yields decreased significantly during and after the war. 
In 1891 total wheat production in the Cape amounted to 909 000 two hundred pound 
bags. By 1904 production had almost halved to a 567 000.521 In March 1900, James 
Joubert of the farm Joubertsdal, wrote to WP Schreiner, complaining about the martial 
law regulation restricting the availability of buckshot and rifle ammunition. 
Regulations dictated that farmers were only allowed to keep shotguns and fine-
grained ammunition, while all rifles and heavy shotgun ammunition were impounded. 
Joubert related how baboons were systematically destroying his maize crops, and 
requested to be issued a permit for 100 Mauser bullets to be used solely for pest 
control.522 Besides hampering their ability to protect their crops from predators, the 
practice of impounding farmers’ guns also contributed to a growing sense of 
persecution, especially in light of Coloured scouts and Town Guards being armed and 
allowed freedom of movement.523  
The dipping of sheep also became a point of contention during the war. As 
movement was severely restricted and farming became regulated by centralised 
patterns of operation, only a limited quantity of sheep could be inoculated against a 
range of diseases. In a letter to Swellendam’s resident magistrate, one man related 
how the local commandant had allocated him insufficient time to dip his sheep and 
cursed him when he voiced his concerns. As a result, 75 of his sheep died because he 
had only been allowed a single day to dip his entire herd.524 Farmers weren’t the only 
victims of martial law restrictions. Reports from Riversdale indicated that the 
restriction of movement and sequestering of draught animals had severely crippled 
urban businesses.525 The situation for merchants and farmers selling and producing 
ostrich feathers was further compounded when the military authorities decided to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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restrict the movement of ostrich feather buyers. The decision was made after dubious 
claims that feather buyers operated as double agents or spies on behalf of the Boer 
republics.526 
 
3.2.3) Commandeering of horses 
 
During the war, the military initiated a massive drive to collect all horses in 
every district of the Cape Colony. Horses were needed by the military to effectively 
wage the mobile war which crisscrossed the South African landscape. As the district 
of Swellendam had been a leading producer of stallions for many years prior to the 
war, the area was considered a prime source for supplying military needs. A 
newspaper article published in November 1900, confirmed that horses from the 
southwestern districts were reportedly the best suited for use in cavalry units.527 The 
second invasion into the Cape also necessitated the commandeering of horses to 
prevent them from falling into the hands of republican commandos. As a result, 
forage supplies were destroyed and horses were kept in well-guarded central 
locations.528 As the railway did not yet extend to Heidelberg, horses were still the 
main mode of transport for the majority of the inhabitants. The loss of the 
community’s horses severely impacted farming activities and impeded the conduct of 
business. In a letter to Swellendam’s magistrate, local storekeeper, Nicolas Friedman, 
requested to be absolved from having to send his only two horses to Swellendam for 
inspection by the military. Friedman remarked that the loss of his horses would harm 
his business, as he had no other means of conveying his goods between customers and 
suppliers. 529  The practice of commandeering horses generally caused great 
antagonism among the inhabitants of the Cape. Farmers resented the arbitrary and 
condescending nature in which the authorities deprived them of their property, as well 
as losing their most important tools of cultivation and transport.  
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526 (TAB) HC 52: Report by Agent Murphy from Riversdale, 19 March 1901. 
527 The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 10 November 1900, p. 2. 
528 C. Strydom: Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, p. 128; J. Snyman: Rebelle-verhoor in 
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For many the loss was also more personal, as emotional bonds between man 
and animal had been forged by years of companionship.530 A letter from Hans Jacob 
Gildenhuys of Goedemanskraal, requested the magistrate’s intervention so that he 
might be allowed to keep his oldest two horses. After taking his horses to Swellendam 
and Riversdale for inspection by the military, authorities refused to release them 
despite declaring both to be useless for military service. Gildenhuys went on to state 
that both horses were very old, having been in the family for many years, and were of 
great personal value to his family.531 Stallions which the authorities deemed unfit for 
military use but which may have been of use to invading commandos, were usually 
castrated. In November 1901, two Heidelberg farmers, named Beukes and Van Zyl, 
complained about the practice, as several of their horses which were castrated under 
orders from the local commandant had died as a result.532 In general, the assault on 
the horse population of the Southern Cape, impacted heavily on farming activity and 
the agricultural output of the region, despite receiving good rains in 1901.533 In the 
wider agricultural context, the war also resulted in a general shift in ownership of 
draught animals to animals kept expressly for slaughter.534 
 
3.2.4) Loss of control over labour 
 
Another challenge to the existing status quo was the issue over labour. During 
the war, many Coloured and Black farm labourers simply absconded from their duties 
in order to seek better numeration and living conditions in service of the military. 
Control over labour had long been a point of contention between the different cultural 
factions at the Cape, and one of the few issues which spurred Cape Afrikaners from 
their general political apathy. The urban-rural divide between the English and 
Afrikaans sections of Cape society constituted the framework regarding the issues 
over control of labour. As the English-speaking sections usually dominated the 
economic sphere in urban spaces, they had better access to capital and the ability to 
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530 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 125. 
531 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from HJ Gildenhuys, no. 178/1901, 23 February 1901. 
532 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Claims by Beukes and Van Zyl, no. 379/1901, 26 November 1901. 
533 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 192. 
534 M. De Kock: Selected subjects in the economic history of South Africa, p. 216. 
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protect the value of artisanal skills. As a result, they advocated for a more competitive 
free market system.  
In contrast, rural-based Afrikaners wanted more protection in the form of 
tariffs and a guaranteed supply of cheap labour. Accordingly, legislation and other 
measures of social control were instituted to stabilize access to farm labour. The war 
challenged this entrenched system of subservience as many farm labourers went off in 
response to the opportunities which the war had made possible.535 Loss of control 
over labour eroded the profit base of Afrikaner agrarian elites, and the sight of 
Coloured labourers enforcing martial law by service in Town Guards and scouting 
units challenged their hierarchy and status.  
In the Southern Cape, where farming activities were dependent on cheap 
labour, the issue over labour absconsion was especially contentious.536 In Heidelberg 
the issue was very apparent, as the magistrate’s files are littered with cases of 
absentee and deserting labourers, starting from as early as April 1900.537 In May of 
1900, Jacobus Migiels, a labourer hired by Louis Peters to clean a section of 
Heidelberg’s fresh water canal, was fined 5 shillings in absentia for never showing 
up.538 Ezak Joers was found guilty and fined £1 for absconding from the service of 
Morden Darcey, having been apprehended at Swellendam’s railway station on his 
way to Worcester.539 On 13 August 1900, Frederik Stoffels was fined 10 shillings in 
absentia for illegally leaving the employ of Peter Lombaard. Authorities ascertained 
that he had left his residence at the Slang River location for work at the military 
remount camp at Worcester.540 Hendrik Johannes, a shepherd in the employ of mayor 
James Munnik, was fined 10 shillings for refusing to fulfil his duties, having stated 
flatly during the proceedings that he could get better pay in employ of Swellendam’s 
Town Guard.541 Records from the trial proceedings of Adonis Eyster in February 
1901 highlighted the futility of prosecuting such cases. The accused could not be 
tracked down and the justice of the peace stated that he was disinclined to award a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
535 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, p. 285. 
536 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 194. 
537 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Index of cases involving labour absconsion, no. 517/1900, 21 April 1900. 
538 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Peters vs Migiels, no. 583/1900, 8 May 1900. 
539 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Joers vs Darcey, no. 865/1900, 16 July 1900. 
540 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Stoffels vs Lombaard, no. 1070/1900, 13 August 1900. 
541 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Munnik vs Johannes, no. 1195/1900, 8 October 1900. 
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fine owing to the fact that the restrictions on movement set in place by martial law 
had made the persecution of offenders impossible.542 
 
3.2.5) The language issue 
 
Despite declarations by the government, like Milner’s manifesto of 23 
November 1899, that the English and Afrikaans sections of the Cape would continue 
to enjoy equal rights, blatant language discrimination regularly occurred throughout 
the war. The pro-British press was especially guilty of assaulting the Dutch and 
Afrikaans languages in their attempts to display loyalty.543 In a section entitled 
Vragen en Gedachten the Southern Cape newspaper, the Het Zuid-Westen, 
commented on a disturbing trend that promoted an unnatural and artificial 
demarcation between “Engelschen and Afrikaanders.”544 In Southern Cape towns like 
Oudtshoorn, authorities insisted that only English be used for all official 
publications.545 Likewise, at Heidelberg the Municipal Council was engaged in a 
polemic with the Colonial government and the Swellendam magistrate’s office over 
the use of Dutch and English in municipal regulations.546 The Council regarded the 
redrafting of municipal regulations in English as an unnecessary expense, especially 
since the majority of the community’s inhabitants were Dutch/Afrikaans.547 The 
dispute may have arisen after a loyalist faction in town secretly complained about the 
lack of martial law proclamations published in English. Military intelligence also 
suspected the secretary of the Municipal Council, James Du Preez as having 
republican sympathies due to his friendship with DF Scholtz. Throughout the 
polemic, Du Preez had been the primary voice of dissent to the Magistrate of 
Swellendam’s insistence on the matter.548The dispute only ended when the Colonial 
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542 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Odendaal vs Eyster, no. 169/1901, 25 February 1901. 
543 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, pp. 97-98. 
544 “Vragen en Gedachten,” Het Zuid-Westen, 1 November 1900, p. 2. 
545 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 136. 
546 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Reply from Colonial Office regarding municipal regulations, no. 341/1900, 
25 October 1900. 
547 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/39: Letter received from Heidelberg Municipal Council, no. 803/1900, 28 
November 1900. 
548 (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report, 23 January 1901. 
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Office interceded by admonishing the council over its refusal to republish in 
English.549 
 
3.2.6) Challenges to existing power structures 
 
Incidents like the Municipal Council’s dispute over language also damaged the 
trust of the loyal inhabitants of the Cape in their government, and forced them to 
reassess their collective identity while under constant suspicion. The questioning of 
loyalist allegiance and the often needless persecution for petty offences under the 
blanket terms of martial law, resulted in alienation and contributed to an emerging 
cultural consciousness.550 The war and imperialist ideology brought the issue over 
identity at the Cape to a head. The ultra-narrow imperial definitions of loyalty, like 
Milner’s famous statement to the people of Graaff-Reinet in 1898, made loyalty 
sound obligatory and part of an ideology of subjugation that was unpopular among 
those at the Cape.551 When efforts to display loyalty were made, they were often 
snubbed or met with disdain. Such was the case when the Heidelberg Municipal 
Council was denied its request to be allowed the honour of sending a welcoming 
delegation to Cape Town for the arrival of the royal couple on their tour to South 
Africa in 1901.552 
The blanket application of martial law spared no one from being subjected to 
its restrictions and demands, and resulted in the social status of those occupying 
higher positions in the rural hierarchy being challenged. A prominent position in rural 
societies of the time was the office of field cornet. A remnant from Dutch rule, field 
cornets performed a vital role in the community before the advent of civil 
commissioners and a institutionalised police force. Field cornets were usually 
wealthy, literate farmers who acted as intermediaries between the judicial office and 
community.553 As such, a degree of distinction and privilege was attached to the 
office. In the early stages of the war, civil and military authorities relied heavily on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
549 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Letter from Colonial Office to Heidelberg Municipal Council, no. 21/1901, 
12 January 1901. 
550 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 176-177. 
551 A. Thompson: The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939, p. 635. 
552 (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 6 June 1901. 
553 F. Van Jaarsveld: Die veldkornet en sy aandel in die opbou van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek tot 
1870, p. 204. 
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field cornets for grass roots intelligence on community feeling and enemy 
movements. The colony-wide declaration of martial law and creation of the Colonial 
Defence Force changed this relationship, as the status and power of the office was 
challenged and the privileges of the title effectively nullified.  
At Heidelberg, the policy of commandeering horses outraged many field 
cornets and many resigned or threatened to do so. On 30 January 1901, Gert Rynier 
Uys 554 resigned his post as field cornet for the Karnemelks River ward due to the 
commandeering of his horses.555 GR Uys was a wealthy farmer on the outskirts of 
Heidelberg, whose uncle, Cornelis Janse (Veldkornet) Uys, was one of the town co-
founders and Uys’ predecessor as field cornet.556 Uys’ resignation may have been an 
attempt to elicit a sympathetic response from authorities to indemnify him from being 
subjected to martial law. Despite being reimbursed for the two horses commandeered 
by the military, Uys was adamant in his resignation.557 In a telegram to the resident 
magistrate of Swellendam, Uys asked if he could get his horses back given his recent 
resignation.558 Following in this trend was HJ Duminy, field cornet for the Krombeks 
River ward, who tentatively resigned his commission after two of his horses were 
commandeered by military authorities at Riversdale. After some coaxing, Duminy 
was eventually persuaded to retract his resignation.559 Both Uys and Duminy had been 
identified as rebellious individuals who were unsuitable for their stations in an 
intelligence report from 1901.560  
It is highly possible that their resignations followed in the wake of these 
assaults on their character. Another reason for these resignations may have been that 
the act of spying on their neighbours and impounding their firearms could have turned 
these men into social pariahs. Although the title had the potential to bestow status, it 
also had a history of strife whenever field cornets had to enforce unpopular 
policies.561 Aside from the loss of productivity and the assault on property exacted by 
the practice of military expropriation, many of these higher ranking rural elites !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
554 Uys b1c5d8e1f14; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2219: Death notice of Gert Rynier Uys, no. 3747, 17 
November 1921. 
555 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Resignation of GR Uys, no. 96/1901, 30 January 1901. 
556 Uys b1c5d9e1 
557 (KAB) AG 936: Resignation of GR Uys, no. 23/1901, 16 February 1901. 
558 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Telegram from GR Uys, no. 116/1901, 4 February 1901. 
559 (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Letter from HJ Duminy, no. 207/1901, 14 March 1901. 
560 (TAB) HC 51: Intelligence Report, 23 February 1901. 
561 N. Penn: The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist & Khoisan on the Cape’s Northern Frontier in the 18th 
Century, p. 116. 
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resented the challenge to their authority by the individuals responsible for the 
commandeering of horses.562 Prior to the war, field cornets were often required to 
travel extensively within their own wards to inspect communal facilities, record births 
and deaths, and assist in legal matters such as arrests. Under martial law, this freedom 
was severely curtailed by the restrictions placed on movement. For individuals used to 
a great amount of personal freedom and autonomy, this represented an assault on their 
way of life and social standing. In July 1900, Henry Charles Hopkins,563 field cornet 
for the village of  Heidelberg, was required to submit an application requesting a 
leave of absence to attend to personal business in Cape Town.564 A well known figure 
at Heidelberg, Hopkins owned a general store and served as treasurer on the DRC 
council.565 For men like Hopkins, the war greatly diminished the power of their office, 
especially as military authorities, frustrated and unfamiliar with local conditions, 
became increasingly distrustful of local loyalists. Hopkins was a second generation 
immigrant from Britain, yet despite his British credentials, his connection to the 
community and marriage into a local Afrikaner family may have led to doubts 
regarding his loyalty in the eyes of military officials. An intelligence report from 
February 1901 identified him as among a list of rebellious individuals and 
recommended that his commission should be cancelled.566  
On 4 March 1902, JH Human, field cornet and member of Heidelberg’s Town 
Guard, requested to privately sell one of his horses in order to cover losses resulting 
from floods. His request was denied under the restrictions imposed by martial law.567 
Another field cornet named Wessels, was removed from his post for allegedly 
distributing pamphlets and copies of the newspaper Onse Land, at a political 
gathering held in Heidelberg.568 Even the stoutest British supporters, like field cornet 
Donald Moodie, who lost his son to the war, were regarded with suspicion. When 
rumours surfaced that the forester at Grootvadersbosch, a man called Reinhardt, had 
hidden a small cache of arms and ammunition somewhere on the banks of the 
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562 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, pp. 83-84. 
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564 (KAB) AG 754: Request for leave of absence by HC Hopkins, no. 69/1900, 15 July 1900. 
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Duivenhoks River, Moodie’s allegiance was also called into question.569 After having 
the area searched and finding nothing, the agent spent the night at Moodie’s home to 
ascertain his loyalty. Moodie was not discharged, yet it was recommended he be kept 
under watch.570 
The greatest challenge to the authority of field cornets came in the form of the 
mounted units like the DMP and DMT, which were comprised of recruits from a 
younger generation and a different social background. Jurisdictional uncertainty and 
sharing of authority often resulted in power struggles and clashes among those 
responsible for the administration of martial law.571 Uncertainty about authority and 
paranoid suspicion were often exacerbated by reports from overzealous intelligence 
officers, who often based these on dubious sources inspired by personal vendettas.572 
A pertinent example of the clash between the old and new factions of authority 
occurred on 11 March 1901, when field cornet Cornelis Jacobus Joubert of the farm, 
Tilney, was charged with the illegal concealment of a rifle and resisting arrest. On 22 
February 1901, Joubert was confronted on his farm by James Coppens, a trooper in 
the DMT, regarding an allegation that Joubert had failed to hand in a Mauser rifle to 
authorities. Joubert denied the allegation and allowed Coppens to search his home. 
Coppens found an empty rifle scabbard and placed Joubert under arrest, believing the 
rifle to be hidden somewhere on the farm. As Joubert’s farm fell under the jurisdiction 
of Barrydale, he was taken to the Barrydale magistrate’s office for processing. While 
entering the town on the 24th, Joubert escaped custody and headed for Swellendam to 
clear the matter with Commandant Nelson. On the 25th Joubert encountered DMP 
trooper William Henry Batten,573 whom Joubert believed to be responsible for the 
accusation. Joubert told Batten that he knew he was responsible and would see to it 
that Batten would be dismissed. Incidentally, Batten was the older brother of Dirk 
Cornelius Batten, who also served in the DMP.574 In the trial, Batten stated that he 
witnessed Joubert in possession of a Mauser rifle the previous year, but denied that he 
had been the source of the anonymous allegation against Joubert. Testimony from Jan !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
569 (TAB) HC 47: Report from Reynecke to H Smith, 17 December 1900. 
570 (TAB) HC 47: Report from Reynecke to H Smith, 20 December 1900. 
571 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 134. 
572 J. Galbraith: British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and 
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Boschstander, a herder employed by Joubert, confirmed that the rifle in Joubert’s 
possession the previous year was not a Mauser but an old shotgun to which the 
scabbard found in Joubert’s home belonged. The trial revealed that Joubert had indeed 
handed in the weapon to authorities, along with 34 other rifles collected from farmers 
in Joubert’s field cornetcy. Joubert had personally taken the weapons to Barrydale by 
hiring a wagon, without remuneration for the cost of the undertaking. Joubert was 
acquitted on the weapons charge, and the magistrate remarked on the dubious nature 
of Batten’s testimony. Joubert was found guilty on the charge of resisting arrest and 
fined £5 or one month imprisonment.575 
The case of field cornet Joubert, reflects how the war magnified the 
undercurrents of class conflict in Cape society, as well as providing a clear illustration 
of how loyal inhabitants were alienated by distrustful authorities. War often acts as a 
catalyst or intensifier for existing tensions and social stratifications, providing a 
mutable context for individual actions which would otherwise be unacceptable.576 The 
South African War opened up a brief period for marginalised groups to assert 
themselves.577 Bill Nasson refers to this as “a popular assertion from below”, which 
afforded the poor and disenfranchised the opportunity for restitution. Although this 
reference was made to the scores of Black and Coloured men who supported the 
British war effort, it is equally applicable to marginalised white Afrikaners in the 
Cape.578  
Grundlingh has shown that economic motivations and opportunities for social 
mobility were instrumental in encouraging poor and landless Afrikaners in the OFS 
and ZAR to join the British side.579 The Cape government’s decision to use volunteers 
for defending the Colony was calculated out of distrust of the British military and 
intended to prevent alienation of the electorate. In reality, this approach resulted in 
abuse of the system, especially regarding the application of martial law, as many used 
the opportunity to settle old scores, inadvertently up-ending the existing social 
order.580 The commandeering of horses and stock seizures resulting from martial law !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
575 (KAB) AG 2045: Correspondence regarding J Schoonwinkel, no. 29/1901, 11 March 1901. 
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1902, pp. 311-312. 
580 K. Surridge: Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 
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Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 107 
often left poor tenant farmers and small business owners without much of a financial 
future and many were compelled to join mounted police divisions in order to 
survive.581 Intelligence reports on local police from the period also suggest that the 
majority of recruits in small towns and villages had been drawn from the lower rural 
classes, stating: “(they are) recruited from the laziest class of farmer who will not 
work on the farm.”582 In the district of Swellendam, enforcement of martial law was 
often synonymous with humiliation carried out by the underclasses, and paired with 
the depression of the local artisan economy, provides compelling evidence for a yet 
unexplored class dimension of the war in the Cape.583  
 
3.2.7) Challenges to civil rights 
 
One of the fundamental aspects of the war in the Cape was the severe 
challenge which martial law posed to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants. The 
suspension of the civil courts and arbitrary judgements of military courts soured an 
increasingly beleaguered citizenry against their existing notions of British citizenship. 
Although the full effects of martial law would only materialize in mid 1901, signs 
indicating the abridged powers of local government already appeared in 1900, when 
the Colonial Office denied an application for deputising a local man as issuer of 
permits and passes at Heidelberg. 584  Records indicate that during the war, 
Heidelberg’s jail was never authorised to incarcerate prisoners for long periods of 
time, and the police were required to transport prisoners to Riversdale and 
Swellendam.585  
In April 1901, military courts assumed control of prosecutions under martial 
law. This coincided with the intensification of republican invasion activity in the 
Colony.586 On 15 April 1901, the administration of the southern area and district of 
Swellendam came under control of the imperial government and Heidelberg’s 
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magistrate office closed on 28 May, only reopening on 17 January 1902.587 Within 
this period, the local inhabitants were subjected to the harsh sentences that reflected 
the arbitrary interpretation of martial law. On 8 June 1901, the Cape constitution was 
suspended until 1903. The decision was rooted in Milner’s dislike of populism and 
democracy, and was underscored by his belief that the Responsible Government at the 
Cape was detrimental to the war effort.588 In an article appearing in The Cape Times 
on 13 September 1901, the pro-British editorial tried to justify the unconstitutional 
nature of the decision by linking it to the martial law restrictions on public 
meetings.589 In reality, the decision was made in order to prevent the Sprigg ministry 
from being deposed by way of submitting a vote of no confidence. Sprigg’s cabinet 
would govern without the consent of the Cape Colonial Parliament, which meant that 
all the decisions made and expenditures incurred during this period were in fact 
unconstitutional.590 
These actions were a direct challenge to the British citizenship rights of the 
people at the Cape and fostered a deep rooted aversion to their partial British 
identities. The interim power vacuum at the top was filled with martial law and 
military courts. To many, the threat of disenfranchising Cape rebels was regarded 
with bitter irony in light of the pre-war issue over the Uitlander franchise.591 Coupled!
with the military practice of paying Coloured witnesses to provide exaggerated or 
false testimony in treason trials, the joint experiences under martial law was probably 
a powerful catalyst in the formation of ethno-ideological identification.592  
Despite its relative isolation and removal from the hotbeds of rebellion, the 
community of Heidelberg did not go untouched by the iron hand of martial law. On 
20 August 1901, two brothers, Jacobus Francois Kleinsmidt and Pieter Gabriel De 
Wet Kleinsmidt, from the farm Lemoenshoek, were charged with assisting the enemy 
when Scheepers' commando crossed their farm. Their only crime was failure to report 
the commandos’ presence to the local commandant. In their defence they claimed that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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they were unable to leave the farm as their children had been ill with the measles. 
Despite the mitigating circumstances, both were found guilty and sentenced to 6 
months hard labour and a £50 fine. 593  Another dubious incident occurred in 
September 1901, when Wynand Scott from Adamskraal was arrested for treason. 
Three troopers in the Riversdale DMT impersonated rebel commandos from Graaff-
Reinet and asked Scott for fresh horses and the names of potential recruits. Scott 
refused to join the “rebels” or give them his horse, but offered them bread and told 
them the mountain pass was clear of patrols.  Scott was arrested and sentenced to one 
year hard labour. 594  Cases of entrapment were commonplace, despite regular 
dispatches by the prime minister to the CDF which strongly condemned the use of 
such tactics.595 
Despite Milner’s convictions regarding the allegiance of  the inhabitants of the 
Cape, the reality was quite different. Most were deeply loyal to the Colony and the 
British Crown, with no interest in military involvement against the Boer Republics or 
secret desires for republicanism at the Cape. In fact, Cape Afrikaners were still in a 
state of cultural and political maturation. Preceding incidents like the Scab Act and 
Jameson Raid had spurred Afrikaners as an ethnic group to low-grade political 
mobilisation. By insisting on clarifying their loyalty, Milner had reluctantly dragged 
them into the unwanted position of choosing sides, which was aggravated by the 
assault on their civil liberties through the application of martial law.596 The military 
further inflamed local passions by blaming the mismanagement and abuses of martial 
law on the low quality of Cape volunteers. In December of 1901, attempts were made 
to counteract civilian distrust by replacing military commandants with civil 
commissioners and magistrates who reported to military administrators for large 
areas.597 A Martial Law Board had been created in October to review cases of military 
abuse and reimburse the losses incurred under martial law.598 Starting from October 
1902, a slew of angry letters and claims started to appear in the files of Swellendam’s 
resident magistrate. Many wanted compensation for commandeered animals, most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
593 (KAB) AG 3635: Military court case against JF Kleinsmidt and PGDW Kleinsmidt, no. 472/92, 20 
August 1901. 
594 The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 5 October 1901, p. 2. 
595 (KAB) DD 1/71: Memorandum from Prime Minister’s Office, no. 1779/1901, 22 April 1901. 
596 M. Tamarkin: Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point 
of return to a dead end, pp. 400-402. 
597 K. Surridge: Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 
1899-1902, p. 46. 
598 C. Strydom: Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, p. 127. 
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demanded their firearms to be returned, while others waited in vain for some form of 
official apology.599 The damage, however, had been done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
599 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letters dated to the period 25 October 1902 to December 1902. 
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Chapter 4 - The Battle 
 
4.1) Opening shots 
 
During August and September of 1901 a state of heightened anxiety and fear 
reigned throughout the Southern Cape as 500 invaders from the Boer Republics 
operated within the area.600 The Boer commandos operating in the region originally 
formed part of the republican invasion strategy to incite rebellion among Cape 
Afrikaners while opening up another front and attracting international attention in 
hope of foreign intervention. By this time, the second invasion drive had lost much of 
its momentum, and due to the lack of provisions and constant hounding by the British 
military, the primary objective of most commandos had devolved into keeping life 
and limb together. On 13 September 1901, Heidelberg was attacked by a Boer 
commando unit known as Theron’s Scouts (Theron’s Verkennings Kommando or 
TVK). The TVK started out as a cycling corps, and was the inception of Danie 
Theron, a young lawyer from Klerksdorp in the ZAR. The movement quickly evolved 
into a scouting unit and gained notoriety for their valorous and courageous actions 
during the occupation of Bloemfontein.601  
Danie Theron was killed in battle on 5 September 1900 and the TVK 
fragmented into smaller units. Leadership of the TVK passed to Jan Lombard 
Theron, 602  who was believed to be Danie Theron’s cousin. 603  Interestingly, 
subsequent genealogical research has shown that the two Theron’s were not cousins at 
all but were only distantly related.604 Jan Lombard Theron was born in Tulbagh and 
grew up in Ceres, but became a naturalised citizen of the ZAR just prior to the war.605 
British intelligence reports of the time described Theron as a short, conceited man.606 
Although not as tactically brilliant as his predecessor, Theron was daring and 
aggressive when engaging the enemy. This aggressiveness appealed to younger men, 
and the TVK had the reputation of luring away recruits from other more war-weary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
600 (TAB) FK 815 (CO 48/554): Confidential despatch to Joseph Chamberlain, no. 34908/1901, 25 
September 1901. 
601 L. Amery: The Times history of war in South Africa, p. 81. 
602 (KAB) HOP: Photograph of Jan Lombard Theron, no. 142, Addendum A, Figure 1. 
603 D. Shearing & T. Shearing: Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave, p. 25. 
604 G. Geldenhuys: Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die verre suide, p. 50. 
605 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/466: Death notice of Jan Lombard Theron, no. 3, 14 April 1902. 
606 (NLSA) Boer Army List, 31 March 1902, pp. 125-126. 
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commandos. Theron’s charismatic enlistment ability made him the ideal candidate to 
head the republican recruitment drive in the Cape, and on 12 July 1901, the TVK 
received orders from General De Wet to cross the Orange River into the Colony.607  
Theron entered the Cape near Venterstad in the Eastern Cape on 16 July 1901, 
and joined forces with the commandos of Botha, Lotter and Smith in the vicinity of 
Fish River station. On the 8th of August, this contingent attacked British forces and 
dynamited the railway tracks, after which the commandos were scattered by the 9th 
Lancers under Colonel Scobell. The TVK broke south and continued on to Graaff-
Reinet where they routed French’s Scouts, capturing 54 and replenishing their arms 
and ammunition supplies.608 The TVK continued this trend when they raided the town 
of Aberdeen on 23 August, and recruited four local men to the commando.609 On the 
26th, the replenished commando mounted a daring attack on a British armoured train 
near Klipplaat.610 Four days later, Theron entered the Oudtshoorn district and engaged 
the local DMT at Vlakteplaas on 1 September 1901.611  
During the war, Boer commandos often made use of Black and Coloured 
auxiliaries or agterryers. Many of them were coerced into service and entire 
communities were often stripped of able bodied men. Fear of reprisals on their 
families and community kept many in the service of the republican invaders.612 On 5 
September, the TVK sacked the mission community of Dysseldorp, and impressed 35 
Coloured men into service as auxiliaries. What Theron lacked in innovation, he made 
up for in cruelty, and during the TVK’s campaign in the Cape, he acquired a 
reputation for extreme cruelty towards all races of the opposition. Upon exiting the 
district, Theron ordered that an intercepted consignment of perfume be poured over 
the Coloured auxiliaries from Dysseldorp.613  
Theron’s next intended target was Mossel Bay, but after clashing with the 10th 
Royal Hussars under Colonel Kavanagh at Brandwacht on 9 September, the TVK fled 
north towards Herbertsdale, where they crossed the Gouritz River near !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
607 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 16-17. 
608 H. Shearing: The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902, pp. 130-131. 
609 (TAB) FK 812 (CO 48/554): Report from Acting Resident Magistrate of Aberdeen on Aberdeen 
Rebels, 26 August 1901, p. 125. 
610 (TAB) FK 812 (CO 48/554): Weekly Summary Cape Colony District, 31 August 1901, p. 91. 
611 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 16-17. 
612 B. Nasson: Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902, pp. 101-103. 
613 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 16-17. 
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Zandfontein.614 After spending the night at Weyders River, the commando entered the 
district of Riversdale near Drooge Vlakte on the 12th of September 1901.615 Theron’s 
audacious actions and ability to evade capture, frustrated British military high 
command, and his reputation for looting and destruction of private property was 
especially troublesome to a colonial administration trying to mollify the increasingly 
outraged inhabitants of the Cape.616 Consequently, Theron became a priority for 
Burke, who actively pursued him throughout the latter half of 1901.617 As such, 
advanced preparations were made for intercepting the TVK as they neared Riversdale 
and Heidelberg. On the afternoon of the 12th, as the Heidelberg Municipal Council 
held its final meeting for the month of September, a combined force consisting of 
DMT troops from Swellendam, Caledon, Oudtshoorn and Riversdale, met up with 
Kavanagh’s Hussars and entered the small plateau of Drooge Vlakte near Still Bay.618 
Among the Swellendam DMT was the young GJ Swart who had also served in the 
Heidelberg Town Guard during the preceding April.619  
Apparently Theron had prior knowledge of the attack and positioned his men 
in a crescent formation atop the hills overlooking the plain. In the midst of heavy rain, 
a fierce battle ensued, resulting in numerous British casualties and the wounding of 
two of Theron’s men.620 According to a later report sent to the Attorney General by 
Riversdale’s resident magistrate, CJ Roux, one of the wounded men captured at the 
battle was a man named Tiell, who served as Theron’s bookkeeper. The other heavily 
wounded man sought refuge at a local farmstead before surrendering at the Riversdale 
on 15 September. His name was Van Biljon, an ex-field cornet from Kroonstad in the 
former OFS.621  
Overwhelmed by the numerical superiority of the British and Colonial forces, 
the TVK abandoned the high ground and escaped westward into the dense fynbos 
underbrush. In the early hours of the 13th September, the commando reached the 
farmstead of Oude Muragie, situated on the Krombeks River just outside Heidelberg. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
614 The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 29 September 1901, p. 2. 
615 “Theron Attacked: Routed north of Mossel Bay, his plan disturbed,” The Cape Times, 13 September 
1901, p. 5. 
616 H. Shearing: The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902, pp. 130-131. 
617 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 16-17. 
618 The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 29 September 1901, p. 2. 
619 (KAB) AG 1013: Report on war service by local mounted officers, no. 185/02, 26 June 1902. 
620 “Heidelberg Attacked,” The Cape Times, 16 September 1901, p. 5 
621 (KAB) AG 933: Report on invasion by magistrate CJ Roux, no. 116/1901, 28 September 1901. 
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The owner, Andries Odendaal, awoke to find his home surrounded by Theron’s men. 
They intercepted Morris Reuvid, a scout from Riversdale, who had been dispatched 
by the Riversdale commandant with a message for Colonel Burke. Theron accused 
Reuvid of being a plain clothes spy and wanted to execute him, but due to Odendaal’s 
pleas for lenience, decided to have him flogged instead. In the confusion that 
followed, Reuvid managed to escape towards Riversdale.622 During the preceding 
night, the TVK had also captured and flogged a Coloured scout carrying a message 
from Burke to Kavanagh requesting his immediate assistance in the defence of 
Heidelberg.623  
It has been generally accepted that Theron’s decision to attack Heidelberg was 
based on the intelligence contained within these dispatches, believing the town to be 
poorly defended.624 Based on subsequent evidence, it can be speculated that Burke, 
who had become dead set on capturing Theron, had purposefully understated 
Heidelberg’s defensive capabilities in order to lure Theron there for a final 
showdown. Shearing has stated that the decision to move the southern district 
headquarters to Swellendam, was partly informed by Burke’s anticipation of invading 
commando movement into the area.625 In fact, under orders from Burke, Heidelberg 
had been occupied by a platoon of 28 soldiers of the 4th West Yorkshire Regiment 
under Major Sir William Henry Mahon,626 who had arrived the previous day.627 The 
44 year old Mahon was the 5th Baronet of Castlereagh from Northern Ireland and 
commanded the 4th Battalion from 21 October 1900 to 31 January 1901. Mahon and 
the Regiment had extensive battle experience, having been deployed in the ZAR and 
OFS during September and October of 1900, and in various locations throughout the 
Cape Colony from March 1900 until the end of the war.628  
It is apparent that Burke was not willing to leave the defence of Heidelberg to 
its fledgling Town Guard in face of such an aggressive foe, especially in light of his 
distrust of and contempt for the local population. The decision may also have been 
influenced by Captain Ryrie, a previous commandant at Heidelberg, who had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
622 The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 5 October 1901, p. 2. 
623 (KAB) AG 933: Report on invasion by magistrate CJ Roux, no. 116/1901, 28 September 1901. 
624 M. Grant: The history of the war in South Africa, 1899-1902, p. 283. 
625 D. Shearing & T. Shearing: Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave, p. 121. 
626 W. Mahon: Photograph of 4th West Yorkshire Regiment, Figure 2, 13 September 1901, Addendum 
A. 
627 “Attack on Heidelberg,” The Cape Times, 25 September 1901, p. 5. 
628 The London Gazette, 10 September 1901, p. 5960. 
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remarked that more men were needed to secure the area as nine tenths of the district, 
including the Town Guard, could not be relied on should trouble arrive. 629 Burke 
himself had arrived on the afternoon of the 12th to direct the construction of defences 
around town, and intended to personally direct the approaching engagement.630 The 
soldiers had been busy constructing defensive ramparts around Henry Hanson’s 
Masonic Hotel, which was considered to be in a strategically advantageous position as 
it was located in the then centre of town with vantage points that covered the main 
entrances into Heidelberg.631 Situated on the corner of Fourie and Hopley Street, next 
to the Masonic Hotel, was the gunpowder and ammunition store. It, too, had been 
heavily fortified with sandbags.632 It was on this corner where some of the heaviest 
fighting would take place. Although the soldiers constructed the defences with haste, 
they could not be fully completed as the same heavy rain which had raged during the 
battle at Drooge Vlakte interrupted the work.633 On the morning of 13 September, 
Mahon and Burke ordered all privately owned forage and saddles located in town and 
the surrounding area to be rounded up. As a precautionary measure, the forage was 
loaded onto wagons and transported to Swellendam for safekeeping. Among those 
employed to carry out this task, were Municipal Council member Jan Crous, Willem 
Lodewyk Lombaard of the Heidelberg Town Guard, and his older brother, Christoffel 
Johannes Lombaard (both brothers of the rebel, Johannes Jurie Lombaard).634 The 
commandeered saddles were distributed among a contingent of white and Coloured 
scouts, who were dispatched in all directions in an attempt to spot the approaching 
Boer commando.635 
Among those tasked to go looking for the enemy were, Dirk Cornelis Batten 
of the DMP, and William Osmond, the gaoler and corporal in the Town Guard. Under 
orders from a lieutenant of the West Yorkshire Regiment, the pair departed from town !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
629 (TAB) HC 52:  Intelligence report from M Knocker on Riversdale, 7 April 1901. 
630 (KAB) DD 4/171: Pay sheets indicate that Heidelberg Town Guard was only operational for the 
month of April 1901. Drill and pay sheets for Town Guard District of Swellendam, no. 61/1901 & 
62/1901, 6 June 1901; W. Mahon & (KAB) HOP: Photographs taken before the battle confirm that 
the only members of the Town Guard present was Henry Jones Hanson and JL Cantrell. Photograph 
of Henry Jones Hanson, no. 1446, Figure 7, Prominent men of Heidelberg, no. 1495, Figure 11 & 
Photograph of 4th West Yorkshire Regiment, Figure 6, 13 September 1901, Addendum A. 
631 (KAB) HOP: Panoramic view of Heidelberg, no. 1326, Addendum A, Figure 10. 
632 (KAB) HOP: Photograph of Masonic Hotel, no. 2442, Figure 3, Addendum A; W. Mahon: 
Photographs of Heidelberg, Figures 4 & 5, 13 September 1901, Addendum A. 
633 “Attack on Heidelberg,” The Cape Times, 25 September 1901, p. 5. 
634 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from J Crous, no. 1014/116/1902, 19 February 1902; (KAB) 1/SWM 
11/13: Letter from WL Lombaard, no. 1015/116/1902, 19 February 1902; (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: 
Letter from C Lombaard, no. 1013/116/1902, 19 February 1902. 
635 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from MJ Geldenhuys, no. 1006/1903, 18 September 1903. 
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late that morning and headed in the direction of Riversdale. At approximately 3 o’ 
clock in the afternoon, near the farm Zeekoegat, in the vicinity of the Krombeks River 
just outside of town, they noticed they were being followed by a small party of men, 
one of whom was dressed in khaki. Believing them to be from the regiment stationed 
in town, Batten and Osmond approached without caution. The men turned out to be an 
advanced party of Theron’s men, and at gunpoint they captured both Batten and 
Osmond.636 The man dressed in khaki was most likely the 28 year old Lieutenant John 
George Niewenhuis, who often played the role of the English officer due to his good 
command of the language. Niewenhuis was a citizen of the ZAR, and had a reputation 
of extreme cruelty towards captured scouts.637 Both were stripped of their weaponry, 
horses and spare clothing. According to Batten’s statement before Swellendam’s 
resident magistrate regarding the incident, Osmond’s riding leggings were also taken, 
as well as his personal diary and gaolers book.638  
Interestingly, in all other official correspondence and military intelligence 
reports from the period, this detail was omitted.639 The information regarding local 
loyalties contained within Osmond’s gaol book and the details of Willem Nothnagel’s 
seditious talk, may have informed Theron’s decision to attack Heidelberg, as these 
items were undoubtedly taken to Theron to be scrutinised. For the first three hours of 
their ordeal, Batten and Osmond were made to walk in front their captors. After 
refusing to walk any further, they were mounted and taken across the mountains 
towards Ladismith to the Brandrivier are.640 Along the way, they were nearly killed 
along with Theron’s men when the party was fired upon by the Riversdale DMT. At 
Brandrivier, they were guarded by a small contingent of Theron’s force for two days 
before being released on the farm of a Mr Nel, from where they set off to return to 
Heidelberg on foot, a journey which took them a further two days.641 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
636 (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by PB Borcherds, no. 100/1901, 15 September 1901. 
637 (NLSA) Boer Army List, 31 March 1902, p. 129. 
638 (KAB) AG 936: Declaration of DC Batten, no. 102/1901, 17 September 1901. 
639 (TAB) FK 815 (CO 48/554): Boers entering the district of Swellendam, no. 317/1901, 17 September 
1901. 
640 (KAB) AG 936: Declaration of DC Batten, no. 102/1901, 17 September 1901. 
641 (KAB) AG 1013: Report on war service by local mounted officers, no. 185/02, 26 June 1902. 
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4.2) Into the breach 
 
Around four ‘o clock in the afternoon, between 150 and 200 commandos 
entered the northeastern periphery of town in the vicinity of Lemoenstock farm.642 
First contact was made when the TVK opened fire on the sentries guarding the road 
bridge leading into town. The commandos fired from three elevated hills located 
roughly 1000 yards from the centre of the town, and rapidly cleared the bridge for 
their entry into Heidelberg.643 At 4:30 pm, the main body advanced into town via  
Hopley Street, only to be met with a heavy rate of fire from the entrenched soldiers 
surrounding the gunpowder magazine and Masonic Hotel, which halted their advance 
to a distance of 800 yards.644 Under sustained fire, the commandos were forced to take 
cover in a culvert which had recently been excavated in preparation for the planned 
railway extension. From here, the main body maintained a steady rate of cover fire, 
while a smaller group of about 50 to 80 men splintered off to flank the enemy position 
from the south west on the Port Beaufort side. The southwestern flank used a dry river 
bed from an artery of the Duivenhoks River for cover. With 20 feet high banks, the 
river bed formed a natural trench from where the commandos engaged the British 
position at a distance of 300 yards. Displaying the aggressive reputation that 
hallmarked the TVK, a party of 30 men on horseback charged up Fourie Street from 
this position, only to encounter heavy resistance from the two ramparts surrounding 
the Masonic Hotel which were manned by 14 members of the 4th West Yorkshire 
Regiment.645 Three of the commando’s were shot from their horses, their wounds 
apparently only superficial as later reports indicate that the horses took the brunt of 
the volley.646  
While the battle continued to rage, the remainder of the group on horseback 
scattered for cover among the town buildings and used the opportunity to replenish 
their supplies. The shop of Nicolas Friedman was ransacked for provisions, and a total 
of six horses were stolen during the engagement.647 Among the horses stolen, were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
642 (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by PB Borcherds, no. 100/1901, 15 September 1901. 
643 “Heidelberg Attacked,” The Cape Times, 16 September 1901, p. 5. 
644 “The Attack on Heidelberg,” The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 19 September 
1901, p. 2. 
645 “Attack on Heidelberg,” The Cape Times, 25 September 1901, p. 5. 
646 (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by PB Borcherds, no. 100/1901, 15 September 1901; “The 
Attack on Heidelberg,” The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 19 September 1901, p. 
2. 
647 (KAB) AG 936: Declaration of DC Batten, no. 102/1901, 17 September 1901. 
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two belonging to Dr Henry Biggs, whose residence was situated across from the 
Dutch Reformed Church,648 and near the very centre of the battle.649 It was in this area 
that the 21 year old Petrus (Pieter) Jacobus Bellingan 650 was fatally wounded while 
attempting to make his escape on one of the stolen horses.651 Bellingan was a young 
rebel from Aberdeen who had previously been captured at Oorlogspoort on 16 
January 1901, and tried under the first Special Indemnity Act of 1900, before acts of 
rebellion came under the sole jurisdiction of the British Military.652 After his capture, 
Bellingan was sent to Green Point prison from where he would have been deported to 
Ceylon according to his sentence. His father, who had been a prominent member of 
the Legislative Council for the southeastern districts, intervened on his behalf and 
convinced authorities to have him returned to the prison in Aberdeen for a retrial. On 
12 February 1901, he was released on parole after the original charges of treason 
against him were dropped for lack of evidence.653 However, the adventure of war 
which appealed to many young men during the conflict once again beckoned, and on 
23 August 1901, Bellingan joined Theron’s commando as they were racing toward the 
coast.654 Bellingan was wounded in the stomach near the stables behind the Biggs 
residence, and crawled into the home of Coloured servants, who concealed and 
attended to him while the battle continued to rage.655 
By all accounts, the ensuing battle had been ferocious. Local witnesses 
recalled that during a certain point the soldiers manning the ramparts fired 
continuously for more than two hours to keep the commandos at bay.656 The fighting 
continued until midnight when heavy reinforcements of the Swellendam DMT under 
Captain Cockburn arrived.657 Under cover of darkness the TVK slipped away and 
regrouped north of town near Kruisrivier, the farm of Cornelis Rall. While Theron’s 
men were making their retreat towards the Ertjiesvlei mountain, 600 km away !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
648 (KAB) HOP: Photograph of Heidelberg Dutch Reformed Church, no. 1295, Addendum A, Figure 8. 
649 “The Attack on Heidelberg,” The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 19 September 
1901, p. 2; H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg 
(Kaapland) 1855-1955, p. 168. 
650 (KAB) HOP: Photograph of Petrus Jacobus Bellingan, no. 1746, Addendum A, Figure 9; Bellingan 
b1c6d7 
651 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 162. 
652 (KAB) AG 3558: Prisoner of War Records for Aberdeen, p. 1. 
653 G. Geldenhuys: Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die verre suide, p. 49. 
654 D. Shearing & T. Shearing: The Rebel Record, p. 28. 
655 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/471: Death notice of Petrus Jacobus Bellingan, no. 1150, 15 September 1901. 
656 “Heidelberg Aangevallen Door Theron,” Het Zuid-Westen, 17 October 1901, p. 2. 
657 L. Tomlinson: Geskiedkundige Swellendam, pp. 102-103. 
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General Smuts’ commando was still trapped perilously atop of the Stormberg 
mountains near Dordrecht.658 In the final tally, the TVK suffered 12 wounded, 
including Bellingan, while among the British military, one corporal was heavily 
wounded in two places and had to be removed from town for advanced medical care. 
For his role in the battle, Major Mahon received the King's Medal with two clasps and 
was created a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order.659 The walls of the 
Masonic Hotel and gunpowder magazine were riddled with bullet holes, and the 
surrounding residences, shops and church parsonage also suffered damage.660 On the 
morning of 14 September 1901, the TVK departed for Brandrivier, and caught up 
with their compatriots who were guarding Batten and Osmond, just in time to be 
briefly pursued by the Riversdale DMT.661 
 
4.3) Aftermath 
 
Late on the afternoon of 14 September, Bellingan was brought to the home of 
Petrus Arnoldus Lourens and his wife Anna Marthina. The aging couple were looking 
after their grandchildren when the servants alerted them to the presence of the 
mortally wounded young man. The Lourens family attended to him as best they could, 
but Bellingan died in the early hours of 15 September 1901. Incidentally, Bellingan’s 
passing coincided with the death of American president William McKinley, who  died 
from gangrene after being shot in an assassination attempt on the 6th of September.662 
In a statement accompanying Bellingan’s death notice, Lourens stated that before 
succumbing to his wounds, Bellingan had asked for his belongings to be forwarded to 
his father. These included a watch and chain, a purse of money and a pocket book.663 
Bellingan was buried in the town cemetery, with Reverend AJ Van Wijk presiding 
over the funeral. Van Wijk contacted Bellingan’s father, who had his son’s body 
reinterred on the family farm after the war.664 In all probability, Bellingan may have 
been the southernmost casualty of the South African War.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
658 (KAB) AG 936: Declaration of DC Batten, no. 102/1901, 17 September 1901. 
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The TVK crossed the Langeberg mountains and regrouped near the mineral 
springs of Barrydale, where Theron would once again display his trademark cruelty 
towards the enemy. On 15 September 1901, having arrived on the farm of a Mr Le 
Grange, Theron’s men happened upon two Coloured scouts from Swellendam. 
Michiel Holster and Jan Hartnick had arrived on the farm the previous evening while 
reconnoitring the area. They had departed early on the morning of the 15th and 
returned to their encampment in the afternoon when they were captured by Theron’s 
men. According to later testimony by Le Grange and his neighbour Van Der Vyver, 
both men were blindfolded and shot twice, once in the chest and once in the head. 
Despite pleas by Le Grange for Theron not to murder the men on a Sunday and in 
cold blood, seeing as they were unarmed, one of Theron’s men was adamant and 
carried out the executions himself.665 The man in question was named Simon, and was 
probably the 40 year old Simon Bloem, a former corporal of Hertzog’s commando 
from the Free State.666 The murders of Hartnick and Holster contributed to Theron’s 
growing reputation of cruelty which started to equal that of Gideon Scheepers, and by 
16 September 1901, Theron and his men were wanted in connection with the murder 
of 16 Black and Coloured men in the Cape Colony.667  
The TVK crossed over the mountains and into the Heidelberg region once 
more on their way to Montagu, when they entered the ward of Tradouw in late 
September 1901. According to a report filed by field cornet CJ Joubert, Theron’s men 
raided the farms Brakrivier, Keesekraal, and Zevenfontein. Eleven sheep were 
slaughtered, three horses stolen, one farm house raided for food, and wheat harvests 
were used as forage for their horses. On the farm of Zandfontein, the young son of 
Pieter Coussard was kidnapped and impressed into service by the TVK. The young 
Coussard was given a horse but not armed, and later managed to escape his captors.668 
At Montagu, Theron’s man in khaki captured a 13 year old white scout named Jan 
Neethling. Neethling was severely flogged along with Jan Niewenhuis, a 64 year old 
farmer who had refused to assist the TVK.669 By the end of September, the TVK had 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
665 (TAB) FK 823 (CO 48/555): Affidavits connected with shooting by enemy of two scouts, no. 
452/1901, 23 November 1901. 
666 (NLSA) Boer Army List, 31 March 1902, p. 129. 
667 H. Shearing: The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902, pp. 130-131. 
668 (KAB) AG 936: Report from CJ Joubert, no. 110/1901, 28 September 1901. 
669 (TAB) FK 823 (CO 48/555): Affidavits connected with shooting by enemy of two scouts, no. 
452/1901, 23 November 1901. 
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evaded capture and reached Sutherland, leaving a trail of destruction and murder in 
their wake, of which Heidelberg was only a small part.670 
In a sense, the battle in town had been a culmination of the anxiety and fear 
which gripped the region throughout the latter half of 1901. For the British military, 
its worst fears regarding the spread of war and sedition in the Cape had been realized 
and the incident informed their subsequent decisions and attitude towards the people 
in the region. For the inhabitants, the complexities of their loyalties were compounded 
by the spectacle of death and destruction to property which the battle had brought to 
their community. Aside from the physical destruction it had inflicted, the battle also 
held other repercussions for the people of Heidelberg. In a military trial held in 
Riversdale on 9 November 1901, Andries Odendaal was convicted of treason for 
allegedly aiding Theron when the commando had occupied his farm on the night prior 
to the attack on Heidelberg.671 Odendaal was eventually sentenced to 6 months 
imprisonment and hard labour.672 At the same trial, HJ Duminy, field cornet for the 
ward of Krombeks River in the district of Riversdale, was convicted of treason for 
failing to report the presence of the enemy.673 Duminy was relieved from his position 
as field cornet and sentenced to one year imprisonment and hard labour.674 Jan 
Lombard Theron eventually died of typhoid fever in the district of Calvinia on 14 
April 1902.675 Like so many others in the war, he died unceremoniously, while still 
trying to gather support and recruits for a cause which had grown decidedly unclear. 
Theron’s actions caused great indignation and fear amongst the people of the Cape, 
and consensus holds that his aggression and cruelty severely hampered the movement 
and reception of other commando units operating in the Cape throughout 1901.676 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
670 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 16-17. 
671 (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Sentence details of military trials, no. 319/1901, 4 December 1901. 
672 (KAB) AG 2084: Persons convicted of high treason, district of Riversdale, 14 November 1901. 
673 (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/5/3: Suspension of HJ Duminy, no. 433/1901, 4 November 1901. 
674 (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Sentence details of military trials, no. 319/1901, 4 December 1901. 
675 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/466: Death notice of Jan Lombard Theron, no. 3, 14 April 1902. 
676 H. Shearing: The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902, pp. 130-131. 
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 Chapter 5 – Community reactions  
 
5.1) Reactions to invasion 
 
Community reactions to the invasion by commando forces and battle in town 
were mixed, and tended to reflect the difficult position in which the war placed Cape 
Afrikaners. Unlike other towns in the Southern Cape, for whom the spectacle of death 
had only been a distant affair, the people of Heidelberg had experienced the actual 
threat and violence of war.677 Arguably, those who had witnessed the battle first hand 
displayed more tangible signs of being affected. For the Lourens family, the presence 
and death of Bellingan in their home, apparently had a profound impact.  In a 
statement accompanying the death notice of Bellingan, Pieter Lourens related how the 
event had impacted on their household and expressed dismay that the personal items 
which the young man had entrusted to him for safekeeping had been confiscated by 
the commandant and British military.678 Reverend AJ Van Wijk, who presided over 
Bellingan's funereal and contacted the young man’s family, was similarly affected. In 
March 1902, Van Wijk asked the church council’s permission to do volunteer work at 
concentration camps in the republics.679 Subsequently, in August 1902, Van Wijk 
joined his brother, ZJ Van Wijk, at the Winburg concentration camp, where he would 
do a month's service before returning home to Heidelberg.680 Van Wijk and his wife 
had almost been killed during the battle, when stray shots smashed through a window 
in the front room of the parsonage where they had been sitting.681  
For many, the violence of the battle threatened not only their property, but 
their lives as well. A letter written by a lady from Heidelberg to her family in 
Grahamstown which appeared in the Het Zuid-Westen on 17 October 1901, details 
how the battle had created fear and resentment among the residents in town. The lady 
relates that her house was struck 10 times during the crossfire of the battle. Eight 
bullets were lodged in the wall of her home while two had gone through her door into !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
677 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 144. 
678 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/471: Death notice of Petrus Jacobus Bellingan, no. 1150, 15 September 1901. 
679 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, p. 73; (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 24 March 
1902. 
680 J. Boje: Winburg’s War: an appraisal of the Anglo-Boer War as it was experienced by the people of 
a Free State district, p. 315. 
681 G. Geldenhuys: Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die verre suide, p. 48. 
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the stairwell. According to the account, the people in town were gripped in panic and 
were concerned about a renewed attack the following day, which made sleeping 
difficult and caused her to wake at 4 am. She went on to mention how the invading 
commandos had done great harm to her community, referring to the damage of 
property and the mistreatment of two young men who were robbed of their horses and 
had to walk back home without anything to eat.682 
Such resentments reflected the difficult situation faced by many Cape 
inhabitants during the war. They were in the unfavourable position of having to 
decide if they would assist the invading forces and face the possibility of treason 
charges, or incur the wrath of commandos if they did not. Most gave very little 
tangible assistance, opting only to supply commandos with food.683 Incursions during 
the latter half of 1901, like the TVK’s attack on Heidelberg, often resulted in murder 
and destruction of property, which came as an affront to the Cape consitutionalist 
tradition rooted in the rights and privileges of living under British rule. Commando 
terror tactics like personal assaults and destruction of property bred resentment among 
inhabitants, and many commandos received a cool reception by the end of August.684  
The lack of support for commandos also resulted from the absence of a 
tangible front and clearly demarcated areas of authority. Unlike the first invasion, 
where large areas came under republican control, borders varied continuously during 
the second invasion, and the severe enforcement of martial law curtailed the 
possibility of local support.685 On 29 August 1901, a combined force of 400 men 
under Scheepers and Van Der Merwe entered the district and burned the home of Mr 
Jan Nel at Brandrivier for refusing to supply them with provisions. The commandos 
occupied Barrydale on the 4th of September, where they raided the town for forage 
and clothes, inflicting damage to the amount of £240.686  
The damage inflicted by the likes of invaders such as those at Barrydale and 
Brandrivier rankled local farmers and businessmen whose livelihoods were already 
affected by martial law. The looting of towns and farms generally undermined the 
Cape Colony’s sympathy for the republics as these actions violated the right to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
682 “Heidelberg Aangevallen Door Theron,” Het Zuid-Westen, 17 October 1901, p. 2. 
683 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, pp. 72, 77. 
684 D. Shearing & T. Shearing: Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave, p. 122. 
685 C. Strydom: Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, p. 92. 
686 (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by PB Borcherds, no. 91/1901, 4 September 1901. 
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protection of property which formed a crucial part of Cape identity.687 While the 
pillaging committed by invading commandos did not result in a decidedly pro-British 
stance, it did modulate Cape sympathies towards the republics.688 While feeling 
towards the roving commandos may have differed from family to family, reports from 
time to time indicate that most inhabitants in the district were deeply fearful of their 
presence. As early as February of 1901, intelligence reports indicated that the 
possibility of an imminent attack by a commando of 100 men, had caused panic and 
fear among the local populace. 689  The military intelligence agent present at 
Heidelberg described the prevailing mood as follows: “…feeling is running extremely 
high and the district seems to be very unsettled.”690 The local inhabitants’ fear of 
invasion was compounded by the likelihood that their already meagre provisions 
would be confiscated and that they would be placed under arrest by the military 
officials.691  
The situation became even more exacerbated during the latter half of 1901, 
when republican commandos ventured further south into the area. Reports from the 
Riversdale branch of Standard Bank describe the locals as being “in laager”, 
indicative of the unsettling limbo most inhabitants had found themselves in.692 What 
most of the towns like Heidelberg, Riversdale, and Swellendam feared most was 
punishment, either for failure to cooperate after being captured by commando 
invaders, or being made an example of by the British military for complying with 
commando demands.693 
 Commando activities were also interpreted in class terms. Many farmers 
regarded those who rebelled and joined the roving commandos as opportunistic 
freebooters drawn from the lower social spectrum of society. The carefree commando 
lifestyle offered not only material gains by means of looting, but also a life free of 
social responsibility  and an escape from the servitude of rural hierarchies. As such, 
many of the landed elite had an intense dislike and fear of the underclass elements 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
687 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, pp. 146, 187. 
688 B. Nasson: Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902, p. 11. 
689 (TAB) HC 50: Telegram from Agent Murphy to Lynx, 5 February 1901. 
690 (TAB) HC 51: Intelligence report from Heidelberg by Murphy, 14 February 1901. 
691 (TAB) HC 49: Report from M Knocker to C Leibrandt regarding Swellendam community, 14 
January 1901. 
692 (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: The Situation – Riversdale, 4 September 1901, p. 353. 
693 (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: The Situation, no. 30, 25 September 1901, p. 436. 
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which comprised commandos operating in the Cape.694 In a report on the commando 
occupation of Barrydale, field cornet for the Tradouw ward, M Versfeld, describes the 
invaders with contempt, referring to them as being of the “…filthy Bywoner class.”695  
 
5.2) The fate of loyalists 
 
Regardless of the individual motivations that lay behind the decision to 
actively display support for the British war effort by means of volunteering in law 
enforcement or the Town Guard, for many Cape Afrikaners their decision had become 
an act of social suicide by the end of the war.  The reforms to martial law enforcement 
in December 1901 and eventual withdrawal of the military from the district in July 
1902, resulted in a power vacuum, and those who had rendered their services to the 
military and colonial authorities no longer enjoyed the same level of protection and 
prestige.696 In an attempt to encourage reconciliation and reconstruction after the war, 
the Peace Preservation Act caused an equalisation between those who had volunteered 
for service in the CDF and those who had not. As a result, many volunteers felt 
betrayed and abandoned in lieu of no reward for their service and loyalty.697   
As the military started to relinquish control during the final months of the war, 
those at Heidelberg who had openly displayed their loyalty, struggled to secure 
remuneration and reward for their services. In February 1902, the town and 
surrounding areas suffered severe flood damage resulting from heavy rains. On 14 
February 1902, Henry Jones Hanson sent letters to the deputy administrator of martial 
law in Swellendam and to Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, urgently requesting financial 
assistance for the damages incurred by the recent floods. Hanson mentioned that he 
had still not been compensated for the losses and damages incurred by the military 
occupation of his premises and subsequent battle in town. The damage inflicted on the 
Masonic Hotel and gunpowder store amounted to £896, and £115 of rations had been 
consumed by the 4th West Yorkshire Regiment while they had been stationed there.  
In light of the recent floods, and his loyal service, Hanson asked Burke to 
intervene by authorising early payment of the amounts he was owed. In the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
694 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, p. 78. 
695 (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by M Versfeld, no. 100/1901, 9 September 1901. 
696 (KAB) AG 1013: Report on community feeling by H Okes, no. 95/1902, 9 July 1902. 
697 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 87. 
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correspondence forwarded to Burke, the resident magistrate mentioned Hanson’s 
generosity to those in town who had suffered heavy losses due to the flooding. Burke 
replied indifferently, stating that he was unable to offer general assistance to the 
village and could not intervene in matters which were the purview of the Martial Law 
Board.698 Similar claims by those involved in the defence of the town were submitted 
in the months that followed. On 19 February 1902, Jan Crous, Willem Lodewyk 
Lombaard, and Christoffel Lombaard requested for payment to be made on the  
outstanding fees owed to them for transporting forage and saddles back and forth to 
Swellendam on the morning of the battle.699 On 18 September 1903, Petrus Jacobus 
Lombaard and Marthinus Johannes Geldenhuys requested compensation for the loss 
of their saddles which had been commandeered by the military on the morning of 
battle.700 Master of the village animal pound, JH Lombaard, requested compensation 
to the amount of £20 for the loss of one of his stallions which had been castrated 
under order of Swellendam’s commandant, Captain Nelson.701 As no records referring 
to any of these preceding claims could be found in the archives of the Martial Law 
Board, it is assumed that none of the claimants ever received any compensation. 
 
5.3) Reconciliation and Retribution 
 
It is apparent that the war created a significant amount of tension within the 
community. The artificial divisions of “loyalists” and “sympathizers” imposed by 
external entities had created much enmity amongst the people of Heidelberg. While 
collective relief over the ending of the war, the mediating role of the church, and the  
bonds of affection and mutual dependency of small town life, did much to aid 
reconciliation, resentment towards loyalists did manifest in a number of notable 
incidents. During the final months of the war, loyalist shop owners and merchants 
were also affected by the military’s indifference to their plight. Their overt displays of 
loyalty designed to carry favour with the military authorities in many cases failed to 
elicit the concessions needed for survival and alienated them from their fellow 
inhabitants. The boycotting of loyalist shopkeepers was a common occurrence during !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
698 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from HJ Hanson, no. 194/1902, 14 February 1902. 
699 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from J Crous, no. 1014/116/1902, 19 February 1902; (KAB) 1/SWM 
11/13: Letter from WL Lombaard, no. 1015/116/1902, 19 February 1902; (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: 
Letter from C Lombaard, no. 1013/116/1902, 19 February 1902. 
700 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from MJ Geldenhuys, no. 1006/1903, 18 September 1903. 
701 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Claim by JH Lombaard, no. 115/1902, 24 October 1902. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 127 
the war, and many disgruntled citizens often displayed their dissatisfaction by opting 
to acquire their supplies from the centralised military distribution points instead of 
local merchants.702 In Heidelberg this had also been the case, when farmers opted to 
buy liquor from native locations rather than support loyalist shop owners.703  
In September 1902, a series of incidents involving shop breaking of loyalist 
stores occurred in Heidelberg. The stores of Henry Jones Hanson, HM Du Preez and 
Thomas Varkevisser were broken into and vandalised without any inventory being 
stolen. The owners complained about the lack of police presence in town since the 
withdrawal of the military and made numerous requests to increase the size of the 
police force.704 An inspection report on the police station in May 1902, indicated that 
only one foot constable and two mounted troopers, responsible for safeguarding the 
town, were stationed at Heidelberg. Despite recommendations by the commandant for 
an increase in the size of the permanent police force, requests for additional 
appointments were denied.705 In October 1902, a report emerged regarding the 
suspicious death of storekeeper William Johnson’s horses. Johnson and his brother 
John Egleson, who served in the Town Guard, operated a general store in Heidelberg. 
Upon investigation, it was discovered that Johnson’s horses had been poisoned. Two 
of the horses that died had been from the remount camp at Worcester and temporarily 
under Johnson’s care.706 The motives behind the poisoning are debatable, as Johnson 
also had a reputation for dishonesty and cruelty towards Coloured townspeople.707  
The Dutch Reformed Church in Heidelberg, as was the case in many other 
towns in the Cape, tried to resolve community grudges by appealing for 
reconciliation. The church, like the monarchy, was regarded as above the fray and 
served as a unifying element to restore the relationships which the war had 
fractured.708 Despite its public appeals for reconciliation, it appears that the church in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
702 J. Snyman: Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, p. 108. 
703 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Complaints by H Du Preez and C Hirschmann regarding martial law, no. 
468/1902 & no. 467/1902, 1 May 1902. 
704 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace WF Rogers on incidents of shop 
breaking, no. 874/1902, 19 September 1902. 
705 (KAB) AG 1013: Inspector’s report on police in district of Swellendam, no. 68/1902, 12 May 1902. 
706 (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace on the death W Johnson’s horses, no. 
950/1902, 9 October 1902. 
707 (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Johnson was involved in an altercation with a coloured man named Petrus 
Roberts in February 1902 regarding the sale of a rotten watermelon. Johnson assaulted Roberts by 
tearing his shirt and kicking him out of the store. Johnson vs Roberts, no. 115/1901, 4 February 
1901. 
708 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 251. 
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Heidelberg may have engaged in subtle forms of retribution against the loyalist 
element of the community. The invasions of the privacy of church council meetings, 
and the strong undercurrent of sympathy with family members in the republics, may 
have inspired the church to use its position as social gatekeeper to punish certain 
individuals exempt from persecution through legal channels. In a church council 
meeting held on 24 March 1902, it was decided that Costly White, the issuer of passes 
and permits, be spoken to about the roof of his barn which occasionally spilled 
rainwater onto church grounds.709 Although speculative, the trivial nature of such a 
grievance may point towards a subtle reprisal. Under martial law, White probably 
yielded great power by determining the access to movement and supplies, a reality 
which undoubtedly bred resentment in the community. In July 1902, Thomas Henry 
Miller and his wife were expelled from the church after a dispute involving the 
daughter of a fellow parishioner. References to the incident are sketchy and oblique, 
but according to the minutes of the church council, a young lady named Kitty Swart 
had publicly insulted Miller regarding his role in the enforcement of martial law while 
he had been in the employ of the municipal police.  
After a lengthy polemic, the council informed Miller that the lady’s parents 
had been spoken to and that the matter was regarded as closed. Miller remained 
indignant and insisted that his name, along with his wife’s, be removed from the 
church roll. In response, the council expelled them both.710 Only after an examination 
of the civil court cases preceding the war, does the full picture come to light. 
Apparently, Miller and Swart had been engaged to get married prior to war, but Miller 
broke off the engagement during the course of 1899. Swart then filed suit against 
Miller for damages in the range of £20 which had resulted from the breaking of the 
engagement. The court found in her favour and Miller was ordered to pay £5 in 
restitution.711 In February 1900, Swart again filed for restitution against Miller, who 
was forced to pay 5 shillings a month until the remaining £12 was paid off.712 Clearly, 
the history of animosity between both parties had contributed significantly to the 
incident and highlights the manner in which a war climate can amplify and exacerbate 
existing conflicts.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
709 (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 24 March 1902. 
710 (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 12 July 1902. 
711 (KAB) 1/SWM A/2/2/2: Catharina Swart vs Thomas Miller, no. 10, 25 September 1899. 
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The incident is notable for a variety of reasons. Given his disagreeable 
experience enforcing martial law and eventual resignation from the municipal police, 
the incident could indicate that Miller’s conduct had been offensive to some. Miller’s 
father, Richard Petrus Cornelis  (Dick) Miller, had been the other appointee to issue 
passes and permits, but was never a member of the DRC.713 Thomas Miller’s 
connection to the DRC came through his Afrikaner wife, Susanna Wilhelmina 
Nothnagel. In his original application to the municipal police, Miller stated his 
ethnicity as being “Scotch Africander”, undoubtedly in reference to his marriage.714 
Miller and his wife’s expulsion may have been a punishment for his wife’s perceived 
betrayal, punishment for his conduct while enforcing martial law, or even indirect 
retribution against his father. No record regarding the incident with Ms Kitty Swart 
could be found in the proceedings of the military courts. Although such an incident 
would clearly have been regarded as sedition under martial law, it was quite common 
for women to be spared the full intensity of prosecution during the war. The products 
of patriarchy and social isolation, Afrikaner women were often the most fervent and 
outspoken anti-British agitators during the conflict.715  
In a similar fashion, Willem Lodewyk Lombaard and his wife were placed 
under censorship and eventually expelled from the congregation in March 1903. The 
exact reasons for their expulsion were omitted from church council records, but 
mention is made of an “impertinent” letter sent to the council by Lombaard regarding 
matters during the war.716 Lombaard had served in the municipal police, Town Guard, 
and DMT, despite having two brothers in the OFS who fought against the British. 
These incidents may point to a degree of discrimination against those members of the 
Heidelberg community who openly assisted the British war effort, and who may have 
abused the power temporarily allotted to them. Alternatively, it may also indicate the 
presence of subtle Afrikaner identity and reactions towards its perceived betrayal. 
Taken at face value, the actions of the church may seem like petty attempts of 
retribution directed at a certain section of the community. Although there may have 
been some component of score-settling to church actions after the war, the more likely 
reasons behind such decisions can be ascertained when studying the minutes of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
713 H. Hopkins: Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 
1855-1955, pp. 176-180. 
714 (KAB) AG 754: Employment application of TH Miller, no. 47/1900, 1 May 1900. 
715 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, p. 232. 
716 (DRCA) GEM-K 596: The minute entry written in Dutch refers to a “parmantige brief”. Minutes of 
Heidelberg church council meeting, 21 March 1903. 
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meetings held by the Ring of Swellendam after the war. During mid-October of 1902, 
the Ring assembled at Heidelberg for a series of meetings to discuss the state of the 
church in light of the effects of the war. The main point of contention during the 
meetings was the adverse effects of martial law. At the first sitting, mention was made 
of the large degree of moral and religious degradation which had resulted from 
denying the community regular access to the church and its facilities.717 During the 
final meeting, reports by church elders about the effects of martial law on the 
community were discussed. The clergy present declared that the application of martial 
law had amounted to a test of  community faith, which in most cases did not result in 
a good outcome. Those present recounted tales of vanity, worldliness, lack of 
empathy and  snobbishness. As martial law had regulated the sale of alcohol to twice 
a week, including on Sundays, the resulting misuse of alcohol and disrespect for 
church authority led to lengthy discussions over the institution of church censorship 
(tucht), degeneration of moral fibre, and the desecration of the holy Sunday.  
Throughout the meetings, the common theme seemed to be about the church’s loss of 
authority over its parishioners and its reduced role in the community in the aftermath 
of the upheavals of martial law. The disciplinary actions and acts of retribution could 
very well have been the result of an institution deeply concerned about losing its 
authority and standing within what appeared to be a changed society. Although the 
loss of power may have been its primary concern, the DRC may very well have 
become partially politicised and more ethnically aware as result of the war. In its final 
meeting, the Ring discussed the disrespect shown towards Dutch language rights and 
vowed to write to the Inspector General of Education and the parliamentary 
commission on education regarding the importance of protecting Dutch in schools. 718 
 
 
5.4) Long-term schisms and community trends 
 
Examination of the long term effects of the war on the people of Heidelberg 
reveals very little beyond the immediate period following the conclusion of the war. 
The absence of notable incidents and references to the war in this period is quite 
commonplace. Shearing refers to the aftermath of the war as the Cold War period, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
717 (DRCA) KR 44 R2/10 A: Minutes of the Ring of Swellendam, 13 October 1902. 
718 (DRCA) KR 44 R2/10 A: Minutes of the Ring of Swellendam, 15 October 1902. 
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when resentment remained subdued while Afrikaners had not yet acquired the means 
to mobilise politically and economically.719 Although Afrikaner ethnic and cultural 
nationalism had not yet awakened, its maturation was inadvertently encouraged by the 
hostile and gloating pro-British press. Assaults on the Dutch and Afrikaans languages 
were already commonplace in prominent newspapers, but in the period immediately 
following the war, even local newspapers adopted a more divisive tone.720 In a 
September issue of the regional newspaper, The South Western Echo and Riversdale 
Advertiser, reference is made to “backward Dutchmen” who were deemed as having 
been ignorant of the inevitability of British victory.721  
Efforts were also made to anglicise and urbanise Afrikaner communities 
during the post-war period. Afrikaner farmers were urged to abandon their agrarian 
lifestyle in favour of skilled and educated professions.722 In Heidelberg, the drive 
towards anglicisation appeared to fail, and the already small English section of the 
community were completely Afrikanerized in the decades following the war. 
Enrolments in the English school administered by the Independent Church continued 
to decline throughout 1902, and the school eventually closed in 1906.723 The old 
DRC-supervised school would eventually be transformed into a dual medium 
government school in 1912.724 In general, the drive towards anglicisation failed, even 
in areas with large English populations, like the Western Cape. English immigration 
to South Africa was insignificant and could not counter the Afrikanerisation in rural 
areas.725 This trend was also a feature of the effects of imperialism, which had a 
tendency to enhance and reaffirm regional identity.726 
An interesting long term effect of the war is revealed when scrutinising the 
archives of the Standard Bank which refer to Heidelberg and the surrounding area in 
the years after the war. According to the Inspection Reports for the branches of 
Heidelberg, Swellendam and Riversdale, the extension of the railway did not meet !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
719 H. Shearing: The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902, p. 266. 
720 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 245. 
721 The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser, 9 September 1902, p. 2. 
722 P. Burger: Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik 
Oudtshoorn, p. 247. 
723 (KAB) SGE 2/110: Inspector’s report for district of Swellendam, no. 1740, 25 September 1902; 
(KAB) SGE 2/186: Inspector’s report for district of Swellendam, no. 1892, 17 October 1906. 
724 (SBA) INSP 1/1/223: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Heidelberg Branch, 30 November 
1911, pp. 11-12. 
725 A. Thompson: The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939, p. 648. 
726 Ibid., p. 629. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 132 
expectations regarding the economic rejuvenation of the area. The Heidelberg section 
of the line was completed in September 1902, only reaching Riversdale in September 
of 1903.727 Yet, railway transport costs were still too high for farmers to take 
advantage of the link, and although farmers were making abundant profits from 
selling their stock to buyers from Mossel Bay, George and Knysna, most opted to 
retain their profits in the form of cash instead of investing it with the bank.728 The 
Swellendam branch reported a 12 year period of difficulty in making a profit from 
farmers uninterested in investment, and suggested that lingering animosity over the 
war may have been to blame.729  Initial reports suggested the reason for local 
apprehensiveness was the result of the collapse of the Barry trading empire 17 years 
prior to the war, as well as some residual ill-feeling towards British institutions after 
the war.730 Reports from Riversdale indicated a marked drop in investment, which 
was decried as owing to the lack of education and backwardness on behalf of local 
Afrikaner farmers.731  
Given the fact that the movement restrictions and incidents of bribery under 
martial law prompted many local clients to withdraw large sums of cash from their 
accounts, goes a long way in explaining the drops in fixed deposits and loans, as well 
as accounting for the animosity towards British institutions.732 Already during the 
period of heightened anxiety in the latter half of 1901, when the application of martial 
law was at its most severe, Standard Bank management was expressing concern over 
the long term impact of the practice on community relations.733  
The decline in business relations between the Standard Bank and local 
Afrikaners is a very subtle yet profound indication of how the war had impacted on 
community relations and prompted the formation of ethnic identity. Throughout the 
post-war period, the Riversdale branch repeatedly inquired into the feasibility of 
opening a branch at Heidelberg. In all instances, reports indicated that local feeling !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
727 (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Riversdale Branch, 9 September 
1902, p. 11; (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Riversdale Branch, 10 
September 1903, p. 13. 
728 (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Riversdale, 15 December 1904, pp. 
11-12. 
729 (SBA) INSP 1/1/276: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Swellendam, 15 December 1904, pp. 
11-16. 
730 (SBA) INSP 1/1/276: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Swellendam, 27 January 1908, p. 13. 
731 (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Generally, Inspection report for Riversdale, 9 September 1902, p. 11. 
732 (SBA) INSP 1/1/167: Fixed Deposits and Advances Generally, Inspection Report for Swelllendam, 
21 September 1901, pp. 3, 7. 
733 (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: Secretary of Standard Bank letter to London Office, 27 August 1901, p. 288. 
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was still against the institution and that the inhabitants preferred to do business with 
local money lenders.734 Standard Bank had to wait until 1911 to open a branch in 
Heidelberg, as the town had not exhibited significant expansion after the completion 
of the railway and the prospects for a branch seemed unfeasible for a very long time. 
Even though farm prices were high, and farmers did exceptionally well, many 
remained disinclined to do business with the bank.735 
Another curious feature of the war’s impact on the community of Heidelberg 
comes to light when reviewing the death notes of its most prominent Anglo-Afrikaner 
loyalists. Most of those who had prominently displayed their loyalty, moved away 
from Heidelberg in the years following the war. Willem Lodewyk Lombaard, the 
mayor James Munnik, council secretary James Du Preez, the Johnson brothers, 
Thomas Henry Miller, and Willem Jacobus Nothnagel, all moved to the southern 
suburbs of Cape Town to live out the remainder of their days. 736  Curiously, 
potentially controversial figures like Henry Jones Hanson and John Alfred Fiveash, 
remained at Heidelberg for the rest of their lives.737 Like Henry Biggs and Albert 
White, they had become town institutions despite their British heritage. Undoubtedly, 
Hanson’s generosity towards the townsfolk in the years after the war had played a part 
in his acceptance, but his and Fiveash’s acceptance probably stemmed from their 
foreignness and status as newcomers.  
It can be speculated that the people of Heidelberg reserved the bulk of their 
condemnation for those whom had committed the worst betrayals in the eyes of the 
community, and subsequently felt compelled to leave town after the war. This 
phenomenon tends to predate and to reflect later patterns of settlement, in which 
urban English and Afrikaans communities increasingly lived apart. The schism of the 
war and mutual distrust resulted in their congregating in different suburbs, while their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
734 (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Riversdale, 15 December 1904, p. 12; 
(SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Riversdale, 22 December 1906, p. 
13. 
735 (SBA) INSP 1/1/223: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Heidelberg Branch, 30 November 
1911, pp. 11-12. 
736 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/4205: Death notice of Willem Lodewyk Lombaard, no. 36368, 21 December 
1933; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/17885: Death notice of Jacobus Adam Willem Munnik, no. 138/51, 19 
December 1950; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/23606: Death notice of Jacobus Du Preez, no. 2288/55, 18 
April 1955; (KAB) MOOC/6/9/9903: Death notice of John Egleson Johnson, no. 84618, 3 March 
1943; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/19749: Death notice of Thomas Henry Miller, no. 3169/52, 11 June 1952; 
(KAB) MOOC 6/9/1107: Death notice of Willem Jacobus Nothnagel, no. 1591, 12 May 1918. 
737 (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2887: Death notice of Henry Jones Hanson, no. 9784, 22 October 1925; (KAB) 
MOOC 6/9/4156: Death notice of John Alfred Fiveash, no. 43849, 26 August 1933. 
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children attended different schools.738 Yet, despite the crisis in identity which the war 
created, Cape Afrikaner identity remained very much the product of local and 
regional historical experience. The people of the Cape’s provincial and colonial 
sensibilities still outweighed any real sense of ethnic solidarity, although the war had 
done much to change this on a subconscious level.739  
The South African War was a turning point in Anglo-Afrikaner relations. 
Although manifestations of cultural alienation were in most cases negligible and 
synthetic, the lack of compensation for losses under martial law, and the absence of 
reward for loyalty, resulted in a loss of control over the term “loyal” when the country 
was left to its own devices in the decades after the war. Following the failure of 
anglicisation during reconstruction and the eventual transformation of empire into 
commonwealth, Afrikaners seized control of the term and turned it into an epithet.740 
The Jameson Raid, martial law, and disenfranchisement had increased the rift 
between English and Afrikaans communities in the Cape, but the split was only 
solidified during the three decades following the war when exclusive Afrikaner 
Nationalism had been made possible by the ethnic mobilisation drive of the twenties 
and thirties.741 However, when considering the following remark made by the General 
Manager of Standard Bank on the impact of the war in the Cape with the gift of 
hindsight, it appears quite prescient regarding a feature of Afrikaner Nationalism: 
 
“The High Commissioner is of opinion that there will be more trouble in the Cape 
Colony after the war, than in any other part of South Africa, and the information we 
glean from various sources has led us to the same conclusion.” 742 
 
The ultimate irony of the South African War relating to issues of identity and 
allegiance in the Cape was realised with Act of Union in 1910. The new South 
Africanism as espoused by Botha and Smuts, was based on the type of colonial 
nationalism present at the Cape prior to the war. Colonial nationalism replaced !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
738 H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners: biography of a people, p. 294. 
739 M. Tamarkin: Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point 
of return to a dead end, p. 405. 
740 A. Thompson: The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939, pp. 640-641. 
741 H. Giliomee: Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915, pp. 
59, 60. 
742 (SBA) GMO 3/1/39: The Situation, General Manager’s Office Letters to London, 30 April 1902, p. 
356. 
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imperialism to become the dominant South African ideology until at least the 
1930s.743 Its dominance was only made possible by the league of administrators 
responsible for overseeing the reconstruction of South Africa after the war. Known as 
Milner’s Kindergarten, their experiences in South Africa led to a reinterpretation of 
the imperial model that abandoned ideas of hegemony and made it possible for South 
Africa to become an independent nation.744 
Ultimately, the future drive of Afrikaner Nationalism was undertaken by the 
generation which had come of age during and after the South African War. Nurtured 
by tales of wartime British oppression and absorbed into the kultuurpolitiek that 
followed in the years after the war, this new generation became the carriers of the 
war’s legacy. Even in Heidelberg, where ethnic identity and allegiance had always 
been in a state of fluidity, the new nationalism would eventually rear its head. In a 
newspaper article detailing the events of the war in Heidelberg, the grandson of 
Andries Odendaal, the farmer who was imprisoned after the TVK occupied his farm, 
recalled how the injustice to his grandfather had led to him joining the 
Ossewabrandwag during the 1930s.745 Similarly, the son of Hans Jacob Gildenhuys, 
whose horses had been commandeered by the British military, became the regional 
commander of the Ossewae Brandwag during the Second World War.746  
Yet, despite the seemingly inevitability of these developments, reconciliation 
rooted in the better angels of human nature still seemed possible, and offers an 
antidote to the foregone conclusion that paints the war as an indefatigable catalyst for 
ethnic exclusion. In July 1906, William Osmond, lockup keeper at Heidelberg, wrote 
a letter to Reverend AJ Van Wijk, thanking him for his service to the community 
during the war. Osmond remarks how the war had created many regrettable incidents 
and unwanted hostility in the community, but concluded with his belief that the ties of 
friendship and magnanimity of community leaders like Van Wijk had helped to keep 
Heidelberg intact.747 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
743 A. Thompson: The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939, pp. 644-645. 
744 G. Cuthbertson & A. Jeeves: The Many-sided Struggle for Southern Africa, 1899-1902, pp. 3, 15. 
745 “Heidelberg se Rebel Bellingan uit stoere Boere geslag,” supplement to Die Burger, 11 July 1998. 
746 M. Rothmann: My beskeie deel: 'n outobiografiese vertelling, p. 150. 
747 (DRCA) K-DIV 1424: Letter from W Osmond, 6 July 1906. 
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Conclusion 
 
The South African War is widely acknowledged to have had a significant 
impact on altering the course of South African development. Although the 
antecedents of Afrikaner Nationalism are regularly identified and debated, the war has 
come to be accepted as an influential event in the creation of Afrikaner ethnic 
solidarity and cultural identity. Yet, historiographic consensus holds that the war’s 
immediate aftermath was less instrumental in establishing Afrikaner cultural 
consciousness and identity than the cultural mobilisation drive of the twenties and the 
issue over participation in the First and Second World Wars. That said, the memory of 
the South African War was employed to further the nationalist agenda in the first half 
of the twentieth century. Emphasis was placed on the bitterness regarding the British 
scorched earth policy and the deaths of Afrikaner women and children in 
concentration camps. Internal division and regional deviations in allegiance were 
glossed over in the drive for cultural solidarity, and the memory of the war as it was 
experienced in the former Boer Republics was extended to a national level.  The role 
of the Cape Colony in the war was omitted in order to promote a unitary version of 
the past that complied with the myths of Afrikaner Nationalism. Although acceptance 
of this version was facilitated by the passing of time and a more susceptible, younger 
generation, its adoption by Cape Afrikaners seems perplexing, considering the 
historical development of the Cape Colony.  
A century of British rule had created complexities in the allegiance of Cape 
Afrikaners. While allowing the Cape Dutch to retain many of their existing freedoms, 
British paternalism had infused the Cape with new rights and privileges, resulting in 
the emergence of a hybrid culture. Cape Afrikaners shared the British affinity for the 
monarchy and prized their rights as British citizens, but remained culturally distinct 
from the British. Despite these complexities, the Afrikaner intelligentsia in the Cape 
Colony came to determine the course of the Nationalist agenda in the decades 
following the war. Understanding how the war impacted on Cape Afrikaner identity 
is, therefore, vital in accounting for this discrepancy. The significance of the war’s 
impact on the Cape Colony and its subsequent consequences for South Africa, have 
received relatively scant coverage and, while indispensible, the majority of studies are 
limited to the periods preceding and following the war. Only a handful of studies on 
the war in the Cape exist, and very few attempt to address the issue at hand.  General 
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works on the South Africa War tend to rely on the republican experience of war to 
account for the formation of cultural consciousness and ethnic solidarity. Blanket 
explanations tend to be vague, and fail to identify the significance of the war’s impact 
on the Cape. A need exists for a more detailed and comprehensive synthesis that 
accounts for historical and regional contexts vital to understanding the impact of the 
war and its consequences for the subsequent development of South Africa.  
This thesis has attempted to bridge the divide by using the case study of 
Heidelberg to illustrate the complexities in allegiance among Cape Afrikaners, and 
how the war challenged their hybrid identities to create the cultural consciousness and 
ethnic solidarity vital to the emergence of Afrikaner Nationalism. Investigation into 
the history of Heidelberg revealed that the town’s origins and cultural composition 
conformed to general patterns of development in the Cape Colony during the 
nineteenth century. The rural community, composed mainly of Dutch/Afrikaner 
farmers who had benefited from the economic opportunities and infrastructure of 
British rule, was centred around the large Dutch Reformed Church congregation. 
Contact with English merchants and access to new markets, had created a landed 
gentry as well as strengthening the status of wealthy remnants from the Company 
period. Dutch ranks and offices like field cornets, were retained and invested with 
enhanced power under British rule. For the wealthy farmers responsible for the 
establishment of the new congregation and town, the church provided them with the 
opportunity for social distinction, as well as a means of investment. The new social 
stratification at the Cape was the result of an amalgamation of the old Dutch rankings 
and the Victorian class system. The wealthiest Afrikaner farmers moved into the 
traditionally British urban sphere, and started to anglicise as a result of intermarriage, 
access to education and the desire for social distinction. As Heidelberg contained only 
a small British component, anglicised Afrikaners dominated the urban sphere and 
were responsible for the progressive attempts at modernising the town at the turn of 
the century.  
At the start of the war, cultural identity at the Cape was fragmentary and 
complex, composed of varying allegiances which seemed to contradict one another. 
Cape Afrikaners had no appetite for war nor republicanism and enjoyed their benefits 
as British subjects, but condoned the war due to extensive family ties with the 
republics. The war challenged the hybrid cultural identity of Cape Afrikaners, by 
compelling them to participate or to display their support for a war against the ZAR 
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and OFS. In Heidelberg, displays of loyalty manifested themselves mainly through 
service in the Town Guard, mounted units and local police force. For the urbanised 
Anglo-Afrikaners, enrolment in these units may have been an expression of their 
progressiveness and Anglo credentials. For first generation British inhabitants, 
displays of loyalty may have seemed a natural expression of their heritage. Despite 
ideological leanings, tangible displays of loyalty during the war may have been 
inspired by other factors. Store owners and merchants may have used enrolment as a 
calculated display of loyalty to elicit special concessions while subject to martial law. 
To others who had already served in some law enforcement capacity, service in these 
units came as a natural extension. Genealogical records also revealed family patterns 
of involvement in law enforcement at Heidelberg. Economic motivations may also 
have inspired participation. The war effectively killed off the local artisan economy 
by commandeering horses and banning possession of horseshoes, harnesses and nails. 
Employment records of those involved in law enforcement reveal that most had been 
artisans prior to the war, while others were impoverished farmers living in close 
proximity to town. These findings seem to confirm Thompson’s studies on regional 
patterns of loyalty, and identify the need for a better understanding of the motivations 
behind displays of loyalty during the war. 
At the centre of the community lay the DRC, which had become an influential 
component in Cape Afrikaner identity since the introduction of British rule. Under 
British governance, Dutch Reformed churches proliferated and the lack of 
interference from the government in church affairs informed a deference to authority 
that was passed onto Afrikaner congregations. The evangelical revivals in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, to which Heidelberg congregations bared witness on 
several occasions, also inspired a conservative sense of obedience to authority. While 
the DRC refrained from involvement in the politics of the war, it did declare the 
conflict as immoral and opted to show support for the republics by way of donations 
and relief missions. At Heidelberg, the DRC minister became increasingly concerned 
over the plight of the republics and eventually applied for leave to do relief work in 
the OFS.  
Like the church, loyalty to the British monarchy formed an essential part of 
Cape Afrikaner identity during the war. Most regarded the monarchy as removed 
from the war and a symbol of incorruptibility as opposed to the capitalist agitators and 
oppressive imperial politicians. As such, the Duke and Duchess of Kent and 
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Cornwall, received a warm welcome at the Cape during their visit in 1901. 
Heidelberg’s Municipal Council applied to send a welcoming delegation but was 
denied access due to the outbreak of plague in the rural areas of the Cape Colony. 
Similar affection was displayed on the death of Queen Victoria at the start of 1901. 
Allegiances among Cape Afrikaners were further complicated by their ties 
with the Boer Republics. In the case of Heidelberg, these ties were much more 
concrete than the superficial statements which studies on the war tend to make about 
shared language and religion between Afrikaners in the Cape and the republics. 
Genealogical records indicated that the community of Heidelberg had extensive 
family connections in the OFS. Concerns over family members involved in the war 
inspired sympathy and  complicated allegiance. Even individuals in the Town Guard 
and law enforcement had family members in the republics fighting on the Boer side. 
Further complications resulted from the presence of large numbers of POWs and 
exiles from the republics. In the early stages of the war, before the intensification of 
martial law, troublesome individuals and prisoners on parole were sent to live with 
families at the Cape. Undoubtedly, their presence transformed the distant and abstract 
war into a reality for many at Heidelberg. Although official documentation regarding 
the practice is limited, its effects on the sympathy and allegiance of Cape Afrikaners 
definitely warrants further investigation. Like the majority of towns in the Cape, 
notable incidents based on sympathy for the republics that resulted in hostility 
towards authority at Heidelberg were limited and subtle. Most incidents were 
prosecuted under civil law and revealed how community members went to lengths to 
protect one another from military prosecution despite their differences regarding the 
war. 
The primary challenge to Cape Afrikaner identity manifested itself through the 
application of martial law. Imperial-minded politicians like Milner disliked the 
complexities in Cape society and settled to resolve them by installing British 
hegemony. The military authorities responsible for the administration of martial law 
were unfamiliar and impatient with the complexities in allegiance at the Cape. Many 
distrusted Afrikaners, and became frustrated as a result of the disagreements between 
the military command and the Cape government regarding the application of martial 
law. Frustration filtered down to the local level and exacerbated the arbitrary way in 
which martial law was enforced. At the heart of the clash between authorities and 
Cape Afrikaners, were two very different interpretations of loyalty. To Afrikaners, the 
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military and politicians seemed to espouse a completely foreign notion of British 
citizenship. To the British, Afrikaners seemed blatantly disloyal by sympathising with 
the republics and refusing to participate in the defence of the Colony. The situation 
was compounded by the military’s lack of experience in the use of martial law over a 
large European population. Heidelberg earned the ire and disfavour of the regional 
British military commander, whose exposure to British military culture and 
impatience with local customs, resulted in a lack of trust in local officials and law 
enforcement. In Heidelberg, the local justice of the peace was not granted the 
authority to issue the community with the passes and permits needed under martial 
law, and the local jail could not be used for the incarceration of martial law offenders.  
The situation was aggravated by a further number of factors. Heidelberg’s 
history of isolation and administrative uncertainty meant that the local inhabitants had 
grown accustomed to a degree of autonomy that was incompatible with the demands 
of martial law. The age and familiarity of local civil commissioners with the 
community eroded their trustworthiness in the eyes of the military. The presence of 
military intelligence agents inclined towards exaggeration prejudiced the already 
skittish authorities towards the community. Enforcing martial law was unpopular with 
local law enforcement, and this reluctance had effectively discredited the local 
policing units in the eyes of the military. The appointment of a commandant with 
criminal tendencies also severely hampered the trust of the local community. 
Under martial law, the rights and privileges which Cape Afrikaners had grown 
accustomed to under British rule were effectively nullified and they felt increasingly 
singled out for persecution. Martial law threatened the constitutional rights, property, 
livelihoods, language and social power base of rural Afrikaners in the Cape. In 
Heidelberg, where the majority of inhabitants were farmers, the expropriation of tools, 
firearms, food supplies and animals by the military threatened the livelihoods of 
farmers and violated their basic rights as British citizens. As farmers in Heidelberg 
relied heavily on draught animals for farming, the military practice of commandeering 
horses was especially unpopular and disruptive. The Dutch language came under fire 
during the war, and at Heidelberg, the Municipal Council was admonished for failing 
to publish the town’s regulations in English. Integral to the economic security of Cape 
farmers was access and control over farm labour. The war lured many Coloured farm 
labourers to abscond from their duties by providing them with opportunities for better 
pay and dignity in service of the British military. Heidelberg was no exception, and 
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the magistrate’s files are filled with cases of labourers absconding from the employ of 
farmers.  
The creation of the CDF to protect the Cape from external and internal threats 
often resulted in clashes between the old and new forms of authority. The war 
intensified existing tensions in communities and volunteers often abused their new 
found authority to settle grudges and upend the social hierarchy. In the case of 
Heidelberg, the authority and social status of field cornets were challenged by 
individuals in mounted units like the DMP and DMT. While most field cornets were 
loyal and provided intelligence reports to authorities, many resigned due to the 
distrust by the military and the assault on their authority by those of a lower social 
standing. The role of class conflict in the enforcement of martial law and its influence 
on the formation of Afrikaner ethnic solidarity in the Cape Colony is an unexplored 
dimension of the war that warrants further investigation, especially in light of the 
rapidly deteriorating archival material of the Colonial Defence Force. 
The military takeover of the courts in April 1901, effectively suspended the 
power of civil authorities, and combined with arbitrary application of martial law, 
made a mockery of the British ultimatum regarding the Uitlander franchise. In 
Heidelberg, the civil courts were closed for 6 months, and members of the community 
were entrapped and prosecuted for martial law violations by over-zealous members of 
law enforcement. Despite the total assault to which martial law had exposed them, 
community response was muted. Yet, martial law was probably the most influential 
factor in altering allegiances and fostering cultural consciousness and solidarity 
among Cape Afrikaners. The administration and enforcement of martial law 
challenged not only the entrenched rights and hierarchies of Cape Afrikaners, but also 
threatened to resolve the complexities which characterised the hybrid cultural identity 
which had existed prior to the war.  
The story of Heidelberg diverged from the general trend in the Cape when it 
was attacked by Boer commandos on 13 September 1901. The ferocity of the battle 
and the violent death of the young rebel in town, changed the war from a distant 
conflict into a local reality, and put a face on a hitherto faceless and abstract 
enemy/brother. The damage inflicted on private property and demands posed by 
invading commandos during this period was not unlike the challenge to the rights of 
local inhabitants under martial law. The assaults on property and bodily harm inflicted 
upon residents of the community affronted the local population and severely 
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dampened sympathies for the republics and mitigated some of the dissatisfaction 
regarding local law enforcement. Yet, the reprisals against the local population by  
military authorities following the battle probably left the issue unresolved. 
 
The end of the war resulted in the withdrawal of the military and the reinstatement of 
civilian authority. The abrupt departure of the military created a power vacuum in the 
Cape and dismantled the power base and credibility of loyalists. Many feared reprisals 
from their fellow countrymen and resented the lack of reward for their wartime 
service. At Heidelberg, loyalist elements of the community struggled to recoup the 
losses incurred in support of the military preceding and following the battle. As 
financial restitution was the purview of civil authorities and the Martial Law Board, 
many loyalist appeals to the military for assistance went unanswered. At Heidelberg 
loyalist losses were exacerbated by flood damages resulting from heavy rains. Despite 
numerous appeals for help, military authorities did not intervene.  
In general, pre-war circumstances at the Cape were restored after the military 
withdrawal, and acts of retribution were minimal in comparison with the former 
republics. Although the bonds of friendship, mutual dependence and relief over the 
ending of the war did much to aid reconciliation, some minor incidents of retribution 
did occur at Heidelberg. Most notable were incidents involving the Dutch Reformed 
Church, which had generally purported to be in favour of reconciliation. The incidents 
highlight the importance of cultural institutions like the church for subscribing 
acceptable behaviour related to cultural identity. The role of the church also 
foreshadowed the ethnic mobilisation of Afrikaners in the twenties and thirties, and 
their experiences in campaigning and relief work placed the clergy on the frontline of 
future cultural mobilisation. 
An interesting anomaly at Heidelberg was the fact that reprisals were mostly 
aimed at anglicised Afrikaner loyalists instead of first generation British immigrants. 
The possibly exists that the betrayal of locals with Afrikaner heritage was considered 
more despicable than acts of loyalty by persons of British origin. Recently arrived 
people of pure British descent, like Hanson and Fiveash, were probably regarded as 
removed from the internal community strife and viewed in much the same way as the 
monarchy. The fact that reprisals were aimed mainly at local English persons and 
anglicised Afrikaners is indicative of the levels of tension and animosity the war 
created within the  community, and may also account for Afrikaners’ continued 
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affinity for the monarchy well into the twentieth century. Although reprisals were 
never overtly political and limited to acts of social shaming, a long term trend 
emerged in which the community of Heidelberg acquired a distinctly Afrikaner 
character that concealed its pre-war cosmopolitan nature. English and anglicised 
Afrikaner individuals who had supported the British war effort moved to the southern 
suburbs of Cape Town after the war. The phenomenon predates later trends of 
separation between English and Afrikaans communities resulting from the pressure 
and subsequent failure of anglicisation efforts during the Reconstruction period. The 
war in the Cape may indeed have accelerated ethnic exclusivity, although in a more 
complex manner than traditional narratives based on republican bitterness regarding 
British atrocities. Yet, for all their teleological significance, bitterness and divisions 
regarding the war in Heidelberg and the rest of the Cape Colony remained subdued. 
The effects of the war would only be realised by a new generation of culturally 
conscious Afrikaners in the decades that were to follow. 
This work has aimed to demonstrate how the South African War as 
experienced by the people of the Cape had significant consequences for South African 
society in the first half of the twentieth century. Although not advocating a Cape-
centric interpretation of the impact of the South African War, it does acknowledge the 
importance of the war’s effects in creating the southern nationalist intelligentsia 
which came to determine the Afrikaner Nationalist agenda in the decades following 
the war. British influence in the Cape in the century prior to the war had significantly 
altered Dutch culture to create a complex and hybrid cultural identity among Cape 
Afrikaners. The war placed Cape Afrikaners in the unfavourable position of hosting 
an imperial war aimed against the Boer Republics. This study has illustrated the level 
of family interconnectedness between the Cape and the republics, and has attempted 
to restore complexity to the issue of allegiance by transcending synthetic divisions in 
its examination of the motivations behind displays of loyalty and sympathy. The 
introduction of an imperial interpretation of British citizenship collided with the 
nuanced allegiances of Cape Afrikaner identity.  
Political and military authorities unfamiliar with the traditions at the Cape 
could not fathom its peculiarities and misconstrued them as disloyalty. To Cape 
Afrikaners, those representing this imperial ideology were foreign outsiders who 
seemed intent on cultural discrimination. This study has demonstrated how cultural 
incompatibility and administrative frustration created  mutual distrust between 
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civilians and authorities, resulting in the aggravation of pre-existing tensions and the 
harsher application of martial law. The introduction of martial law effectively 
mitigated the rights and privileges of Cape inhabitants, as well as challenging their 
social distinctions and sources of power. As an unintended result, powerful 
antecedents to ethnic solidarity and cultural awareness among Cape Afrikaners were 
created, which held far-reaching consequences for the evolution of South African 
society. 
This thesis has illustrated the value of local history, especially the use of 
micro-histories to add valuable context to documentary sources, as well as using 
multiple local histories to form an aggregated mosaic of national history. The first 
section has revealed how wartime responses were tempered by the very regional and 
local patterns of socio-economic and cultural development. While these developments 
seem to confirm wider historical developments in Cape society, a localised or regional 
framework for interpreting responses to the war would undoubtedly lead to new 
discoveries regarding the war in the Cape.  
Yet, studies of the impact of the South African War in the Cape are still few 
and far between. Without companion pieces which could be used for comparison 
studies, the story of the war in the Cape could remain mired in disconnected pockets 
of local history or even revert back to older narratives that gloss over regional and 
local responses to the conflict. The impact of the war on Cape society was an 
important component in the development of South African society, which merits a 
more comprehensive and in-depth analysis. Hopefully, this study has provided some 
useful insight into the possible approaches available to those interested in this very 
rich seam of South African history.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commandant Jan Lombard Theron of Theron’s Verkenningskorps (TVK) 
(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 142) 
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Figure 5 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
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Figure 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Petrus Jacobus Bellingan, the young rebel from Aberdeen. Fatally wounded during the battle 
in Heidelberg, he was probably the southernmost casualty of the South African War. 
(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 1746) 
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Figure 10 
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First Row: 
CJ Kemp, P Moolman, L De Jager, P Odendal, W Odendal, AJ Geldenhuis, H Du 
Preez, P De Jager, HJ Gildenhuys, J Van Wyk Snr 
 
 
Second Row: 
W Grove, C De Wit, GR Uys, R Miller, J Uys, EM Hoffmann Snr, Dirk Uys, A White, 
H Bosman, C Kleinhans 
 
Third Row: 
J Uys, G Odendal, D Gildenhuys, E Hoffmann, C Uys, J Uys, J Human, C De Jager, 
A Bosman, J Van Wyk, W Van Rensburg 
 
Fourth Row: 
James Munnik, E Batten, Rev AB Daneel, Rev A Stewart, JW Farrell, HR Du Preez, 
CJ Human, R Human, R Swart, James Du Preez, HM Du Preez 
 
Fifth Row: 
W Osmond, E Friedman, M Friedman, J Dickson, ET Friberg, HG Biggs, Rev 
Schierhout, HC Hopkins,  N Friedman, S Hall, S Helm 
 
Sixth Row: 
H Uys, S Klopper, W Van Wyk, M Eksteen, J Pentz, J Johnston, D Lotz, M Uys, J Rall 
Snr, L Kuntz, P Uys Snr 
 
Seventh Row: 
JL Cantrell, J Moodie, S Morrison, D Moodie, C Van Der Merwe, S Hall Jnr, P 
Hopkins, W Swart, M Gildenhuis, J Pentz 
 
Eighth Row (Bottom): 
P Lombaard, P De Villiers, P Heiberg, S Rall, J Bunford, S Bunford, M De Jager, P 
Odendal, H Uys, F Badenhorst 
 
Figure 11 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
! 168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo entitled Prominent men of Heidelberg 1900 (See previous page for list of names) 
(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 1495) 
Figure 12 
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